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Abstract 
 
 This thesis explores the role played by the second presidential administration of 
Grover Cleveland on the evolution of United States foreign policy in the mid-1890s. 
Coming at the end of a period of rapid industrialisation and national growth for the United 
States – and culminating in the War of 1898 – the mid-1890s has generally been portrayed 
as either the end of the post-Civil War era or a precursor to American empire. The second 
Cleveland administration in particular has often been overlooked by foreign policy 
historians, but it forms an anomaly in the narrative of a nation preparing to acquire an 
overseas empire. At a time when much of American politics and society was increasingly 
in favour of an assertive and expansive foreign policy, Cleveland and his Secretaries of 
State, Walter Q. Gresham and Richard Olney, enacted a policy which opposed overseas 
expansion and sought to limit the United States’ involvement in the affairs of other nations. 
 This thesis argues that, confronted by the same changing circumstances for the 
nation on the world stage which had created the public demand for a more aggressive 
foreign policy, Cleveland, Gresham and Olney set out a new template for how the United 
States should conduct itself in global affairs. This template rejected imperialist expansion 
and proposed a more limited interaction with other nations based upon legalist principles. 
It also included elements of moral duty and a belief that the United States should be an 
example to other nations. The template was formulated on a largely ad hoc basis through 
several foreign policy incidents throughout the term, but its underlying values were present 
throughout and Cleveland would ultimately propose it to the nation as a future direction for 
American foreign policy in his final Annual Message. As such, Cleveland’s template for 
foreign policy stands as an alternative vision for the evolution of U.S. foreign policy in the 
1890s.  
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Introduction 
 
 For the last century the 1890s have been viewed as a crucial decade in the evolution 
of American foreign policy. In the three decades following the Civil War the United States 
underwent dramatic changes – reconstructing the South, populating the West, building a 
transport and communications infrastructure, and creating a nation whose industrial and 
financial power rivalled that of any other. All of this combined to vastly increase the 
United States’ influence – and also its involvement – in world affairs, a fact that was 
confirmed by the War of 1898: the moment when the United States conclusively took up 
the mantle of a global power, demonstrating its military might and acquiring overseas 
territory.
1
 The significance of this moment in particular is undeniable, but it has also 
affected the way in which American foreign relations in the late 19
th
 Century are studied. 
By creating a narrative in which changes taking place in the United States and its 
interactions with the world from the 1860s until 1898 all culminated in the Spanish-
American War, historians have tended to use that event as a lens through which all of 
American foreign policy in the preceding years must be viewed. While explaining the 
origins of the war has been a vital area of historical study, this tendency to emphasise its 
position as the endpoint of foreign policy has led to some aspects of foreign policy during 
the period being ignored. One such aspect is the effect on this evolution of foreign policy 
of the personalities of the men who were directly responsible for its creation and 
implantation: the Presidents and their Secretaries of State. While the amount of attention 
given to these men has varied – Secretaries of State who are perceived as playing an active 
role in the development of U.S. foreign policy such as William Seward or James G. Blaine 
have been the subject of a great deal of study – some figures have undoubtedly received 
less than their fair share. Of these figures one of the most interesting is President Grover 
Cleveland, the only Democrat to occupy the Executive Mansion between the Civil War and 
1912. This relative lack of interest is particularly noteworthy because Cleveland’s second 
term of office immediately preceded the events of 1898 and contained numerous incidents 
in the realm of foreign policy whose effects would continue to be felt by his successor, 
William McKinley. Confronted by similar conditions to those faced by his successor, 
Cleveland and his Secretaries of State, Walter Q. Gresham and Richard Olney, formulated 
a different image of how American foreign policy should be conducted. 
                                                 
1
 The War of 1898 has been known for most of the last century as the Spanish-American War. More recent 
historians have suggested that this is something of a misnomer since it ignores the vital roles played by large 
numbers of Cubans, Puerto Ricans and Filipinos. The two terms will be used interchangeably in this work. 
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 This thesis will redress that balance by exploring the roles played by Cleveland, 
Gresham and Olney in the evolution of foreign policy in this crucial period in American 
history. In particular it will seek to discover the extent to which the personalities of these 
men affected their actions. This introduction will present an historical background essential 
to the understanding of the thesis itself, in particular by explaining the seismic changes that 
took place within the United States’ economy and society in the decades following the 
Civil War, as well as the shifts which occurred in the field of international relations with 
the rise of new powers and the decline – to varying degrees – of older ones. It was these 
changes which profoundly altered the United States’ position in global affairs and thus 
necessitated new approaches to foreign policy. The introduction will also provide a brief 
overview of Cleveland’s early life and political career from his election as sheriff of Erie 
County to his second inauguration as President of the United States. This grounding is 
necessary for the understanding of Cleveland as a man and as a politician. Finally, the 
introduction will review the most important elements of the existing literature and discuss 
the sources which will provide the foundation for the thesis. 
 
 Between the Civil War and the beginning of the 20
th
 Century the United States 
entered the modern age. In this period it underwent changes that fundamentally altered 
both domestic society and also the nation’s position in global affairs. This alteration was 
not, for the most part, a result of military power; the Civil War had demonstrated that the 
United States could recruit, equip and command a military force to rival any on the globe, 
but the rapid decline of those forces in the years following the war bore testimony to the 
nation’s inherent dislike of maintaining such forces either for reasons of principle or 
economy. Military changes would have some bearing on the United States rise to the 
position of a world power – and would, of course, be vital to the nation’s victory in the 
War of 1898 – but they were generally secondary consequences of the much greater 
changes in American industry, agriculture, commerce, and communications. Between 1870 
and 1900 wheat production rose from 254 million bushels to 599 million, and steel 
production exploded from 77,000 tons to 11.2 million in the same span.
2
 Of this growth in 
steel manufacturing nearly half of the increase took place in the 1890s.
3
 Such growth was 
indicative of changes taking place across industry and agriculture. The consequences of 
these increases were numerous and far-reaching: greater food production improved health 
and lowered food prices at home, but it also brought the United States into greater collision 
                                                 
2
 Charles W. Calhoun, ‘Introduction’, The Gilded Age: Perspectives on the Origins of Modern America, 2nd 
Edition, Ed. Charles W. Calhoun, (Lanham, MD.: Rowman Littlefield Publishers Ltd., 2007), p. 2 
3
 Nell Irvin Painter, Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877-1919, (New York: WW. Norton & 
Company, 1987, reprint New York: WW. Norton & Company, 2008), p. xiii 
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with other major agricultural producers such as Canada, Russia, and Argentina in the 
global marketplace. Lengthy diplomatic battles were waged between Washington and Paris 
and Berlin over the quality of American foodstuffs being shipped to European dinner 
tables. Similar confrontations occurred with Great Britain and Germany over industrial 
products. One result of these clashes was a change in the landscape of domestic politics: 
with regions the size of European nations owing their prosperity to agriculture, industry, 
mining or commerce, sectional divisions took on a new dimension. The issue of import and 
export tariffs in particular became a key subject of domestic politics throughout the 1880s 
and 1890s and beyond.  Many of the changes were self-reciprocating with new 
technologies made possible by the growth in industrial output helping to facilitate further 
increases in production. Where in 1800 each acre had required 56 man hours of labour to 
produce a wheat crop, in 1900 – thanks to mechanisation – it required only 15.4 Changes in 
transport and communications infrastructure in particular had a profound effect on almost 
every aspect of American society. Between 1870 and 1890 the nation’s railroad mileage 
nearly quadrupled.
5
 This increase allowed easier transportation of both agricultural and 
industrial produce, changing Americans’ diets and lifestyles while also making it easier to 
export products to global markets. Much of the growth of the American steel industry was 
devoted to the expansion of this transport infrastructure with 2,672,000 tons of rails 
produced in 1900.
6
 
These dramatic increases were themselves fuelled, to a large extent, by 
demographic changes: the population of the United States nearly doubled between 1870 
and 1900, reaching nearly 76 million.
7
 Much of this growth was the result of new waves of 
immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe with the result that the foreign born 
population rose by 86%.
8
 These new arrivals fuelled the growth of American industry: in 
1870 52% of workers were employed in agriculture, by 1900 60% were employed in 
industry.
9
 Together this rise in population, new wave of immigration, and growth of 
industry brought about rapid urbanisation. Where in 1870 the United States had contained 
25 cities with a population of 50,000 or more, in 1900 it contained 78, with 3 having a 
population over one million.
10
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The growing power of the United States was not the only factor to affect global 
affairs in the late 19
th
 Century. While European powers still dominated much of the globe, 
the balance of power within Europe itself was undergoing profound changes. The 
unification of Germany and the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War had marked 
the decline of one power and the rise of another. In the Southern Mediterranean the newly 
unified nation of Italy at least held the potential to be a power, while in the East the 
Ottoman Empire faced challenges from both within and without, raising the prospect of the 
Russian Navy gaining access to the Mediterranean. Great Britain remained the dominant 
global power, but found itself increasingly challenged by both Russia and Germany – as 
well as the United States – in terms of industrial output, commerce, and the control of 
colonies around the world. With most of Africa claimed by European powers, few areas of 
the globe remained outside the European sphere of influence. The independent republics of 
Central and South America formed a major exception to this rule, raising fears in some 
quarters that a new ‘Scramble for Latin America’ might follow the one which had taken 
place in Africa. Finally, in the Far East, Japan was undergoing its own internal changes, 
developing into the major local power in the region – a fact which was welcomed by many 
in both Britain and the United States. These changes in the global balance of power were 
unsettling to many, as were the potential changes to modern warfare produced by new 
technologies. In his 1909 novel The War in the Air, H.G. Wells depicted a global war in 
which armadas of airships fought one another for control of the sky, sinking fleets of 
battleships and bombing New York, London, Berlin and other great cities into submission. 
Tellingly the major threats depicted by Wells were German militancy and a secret alliance 
between Japan and China which invaded the United States.  
Beyond the world of fiction, however, none of the rising powers – Germany, Japan, 
Russia, Italy – held the same potential as the United States. In the words of Paul Kennedy, 
“The United States seemed to have all the economic advantages which some of the others 
possessed in part, but none of their disadvantages” [his italics].11 Clear evidence that this 
rise was recognised for what it was at the time is given by the decision by the major 
European powers to upgrade their representatives in Washington to full ambassadors in 
1892 – a gesture which Congress agreed to return without debate a year later.12 The rise 
was not always a smooth process, nor was it consciously directed or preordained – it was 
the result of numerous factors at both a domestic and an international level feeding one 
enough to produce an outcome which was nearly accidental. Blessed with abundant natural 
                                                 
11
 Paul Kennedy The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 
to 2000, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), p. 243 
12
 George Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), p. 300 
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resources, almost limitless space to house and feed its growing population, and the security 
of 3,000 miles of ocean separating it from its European rivals, the United States was 
uniquely well-placed to succeed in the modern age. This fact has led one historian to 
suggest that “Some nations achieve greatness; the United States had greatness thrust upon 
it.”13 If this is true, then it was individual policymakers such as Grover Cleveland and his 
Secretaries of State who were responsible for moulding how that greatness took shape. 
 
The domestic political system which produced men such as Cleveland, Gresham 
and Olney was a deeply divisive one. The political landscape was divided along lines both 
partisan and sectional as well as by issues of wealth and race. The legacy of the Civil War 
still influenced events a quarter of a century after Appomattox both in the sectional divides 
of electoral politics and in the unresolved problems resulting from the conflict which 
occasionally resurfaced in Congress, such as the ownership of captured rebel battle flags 
and the payment of pensions to veterans.  
For the Democratic Party that legacy had meant a long, slow return to power in 
Washington with the Party first regaining control of the House of Representatives in 1875 
and of the Senate in 1879. While control of Congress remained largely equal over the 
following two decades – with the Democrats usually winning the House and the 
Republicans usually winning the Senate – Cleveland’s victories in 1884 and 1892 marked 
the only Democratic presidential successes of the period. Partisan divisions were among 
the fiercest in the nation’s history, but many of the issues at stake would be largely 
unrecognisable to modern voters. Two subjects which would prove crucial to Cleveland’s 
second term were tariff reform and the question of whether the national currency should be 
based on gold, silver, or some combination of the two – matters of little interest to the 
electorate of the 21
st
 Century, but of immense importance to those of the late 19
th
. Beyond 
the two main parties, the period saw strong showings for third parties who fed off the 
sectional divisions in the country and placed a special focus on currency reform. The 
Greenback Labour Party sent 13 representatives to the 46
th
 U.S. Congress in 1879 and 10 
to the 47
th
 Congress two years later and also had reasonable showings in the presidential 
elections of 1880 and 1884. More significantly, the People’s Party had a brief, but 
impressive, existence in the 1890s which saw them draw upon the dissatisfaction of 
farming communities of the South and the Western plains, as well as mining communities 
of the Rocky Mountains to win seats in both the House and the Senate as well as several 
State Governorships. In the presidential election of 1892 James B. Weaver won over a 
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 Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power, (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and World, 1961), p. 270 
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million votes and may have helped to swing the election to Cleveland.
14
 Four years later, 
with the Democrats positioning themselves behind William Jennings Bryan as supporters 
of silver currency, the People’s Party also nominated Bryan as their presidential nominee 
thus essentially destroying the Party as a separate entity, but also fundamentally altering 
the Democratic Party. 
Sectional issues played a major role in late 19
th
 Century politics, both nationally 
and within the two main parties. Presidential elections tended to show a clear North-South 
divide with Republicans winning the Northeast and Mid-West and Democrats sweeping 
the South. Elections were generally decided by swing states such as Connecticut, New 
York, New Jersey and Indiana while both parties saw the western states as a potential 
future counterweight to their opponent’s heartlands. This desire to capitalise on the 
growing number of western states would see the Democrats repudiating their own 
president in 1896 in order to adopt a pro-silver platform designed to appeal to plains 
farmers and mining communities. Such economic divisions between sections – the 
industrial and mercantile Northeast, the agrarian South and plains, and the mining 
mountain states – also led to a variety of demands as to how the nation’s foreign policy 
should best be directed, whether towards the industrial states of Europe, the raw materials 
of Central and South America, or the almost mythical potential markets of Asia. 
The late 19
th
 Century was also remarkable for the extremely high level of public 
interest in politics. The turnout for elections, in percentage terms, was enormous with the 
presidential election of 1896 seeing almost 80% of eligible white male voters cast their 
ballot.
15
 The United States’ global reputation for almost pathological enthusiasm for 
partisan democracy is demonstrated by the French author Jules Verne’s decision to make a 
political rally – which resembles a mass brawl – the first thing that Phileas Fogg 
encounters upon his arrival in San Francisco in the 1873 novel Around the World in 80 
Days. This places politics in the United States on a par with national stereotypes such as an 
elephant and mystical religious ceremonies in India, and an opium den in Hong Kong. This 
enthusiasm went beyond mere party loyalty, however, with the late 19
th
 Century seeing a 
decline in party events such as picnics, parades and bonfires, replaced by a genuine attempt 
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to appeal to voters intellectually through speaking tours and pamphlets which were 
published in their millions.
16
 
For many years this period of American political history has been portrayed as a 
period of corruption and nepotism, but more recent scholarship has contested this view. 
This scholarship argues that there has been too much emphasis placed on the concept of 
the ‘Gilded Age’ – a name which suggests venality, fakery and fraud – and a too ready 
acceptance of the exaggerations of Mark Twain and the partisan accounts of newspaper 
editors of the time.
17
 While both parties accused each other of dirty tricks – most notably 
attempts to bribe voters in marginal states – it is extremely difficult to verify any such 
accusations. Undoubtedly some late 19
th
 Century elections saw attempted smear campaigns 
against the candidates – Grover Cleveland’s first election being a major instance – but they 
were neither as ubiquitous nor as professionally executed as in modern elections. The 
power of the President to distribute government jobs as patronage to his followers certainly 
led to a certain amount of backroom dealing and helped to support the powerbases of the 
political powerbrokers in major cities such as New York and Philadelphia, but it was 
neither illegal nor markedly different from internal party politics at any point in the 
nation’s history, even if it was taken to a further extreme with approximately 200,000 
federal jobs at stake. That said, it is clear that many members of the public were concerned 
about corruption and nepotism at all levels of American politics and this concern would 
prove crucial in elevating Grover Cleveland to the presidency. 
The distribution of patronage (the spoils system) was a major strength of the 
presidency at a time when the position of chief executive was still recovering from the 
attacks against its authority during the Reconstruction era. This low ebb for the office of 
the president was well-illustrated by the dilapidated state of the White House at the time.
18
 
In the next decade Theodore Roosevelt would preside over a major repairing, 
refurbishment and redecoration of the Executive Mansion, but in the 1890s it was at best 
still reaping the benefits of President Chester A. Arthur’s refurbishment of 1881 and the 
introduction of electricity under the presidency of Benjamin Harrison.
19
 The president’s 
staff numbered roughly a dozen people and the vast majority of political business had to be 
done in person, resulting in long working days for Cleveland who was always reluctant to 
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 Edition, Ed. Charles W. Calhoun, (Lanham, MD.: 
Rowman and Littfield Publishers Ltd., 2007), p. 253 
17
 Ibid, pp. 241-242 
18
 In the 1890s the White House was still officially called the Executive Mansion, although both the press and 
the public referred to it as the White House. This thesis will use both terms. 
19
 Richard H. Collin, Theodore Roosevelt, Culture, Diplomacy, and Expansion: A New View of American 
Imperialism, (Baton Rouge, LA.: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), pp. 33-44; Allan Nevins, Grover 
Cleveland: A Study in Courage, (1932, reprint New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1966), pp. 212-213 
11 
 
delegate tasks to others. The president was, however, still clearly recognised by the public 
and press of the time to be the national head of state. While the period saw numerous 
instances of the president and Congress clashing over a variety of issues, both foreign and 
domestic, the general movement was towards an increase of presidential power and 
authority, which would eventually culminate in Theodore Roosevelt’s bully pulpit and the 
Imperial Presidency in the next century. Perhaps aiding in this was the ever-increasing 
workload being placed on Congress which forced it to become less of a forum and more of 
an administrative centre.
20
 
The late 19
th
 Century was a period of change in American government. Following 
the assassination of President James Garfield, supposedly by a disappointed office seeker, 
in 1881, the campaign to reform the nation’s civil service saw the passing of the Pendleton 
Act (1883) which sought to reduce the role of the spoils system in filling government jobs 
by making appointment and promotion a matter of competitive examination. Over the next 
decade this process placed thousands of jobs outside the patronage system – something 
which Cleveland himself played a major role in achieving – but did little to dent the 
workload of an incoming President since the size of the government was also expanding.
21
 
While the federal bureaucracy was still tiny in comparison to what it would become over 
the next century there were distinct signs that larger and more professional government 
departments were developing. In 1888 the gigantic new State, War and Navy Building was 
opened in Washington providing new office space for three government departments. If 
anything these new offices outshone the departments they housed: the State Department 
was a relatively small affair comprising only the Secretary of State, the Assistant 
Secretaries and a handful of clerks, personal secretaries and assorted office workers. 
Second Assistant Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee served the department for over 50 
years under both Republican and Democratic administrations, the majority of that time as 
Second Assistant Secretary, and thus became both a highly valued civil servant and also a 
key element of institutional memory.
22
 The ability of the men representing the United 
States overseas was also distinctly variable. While the few prestige posts were filled with 
relatively little difficulty, the task of recruiting consuls and commercial agents was a more 
difficult one, prompting Cleveland and Olney to attempt to increase the pay on offer to 
them in 1895.
23
 The promotion, when it came, of the United States’ key representatives 
                                                 
20
 Keller, Affairs of State, p. 300 
21
 Richard E. Welch, The Presidencies of Grover Cleveland, (Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 
1988), p. 61 
22
 Collin, Theodore Roosevelt, Culture, Diplomacy, and Expansion, p. 102 
23
 Grover Cleveland to Richard Olney, September 15, 1895, Reel 91, Grover Cleveland Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.; Richard Olney to Grover Cleveland, September 17, 1895, 
Reel 91, Grover Cleveland Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.; Grover 
12 
 
abroad from ministers to ambassadors was overdue and indicative of the nation’s changing 
status, but the slow growth of the State Department and the difficulties encountered in 
recruiting people for its work was indicative of the limited vision that many in Washington 
still had of the United States’ government and the nation’s place in world affairs. 
 
Grover Cleveland is hardly a well-known figure in United States history. Even to 
historians he is generally known for one of two reasons: he was the only President in 
American history to serve his two terms non-consecutively and he weighed, at his largest, 
over 300lbs. Such trivia, while of some interest (particularly in the former case), does not 
serve to throw much light on either the man or his policies. It seems almost obligatory for 
any biographer of Grover Cleveland in the last 30 years to include in their introduction 
some reference to the various polls that have been conducted amongst historians in order to 
rank the Presidents of the United States by achievement or ability. In such exercises, we 
are told, Cleveland has consistently scored well (a recent biographer describes how a 1966 
poll placed him as ‘High Average’) and yet he has not survived in the public consciousness 
because the events he oversaw were not significant enough to excite broad interest.
24
 
Cleveland has shared the fate of almost all the Chief Executives of the late 19
th
 Century 
and slipped into obscurity, but still has maintained a better reputation amongst experts than 
many of his peers. This obscurity does not mean that his work was insignificant. 
Stephen Grover Cleveland was very much a product of the American political 
system of the late 19
th
 Century. Born in Caldwell, New Jersey, in 1837, the son of a 
Presbyterian minister. His father’s career was important in shaping Cleveland’s life, first 
by moving the family to central New York state – with ministries in the towns of 
Fayetteville and Clinton – and later by forcing the young man, after his father’s death when 
Grover was 16 years old, to abandon hopes of attending college in order to support his 
mother and siblings.
25
 After a year assisting one of his older brothers who was teaching at 
a school for the blind in New York City, Cleveland headed west on his own, initially 
aiming for Cleveland, Ohio, but instead finding himself settling in Buffalo, New York. In 
Buffalo he began training for a career in the law and developed the habits of working 
diligently for long hours which would be a defining characteristic for the rest of his life. 
His legal career was marked by dogged hard work rather than by intellectual brilliance, but 
these qualities were ideally suited to the legal work of a city like Buffalo and his reputation 
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grew. Despite identifying with the Democrats as early as 1856 – Nevins notes that not only 
were they the party of solidity and conservatism at the time as Cleveland himself later 
stated, but that his friends and superiors in Buffalo were also Democrats – Cleveland does 
not appear to have had political ambitions for himself, although he worked as a volunteer 
for the Party at grassroots level from 1858.
26
 While he did not serve in the Civil War – 
justly claiming that he was obligated to support his widowed mother and hiring a substitute 
when drafted – he appears to have been fully in favour of the Union cause.27 His first 
political office came during the Civil War when he was appointed assistant district attorney 
in 1863 and his first bid for election in his own right came in 1865 when he was defeated 
in the race for district attorney. In 1870 he was persuaded to run as the Democratic 
candidate for sheriff of Erie County, serving two years, but declining to seek re-election. In 
1881, therefore, Cleveland’s experience in electoral politics was confined exclusively to 
legal roles, the last of which he had held 8 years previously. Under such circumstances it is 
surprising that he was selected by the local Democratic Party to be their nominee for the 
mayoralty race. Welch explains this decision as the result of increasing public concern 
about the city’s Republican leaders resulting from corruption and complacency and the 
Democrats’ wise decision to embrace this dissatisfaction by selecting a fresh face with a 
local reputation for hard work and honesty.
28
 In many ways this first election would define 
Cleveland’s meteoric political ascent with his reputation as a political outsider of high 
moral probity being seized upon repeatedly by Democratic leaders seeking for a candidate 
capable of winning elections first for Mayor of Buffalo, then as Governor of New York, 
and finally as President of the United States. This reputation was only increased by his 
actions in office: both in Buffalo and in the State House in Albany Cleveland exercised his 
power of veto with a regularity bordering on enthusiasm as he struck down legislation 
which he believed to be corrupt, illegal or not in the public interest. His efforts at ensuring 
the efficient use of public funds by exposing graft within the Buffalo city government 
swiftly earned him the interest of state party leaders and on January 1, 1883 – exactly two 
years after taking the oath of office as Mayor of Buffalo – Cleveland was inaugurated as 
Governor of New York. The continuation of such practices at a state-wide level won him 
national attention as well as the support of disaffected Independent Republicans – proudly 
adopting the disparaging nickname of Mugwumps – who were opposed to the corruption 
inherent in the spoils system and who played a small role in helping Cleveland gain first 
the Democratic nomination and then the presidency itself. Running against James G. 
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Blaine, a man who – rightly or wrongly – had a reputation for involvement in cases of graft 
and corruption, Cleveland’s image as a man of great honesty and probity was a major asset 
in helping him to achieve victory in a close race, although one biographer has concluded 
that Cleveland’s victory was most likely the result of a schism within the Republican Party 
and thus “was perhaps less the result of his superior political morals than the result of the 
machinations of Roscoe Conkling, a man whose political ethics were far more suspect than 
those of James G. Blaine.”29 Whatever the actual reason for Cleveland’s victory, he entered 
office in 1885 with a reputation as the champion of honesty and good governance, a 
reputation that had, if anything, been bolstered by his reaction to a sex scandal that had 
broken during his election campaign. Confronted with allegations that he had fathered a 
child with a woman in Buffalo, Cleveland faced the accusations head-on, accepting the 
possibility that he was indeed the child’s father and famously sending a telegram to his 
supporters instructing them to “Tell The Truth” – with proof of his developing political 
instincts being provided by the subsequent leaking of this telegram to the press.
30
 By 
engaging with the issue openly and supporting an investigation which subsequently cleared 
him of any misconduct beyond the initial act of fathering the child Cleveland was able to 
emerge from the scandal largely unscathed. 
Cleveland’s first term as President was relatively free of incident in regard to 
foreign policy and he himself showed little inclination to actively seek to promote an 
agenda. He did make his position on foreign policy matters clear soon after entering office 
when he withdrew the Frelinghuysen-Zavala treaty – which would have granted the USA 
the right to construct a trans-isthmian canal in Nicaragua – from Senate consideration on 
the grounds that it made Nicaragua a protectorate of the United States and threatened a 
clash with Great Britain over its violation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850 which 
expressly forbade the independent construction of such a canal by either Britain or the 
United States.
31
 He also refused to submit the Berlin Convention which had been 
negotiated over the previous winter by the United States and several European powers and 
aimed to guarantee neutrality and free trade for the Congo basin on the grounds that the 
United States had no business involving itself in European imperialism in Africa.
32
 After 
this early assertiveness, however, the major incidents of Cleveland’s first term were a pair 
of long-running disputes with Great Britain over fishing rights off the coast of Canada and 
seal hunting in the Northern Pacific, and a standoff with Germany and Great Britain over 
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the independence of Samoa which resulted in an unsatisfactory tripartite protectorate over 
the islands which would resurface in Cleveland’s second term. The first term was 
bookended by events relating to Latin America – a brief deployment of marines in 
Colombia to help restore order in the province of Panama in April 1885, and the issuing of 
invitations for a Pan-American conference in Washington to discuss issues of trade which 
was ultimately presided over by the Benjamin Harrison administration.
33
 Overall, 
Cleveland’s first term saw little action in terms of foreign policy, but it did demonstrate 
some important themes in terms of his personal vision on such matters: an adherence to 
George Washington’s strictures against entangling alliances, and an instinctive dislike of 
colonialist expansion and foreign adventures. These themes would provide a foundation for 
much of his administration’s conduct of foreign policy during his second term. 
Before that second term, however, Cleveland had the unique experience of a four 
year period out of office. This time saw him living, for the most part, in New York City 
and this may have had a bearing on his conduct upon returning to the Executive Mansion 
in 1893. During his time in New York, Cleveland spent much of his time in the company 
of wealthy, influential men such as journalist Richard Watson Gilder and the financier E.C. 
Benedict, both of whom would remain friends and confidants of Cleveland after his re-
election. These friendships have prompted one biographer to suggest that his second term 
in office saw less sensitivity to the needs of the ordinary working men who he had known 
in Buffalo and a greater interest in the needs of financiers.
34
 This view is debatable on two 
counts: firstly because Cleveland’s Buffalo friends were often members of the local legal 
profession like himself and so not quite the ordinary working men of America, and 
secondly because the accusation that Cleveland was beholden to Eastern financiers was 
routinely levelled at him by his opponents on the subjects of tariff and currency reform 
who recognised it as a means of appealing to Western and Southern farmers. That said, it is 
true that Cleveland’s new social circle was undoubtedly loftier than his previous one and 
that, with his second term dominated by the financial crash of 1893 and the recession that 
followed, he did indeed devote more time to financial issues with most of his decisions 
clearly more likely to directly benefit bankers and investors than farmers and factory 
workers. These decisions were almost certainly motivated by a genuine belief that they 
were best for the nation as a whole, but with little financial expertise of his own it is not 
surprising that Cleveland relied upon the advice of those better informed on such matters. 
Cleveland returned to the White House on March 4, 1893. He had defeated 
Harrison – and the Populist candidate James B. Weaver who received more than a million 
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votes – by a majority of nearly 400,000 votes out of a total of nearly 12,000,000 cast. In 
the Electoral College he received 277 votes to 145 for Harrison and 22 for Weaver. In 
Congress the Democrats followed up their crushing victory in the midterm elections of 
1890 by gaining control of the Senate and maintaining a sizable majority in the House of 
Representatives. On paper at least Cleveland had a perfect opportunity to enact whatever 
agenda he saw fit. All that would change with the economic crash which struck the country 
shortly after the inauguration – although it is debatable whether the fractured condition of 
the Democratic Party would have made for smooth relations between the Executive and 
Congress if the crash had not occurred. In terms of foreign affairs, Cleveland returned to 
Washington without an agenda, but as George Herring has written about the man who 
would occupy the White House a century after Cleveland: “in foreign policy U.S. 
presidents do not have to seek trouble, it finds them.”35 
 
Grover Cleveland is not the easiest president for a historian to study. He does not 
appear to have ever devoted significant time to introspection and he never wrote an 
autobiography. The closest that he came to producing such a work was in a series of 
lectures given to students at Princeton University in the early years of the 20
th
 Century 
having moved to Princeton, New Jersey, after leaving office for the second and final time 
in 1897. These lectures, subsequently compiled in a single volume entitled Presidential 
Problems, give some insight into Cleveland and his advisors’ thinking in four incidents 
which he considered to be of the greatest significance in his two terms as president. Even 
these, however, do not give a complete record of exactly what the administration did and, 
more significantly, exactly why they did it. Even when setting the record straight, 
Cleveland was somewhat reticent on the subject of motives. This problem is magnified in 
Cleveland’s own records. The Cleveland Papers, kept by the Library of Congress, provide 
a significant archive of letters and telegrams received by him over the course of his life, 
but is frustratingly lacking in material that he wrote himself, with letterbooks only covering 
his first term in office. The Index to the Papers suggests that Cleveland had a “somewhat 
casual attitude” towards his papers – rarely keeping copies of letters that he wrote in 
longhand, and subsequently scattering drafts of messages, addresses, proclamations, and 
executive orders by using them to comply with requests for autographs.
36
 The Index also 
describes his handwriting as “neat but not easily legible” which might be considered 
generous. More significantly, Cleveland preferred to conduct government business with 
Members of Congress and his Cabinet in face-to-face discussions, and the papers are 
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replete with tantalising references to conversations of which no record has been kept. The 
surprising result of this is that it is often easier to discern the motives and reasoning behind 
the administration’s actions for events which took place during the summer months when 
Cleveland – in common with all members of Washington’s political community – fled the 
stifling heat of the city for the cooler climes (and better fishing) of Grey Gables, his home 
on the Massachusetts coast. During these times when Cleveland was handling 
governmental matters – which, with Congress out of session, were usually related to 
foreign affairs – at arm’s length, the need for clarity of understanding meant that both 
Cleveland and his Secretaries of State tended to express themselves much more fully (and 
also more frequently) in their letters than they would when both were in Washington. 
 
This thesis is founded upon an acceptance of the hypothesis that American foreign 
policy evolved in the late 19
th
 Century as a result of the development of the nation’s 
industry and commerce which changed its position in relation to other world powers and 
expanded its contact with the wider world. This thesis also seeks, however, to explore the 
role played by individual policymakers in that evolutionary process and, as such, argues 
that there are limits to the applicability of the industrial development hypothesis. A failure 
to acknowledge such limits has been a recurring flaw amongst the historians who have 
espoused it as a theory dating back to the 1920s. This has consequently resulted in an over-
emphasis of the role played by American business in both the conduct of individual events 
and the formulation of grand policy as well as a tendency to downplay the impact of 
policymakers. While different historians have interpreted the impact of these economic 
influences on U.S. foreign policy in different ways, the basic theory is that first expounded 
by Charles and Mary Beard in the weighty narrative history of the United States, The Rise 
of American Civilization, first published in 1927. Beard argues that the United States 
provided a perfect situation (without royalty, aristocracy or ancient and wealthy clergy) for 
the growth of a class of industrial businessmen.
37
 With the massive development of both 
industry and finance following the Civil War this group of businessmen amassed great 
wealth and began to invest overseas, creating for themselves a period of stability that 
contrasted with the fractured and disjointed politics between the 1860s and 1890s.
38
 Thus 
Beard creates an image of a United States that came to be dominated by economic issues 
such as tariff politics.
39
 In particular he argues that the President’s power to manage 
foreign relations was a great aid to business and that the responses to the major issues in 
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American foreign affairs during the period such as the Hawaiian revolution of 1892 and the 
Cuban revolution of 1895 were rooted in the demands of American business.
40
 Thus the 
economic approach to explaining the evolution of American foreign policy emphasised the 
power of business over that of the President from the beginning. 
Beard’s theories fell out of favour in the 1940s, but were revived in the late 1950s 
and 1960s by a new generation of historians referred to as the Wisconsin School, most 
notably William Appleman Williams and Walter LaFeber. Probably Williams’ most 
influential work of the period was The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, first published in 
1959 and expanded in a second edition in 1962. This work, written in the aftermath of the 
Communist revolution in Cuba, argues that the foreign policy of the United States has been 
consistently based upon the desire to acquire and maintain markets for its manufactured 
goods as demanded by the business community. Williams traces the roots of this policy 
back to the 1890s when, he suggests, the United States faced a major internal crisis brought 
about by the closing of the frontier and increasing labour unrest and was forced to abandon 
Jacksonian laissez-faire government for a larger, more active government better suited to 
work on behalf of a new syndicalist system characterised by the rise of corporations in the 
business world.
41
 A key part of this change, Williams argues, was the widespread 
acceptance among the ruling elite that the best way to remove “the specter of chaos and 
revolution” was through an expansionist foreign policy.42 He even goes so far as to argue 
that Grover Cleveland can be seen as the President who set the tone for the United States’ 
non-colonial imperial expansion in the twentieth century.
43
  
A decade after he first published The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, Williams 
published The Roots of the Modern American Empire, a work solely based around the late 
19
th
 Century, first published in 1969. This work takes the theories of Beard that had since 
been revised by Williams himself and others such as Walter LaFeber and extends them in 
an exhaustive study of the effect of agriculture on United States foreign policy in the late 
19
th
 Century. In particular this work focuses upon the increasing political awareness of 
farming communities during the period, culminating in the rise of the Populist movement 
during the late 1880s and the eventual merger of the Populists with the Democratic Party in 
1896. As an exercise in historical research The Roots of the Modern American Empire is an 
outstanding piece of work, but it suffers severely from overstating its case. Williams 
produces reams of evidence to document the growth of American agricultural production 
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after the Civil War and the importance of those products to exports during this period, but 
he fails to make a convincing case to show that the agricultural communities were actually 
able to influence policy during this time, while his insistence upon seemingly tracing every 
major foreign policy event of the 1890s back to the influence of the agricultural 
community does strain belief.
44
 In particular, Williams over-emphasises the influence of 
the agriculturalists at the expense of marginalising other important groups including, 
strangely, the industrial workers that he had noted as an, admittedly inadvertent, influence 
on foreign policy makers in The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. Ultimately, The Roots of 
the Modern American Empire is an excellent resource for the study of American 
agriculture and its place in global trade in the late 19
th
 Century, but does not provide a 
convincing theory for the foundations of U.S. foreign policy during the period. 
Williams’ work of the 1950s was built upon by Walter LaFeber, also from the 
University of Wisconsin, who published The New Empire in 1963. Whether one agrees 
with its theory or not this work is still a definitive study of the period, basing itself in 
particular around the second Cleveland administration. The book sets out a case for an 
interpretation of American foreign policy as being dominated by business interests and the 
need for foreign markets covering successive administrations. Its main weakness is a 
tendency to emphasise the role of American businesses in the creation of foreign policy - a 
problem exemplified by its extensive use of business journals of the period for evidence - 
with the role of individual policymakers being consequently overlooked. It might also be 
argued that LaFeber is at times guilty of overstating his case and attributing events and 
policies to the industrial developments that were only tangentially related. Perhaps 
tellingly, his later work entitled The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913 presents 
a rather more measured argument and in particular places a far greater emphasis on the 
influence of competing European powers in the Americas, the Pacific and the Far East.
45
 In 
both The New Empire and The American Search for Opportunity LaFeber does discuss the 
influence of certain individuals on policy, but – with a few exceptions such as William H. 
Seward and James G. Blaine – these tend to be wealthy industrialists and intellectual 
exponents of an expansionist foreign policy rather than those politicians whose role it was 
to actually formulate and execute that policy. 
This economic interpretation of United States foreign policy has been challenged 
by some historians. David M. Pletcher published an article in Diplomatic History in 
Spring, 1981, warning of the dangers of placing too much faith in politicians’ rhetoric. 
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Pletcher argues that all the major politicians of the late 19
th
 Century made speeches 
declaring the need for foreign markets for American produce, but not all of them made 
significant actions to achieve this goal. In particular he identifies Gresham and Olney as 
examples of politicians whose support for trade expansion was expressed far more in 
words than it was in deeds.
46
 Pletcher’s own view is that the late 19th Century was a time of 
experimentation in policy necessitated by the presence of numerous competing political 
groups that made consensus impossible to achieve. This view certainly merits further 
study. 
While Beard’s theories initially received broad attention they declined in influence 
in the 1940s before their revival by the Wisconsin School. At this time perhaps the 
dominant interpretation of the late 19
th
 Century was that put forward by Julius W. Pratt. 
Pratt’s theory suggests that the move to global power status came about because of the 
proliferation of new ideas of nationalism and imperialism propagated by significant 
individuals such as Capt. Alfred T. Mahan and the growing influence of social Darwinism 
and Anglo-Saxonism as argued by Josiah Strong, John Fiske and Prof. John W. Burgess.
47
 
Pratt also suggests that these ideas of nationalism and imperialism were enflamed by the 
work of the so-called ‘Yellow Press’ – sensationalist journalism being published by 
William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer – which helped create a public desire for war 
in 1898.
48
 The difficulty with this theory is proof. It is certainly possible that the work of 
men such as Mahan and Frederick Jackson Turner – whose ‘Frontier Thesis’ argued that 
the USA needed to keep expanding in order to maintain its vitality – did have an effect on 
policymakers, but there is no way to quantify that effect, not to mention the dangers of 
ignoring the preconceived ideas of policymakers themselves. As with the economic theory 
(which Pratt acknowledges in the 1965 edition of his A History of United States Foreign 
Policy, but argues was only of importance after 1898) the argument that new ideas and 
their exponents were a decisive force in changing foreign policy fails for its tendency to 
downplay the role of those men who actually made that policy by suggesting they were 
merely foils for the ideas of others.
49
 
One of the most influential developments in the field of late 19
th
 Century foreign 
policy historiography in the 1950s was Richard Hofstadter’s proposition that the United 
States suffered from what has come to be termed a ‘Psychic Crisis’ in the mid-1890s. This 
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theory, first proposed in a paper entitled ‘Cuba, the Philippines, and Manifest Destiny’ in 
1951 and later published in The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays in 
1965, argues that an abrupt change in United States foreign policy characterised by the 
Spanish-American War came about as a result of a variety of issues that beset the USA in 
the 1890s. Hofstadter highlights the depression of 1893, the fears of social disruption 
brought about by the rise of Populism, the growth of corporatism in business and the 
subsequent concerns for the future of the individual entrepreneur, civic corruption in cities, 
new waves of immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, and the worries that the 
closing of the frontier heralded the end of free land in the West, the result of which was a 
fresh interest in reform movements such as Populism and Socialism and a new mood of 
national assertion, aggression and expansion.
50
 He also argues that the revival of European 
imperialism overseas acted to make Americans question their nation’s place in the world 
and even demand that the United States acquire colonies in order to keep it from being 
overwhelmed by its rivals. Hofstadter too suggests that the ‘Yellow Press’ were influential 
on public opinion, theorising that the public were made more receptive to sensationalist 
journalism by the effects of the psychic crisis.
51
 Once again the difficulty with the ‘Psychic 
Crisis’ theory is proving it (a fact that Hofstadter himself acknowledged) and, while it was 
influential at the time it was produced, the theory is now generally dismissed by historians 
as an over-simplification at best and possibly even a complete misinterpretation of a period 
of increasing American confidence and assertiveness.
52
 
Another important product of the early 1960s was Ernest R. May’s Imperial 
Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power, published in 1961. This work’s 
great strength is its willingness to examine a wide variety of potential motivations – 
including the influence of the ideas put forward by Mahan, Strong and Fiske, and the 
desire for markets – without seeking to establish a radical new theory of its own.53 Indeed, 
May ultimately concludes that policymakers of the 1890s (particularly Cleveland and 
McKinley) were overwhelmingly concerned with domestic issues and that there had been 
no specific motivation for the growth of American imperialism, rather that imperialism had 
come about because events outside America had forced the United States to interact with 
the world.
54
 May also strives to place the actions of the United States in an international 
context rather than attempt to study American foreign policy in isolation. To this end May 
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begins by examining how international attitudes towards the United States changed as the 
nation grew in power after the 1830s and this approach is maintained with an entire chapter 
devoted to examining British actions during the Venezuelan Border Dispute of 1895.
55
 
May also presents a picture of an American people showing increasing awareness of the 
world around them, particularly in a humanitarian sense as displayed in the angry response 
to the massacre of Armenian Christians in the Ottoman Empire in 1894 and 1895.
56
 This is 
an important theme that is still being explored nearly 50 years after Imperial Democracy’s 
publication through the work of Frank Ninkovich among others.
57
  
While they may have expounded differing theories about the key motivating factors 
for American foreign policy in the 1890s, Hofstadter, Williams and LaFeber all agree that 
the mid-1890s – and possibly 1898 itself – marks a dramatic turning point in the United 
States’ interaction with the world: a change from isolationism to imperialism and the start 
of America’s move to global superpower status. This view was not universally held by 
1960s scholars, however, and would come under further attack in the 1970s. In his 1962 
work The Growth of American Foreign Policy, A History, Richard W. Leopold clearly 
differentiated the chapters dealing with the 1890s and the growth of American Imperialism 
in a section covering the years between 1889 and 1905. This choice of dates is emblematic 
of his approach to late-19
th
 Century American diplomatic history, a period, he argues, 
when continuity was just as important as dramatic change. Leopold suggests that the 
United States was, in some respects at least, a world power long before the 1890s and 
interacted with the world politically through its ability to interfere with the European 
balance of power, morally through the work of its missionaries, and commercially through 
its produce and its merchant navy.
58
 Rather than revolutionary change Leopold highlights 
the continuities that can be seen in American foreign policy in the 1890s which saw the 
desire for neutrality and a belief in the usefulness of the Monroe Doctrine maintained while 
even the venerable policy of isolationism continued to hold strong support.
59
 Most 
interestingly Leopold does not see the United States’ power and influence in the world 
changing in the 1890s so much as he sees the global definition of what was required to be 
considered a world power undergo a dramatic alteration as the rapid acquisition of colonies 
and the burgeoning system of European alliances changed the nature of international 
                                                 
55
 Ibid, pp. 3-6, 43-55 
56
 Ibid, pp. 27-29 
57
 Frank Ninkovich, Global Dawn: The Cultural Foundation of American Internationalism, 1865-1890, 
(Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2009) 
58
 Richard W. Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy, A History, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1962) p. 105 
59
 Ibid, p. 106 
23 
 
diplomacy.
60
 Under these circumstances, Leopold suggests, the increasing assertiveness of 
the United States in the late 1890s was merely a natural response to changing conditions 
around the world. This is not to say that Leopold simply sees the Spanish-American War 
and its consequences as a natural progression of American policy, indeed he states that 
McKinley “opened a new era in American diplomacy,” but he does suggest that many of 
the subsequent developments would have been a matter of inevitable progression 
regardless of who occupied the White House.
61
  
In relation to the aims of this work perhaps the most important book published in 
the 1960s was John A.S. Grenville and George Berkley Young’s Politics, Strategy and 
American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917, which first appeared in 1966. 
This book forms a notable departure from the more thematic approaches of previous 
historians by consciously setting out to provide a biographical study of some of the key 
figures in U.S. foreign policy in the late 19
th
 Century rather than a pure narrative history. 
Grenville and Young acknowledge the limitations imposed by such an approach, but argue 
that their method provides a necessary counterweight to the natural inclination of historians 
to attempt to impose order upon irrational events and thus ignore the role played by the 
personal prejudices and idiosyncrasies of the individuals who actually created and 
executed foreign policy.
62
 The work itself covers a broad span beginning with the role 
played by Admiral Stephen B. Luce in the creation of the new Navy (and thus arguing 
against the heavy emphasis placed by previous historians upon the work of Alfred T. 
Mahan) and ending with the influence of Admiral George Dewey on the evolution of U.S. 
foreign policy in the first decades of the 20
th
 Century. The book focuses upon the period 
between Grover Cleveland’s first inauguration in 1885 and the War of 1898 with an 
emphasis on Cleveland’s second term which is covered in three chapters. Considering this 
strong focus on Cleveland’s administrations it is perhaps surprising that Grenville and 
Young seem to struggle to define Cleveland’s character and motivations; their discussion 
of the decision not to push forward with Hawaiian annexation in 1893 declares that 
historians have been too ready to accept Cleveland’s explanation that considerations of 
justice and honour forbade him from annexing the islands only to state “Justice and honor 
weighed heavily with Cleveland and Gresham.”63 This is perhaps overly critical of a 
laudable effort to examine Cleveland’s record sceptically, but it is indicative of a problem 
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facing many scholars of Cleveland’s presidencies: the difficulty in indentifying the true 
character of an enigmatic and deeply reserved man. 
Ultimately, Grenville and Young define Cleveland as a pragmatist who relied 
heavily upon the advice of his Secretaries of State, granting these men a powerful role in 
the formulation of policy.
64
 This being so, their definitions of these men also becomes of 
great importance. Walter Quintin Gresham is described as “a man of intelligence and 
ability”, but one who was overmatched by the Hawaii controversy; his handling of the 
naval intervention in Brazil in 1894 receives praise as does his cautious approach to the 
requests for aid from Venezuela that would culminate in the Venezuelan Border Dispute 
under his successor.
65
 By contrast Richard Olney is identified as more perceptive than 
Gresham - as identified by his warning to Gresham that restoring the Hawaiian Queen to 
her throne was a near impossibility - but also as more misguided with much of the July 20
th
 
dispatch to Great Britain that formed the heart of the Venezuelan Border Dispute dismissed 
as an unfortunate failure on Olney’s part to comprehend the true facts of the matter.66 All 
of these character definitions warrant further investigation both as to their veracity and the 
implications they carry for future scholarship, but it is unfortunate that Politics, Strategy 
and American Diplomacy has not been followed by similar studies. 
 
The 1970s saw a reaction from scholars to the theorising of the 1950s and 1960s. 
Several historians, dissatisfied with the established story of a dramatic change in American 
foreign policy aims and methods brought about by economic expansion, a ‘Psychic Crisis’ 
or the growth of a racist, evangelising belief in the United States’ civilising mission, began 
to pose a variety of alternative explanations for the events of the late-19
th
 Century. In 1975 
Robert L. Beisner produced From the Old Diplomacy to the New, 1865-1900 in which he 
proposed a range of variations on the traditional themes. The first of these was to extend 
the experimentation previously shown by Leopold over exactly when the crucial change in 
United States’ foreign policy took place. Beisner does not reject the theory that a dramatic 
change occurred in American foreign policy in the 1890s, but he argues that it occurred 
significantly earlier than most historians suggest. Where even scholars such as Leopold 
and LaFeber saw events such as the Venezuelan Border Dispute more as indicators that a 
profound change was imminent, Beisner argues that “by the mid-nineties at the latest, 
American policymakers had begun to see foreign affairs from a new perspective, to 
confront the international world with new assumptions and concerns, and to seek new 
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objectives.”67 He argues that this change came about as a result of the economic changes in 
the United States which granted the nation considerably greater power and influence, but 
not the knowledge of how to wield that power.
68
 In another break with the scholarly 
tradition of a dramatic change in foreign policy occurring in 1898, Beisner sees the 
developments of the late-19
th
 Century as being the natural result of growing power 
allowing “the profoundly imperialistic implications of the American Mission” which he 
argues had held the disparate, immigrant-based, population of the United States together 
for much of the 19
th
 Century - to emerge.
69
 Beisner sees value in the theory that foreign 
policy was dictated by economic factors, but argues that it can only explain some small 
episodes, rather than the entirety of United States foreign policy at this time; in his view 
the business community was too divided to enact such a policy while the politicians did not 
have either the expertise or the will.
70
 He convincingly asserts that Presidents and their 
Secretaries of State showed only sporadic interest in foreign markets while Congress raised 
tariffs and rejected reciprocity treaties, all without significant protest from the business 
community which was more interested in the domestic market and Europe.
71
 
Having set out an interesting base for a new theory describing the development of 
American foreign policy in the 1890s it is somewhat disappointing that Beisner falls back 
upon the old theories of change being brought about by a social malaise (the ‘Psychic 
Crisis’ in a new guise), economic crisis, and new threats to American markets. This does 
not mean that Beisner merely parrots the words of his predecessors, addressing these old 
theories in new ways. His assessment of the social malaise as opening American minds to 
new ideas in replacement of the old ones that had failed them, in combination with the 
revolution in technology which saw improved communications grant greater access to the 
world and advancing naval technology erode the USA’s traditional defensive isolation, is 
of some interest even if it does still force us to rely upon the ‘Psychic Crisis’ theory.72 
Similarly Beisner’s mention of the impact of the passing of the Civil War generation from 
the political scene – and thus the removal of a generation who were instinctively opposed 
to war and an adventurous foreign policy – raises some valuable questions.73 This 
investigation of a variety of motivating factors is perhaps best displayed in the discussion 
of the impact of key figures such as Mahan, Strong and Brooks Adams. Beisner suggests 
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that the imperialist tendencies of all three men may have been overstated by previous 
historians, but that this does not mean that their rhetoric (and the related theories of social 
Darwinism and Anglo-Saxonism) might not have prepared American minds for accepting 
the realities of imperialism.
74
 It is in this area that Beisner’s work reaches its climax, not so 
much as a blueprint for precisely how and why American foreign policy developed as it 
did, but as an explanation of the changing opinions of the American people which itself led 
to new expectations of how foreign policy should be enacted. As American power 
expanded and popular interest in foreign affairs increased, the number of events abroad 
that Americans felt they had a stake in also increased. This in turn required a more formal 
and consistent foreign policy, orchestrated from Washington, and promoted the 
consistency of foreign policy between administrations that came to be seen after Grover 
Cleveland’s second term ended in 1897.75 In this sense Beisner identifies the 1890s not as a 
period leading up to a single revolutionary change, but as a longer period of transition in 
foreign affairs in which new ideas were tested in Latin America and Asia before being 
applied to Europe.
76
 While this may be to overstate the case for a new paradigm in 
diplomacy – as David M. Pletcher argues in his review of From the Old Diplomacy to the 
New when he suggests that many of the changes that Beisner considers to be new in the 
1890s had been developing since the 1860s – the arguments Beisner uses to reach this goal 
do help to expand the academic field.
77
 
Another notable work of the 1970s was Charles S. Campbell’s The Transformation 
of American Foreign Relations, 1865-1900. As the title suggests, this work, published in 
1976, also sets out to redefine the timeframe in which the foreign policy of the late-19
th
 
Century is viewed by examining broad trends across several decades. Campbell sees the 
two major issues of the period as being Anglo-American relations and the overseas 
expansion of the United States.
78
 Like Beisner, he argues that public opinion was generally 
opposed to an assertive foreign policy after the Civil War (although some individuals 
disagreed), but that this gradually changed as the next generation came to power.
79
 
Campbell places greater emphasis on strategic concerns of expansion such as the need for 
coaling bases and the potential role of Hawaii in protecting a trans-isthmian canal and the 
United States’ western coast, but still appreciates economic issues. 80 In relation to 
Williams and LaFeber he argues that business did more to promote trade than the 
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government (although he suggests that this did gradually change), but does acknowledge 
their work by arguing that reciprocity can be seen as a form of commercial annexation.
81
 
The Transformation of American Foreign Policy places a strong emphasis on the power of 
social Darwinism and Anglo-Saxonism and the influence of theorists such as Mahan, 
Henry and Brooks Adams and Frederick Jackson Turner without displaying the subtlety of 
analysis shown by Beisner.
82
 Once again Campbell struggles to prove that these theorists 
influenced the men who actually made policy for the nation. 
The work of Beisner and Campbell demonstrates the growing desire among the 
diplomatic history community in the 1970s to reassess the preconceptions of their field. 
This perceived stagnation was flamboyantly addressed by James A. Field in his 1978 
article ‘American Imperialism: The Worst Chapter in Almost Any Book’. As the title 
suggests Field’s article is a stinging critique of what he considers to be a field that had 
fallen into numerous bad habits. Chief among these are a tendency to suggest a logical 
flow to history that did not take into account the role of chance, a failure to differentiate 
between the actions of government, business and individuals, and an overly ethnocentric 
approach that ignores the influence of the outside world upon American actions.
83
 Field 
also emphasises the failure on the part of historians to consider the logistics of the plans 
and intentions they credited to 19
th
 Century figures, a comment that he later reinforces with 
his assertion that a key element in understanding the development of United States foreign 
policy is the development of the global telegraph cable network in the late-19
th
 Century 
which strongly indicates a far greater interest in European and Latin American affairs than 
in the Far East.
84
 Field’s main contention is that the power of economic factors to direct 
foreign policy and their influence upon both policymakers and the general public have 
been seriously overestimated. His demolition of the social Darwinists is particularly 
persuasive, arguing that men such as Strong and Fiske were few in number, unoriginal, “of 
doubtful leverage,” and have regularly been quoted selectively by historians.85 This attack 
also extends to the influence granted to Mahan who, Field argues, was primarily concerned 
with the American hemisphere and did not set out a clear strategy beyond controlling and 
defending the Central American isthmus.
86
 
In terms of economic factors Field argues that the role of the Far East in 
influencing American foreign policy has been hugely exaggerated in comparison to 
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Europe, suggesting that true interest in the Far East would have seen far greater interest in 
acquiring and developing coaling stations in the Pacific.
87
 Finally, Field points out that 
most of the naval incidents in which the United States was involved in the 1890s occurred 
in the Western Hemisphere and generally in areas of very little economic interest (with the 
exception of Brazil in 1894) and are far more consistent with a defence of the Monroe 
Doctrine or an attempt to fulfil the strategy of defending a potential isthmian canal as 
suggested by Mahan.
88
 In Field’s opinion the United States in the 1890s was still engaged 
in a defensive foreign policy, now centred upon an isthmian canal and enacted by cables 
that gave instant access to Europe and Latin America, but not to the Pacific islands or the 
Far East, and was only shocked into an entirely new direction by the acquisition of the 
Philippines.
89
 
Field’s article is an important example of the frustration with the perceived 
stagnation of late 19
th
 Century diplomatic scholarship, but it has not escaped criticism. The 
article was published with responses from Walter LaFeber and Robert Beisner and a 
subsequent reply from Field. Both Beisner and LaFeber comment that Field failed, despite 
his stated disappointment with the state of accepted scholarship on late 19
th
 Century 
foreign policy, to set out a true reconceptualisation of the subject.
90
 LaFeber’s reply takes 
strong issue with Field’s emphasis on accidents in history which LaFeber describes as an 
“escape hatch”.91 In particular LaFeber argues that the destruction of the U.S.S. Maine in 
Havana harbour cannot be considered an accident since a conscious decision had been 
made by policymakers to send the ship there.
92
 Field responds to this, quite convincingly, 
that while the Maine’s presence in Havana may have been a carefully weighted move in 
the escalation of pressure on Spain, it is hard to argue that it was expected that she would 
be sunk or that placing an American naval vessel in Havana could be considered the first 
step towards annexing the Philippines.
93
 The main criticism of Field’s essay, from 
LaFeber, Beisner and Edward P. Crapol in his survey of late-19
th
 Century diplomatic 
historiography is that Field ignored elements of scholarship that cast doubt on his argument 
and, in Crapol’s words, was guilty of setting up “strawmen that he could easily knock 
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down.”94 Both Beisner and Crapol do, however, praise Field’s attempt to introduce the 
potential relevance of cable networks in diplomacy and Beisner and Field between them 
elaborate some potential impacts that cable communication may have had on foreign 
policy.
95
 
Even if Field’s article was unable to do more than suggest the need for more varied 
approaches to the subject, the late 1970s and 1980s did produce some interesting new 
scholarship. V. G. Kiernan’s America, the New Imperialism: From White Settlement to 
World Hegemony suggests that overseas expansion can be seen as a logical extension of 
the colonisation of the frontier - as indeed it was justified at the time.
96
 Kiernan also argues 
that the suppression of Native Americans set a precedent for the treatment of native 
peoples abroad, perhaps explaining the American determination to suppress the 
insurrection in the Philippines.
97
 Showing more interest in how imperialism was preached 
to the public, Kiernan sees jingoism as a means of controlling the industrial populations of 
the North while uniting the waves of new immigrants.
98
 He also casts doubt on the theory 
that American foreign policy was dominated by the needs of national security, suggesting 
that important territories were always portrayed as vital to national defence despite the fact 
that several other places could have been equally useful.
99
 This emphasis on the continuity 
of American expansion from the nation’s origins until its acquisition of an overseas empire 
has also been put forward by Walter Nugent in his 2009 work Habits of Empire: A History 
of American Expansion. Like Kiernan, Nugent has argued that there was no division 
between the end of continental expansion and the move to acquire territories overseas. 
Indeed, Nugent argues that the nation’s history is largely defined by expansion which, 
while sometimes fortuitous, has almost always been a matter of design.
100
 
Possibly the best example of the new wave of scholarship that appeared in the 
1980s is Richard H. Collin’s Theodore Roosevelt, Culture, Diplomacy, and Expansion: A 
New View of American Imperialism, which first appeared in 1985. This work breaks from 
the ethnocentric tradition bemoaned by James A. Field, placing the rise to power of the 
United States in context with that of Japan and Germany in the same period, most 
particularly in regard to their relationships with Great Britain who, Collin suggests, chose 
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to appease the United States because Germany was the greater and more immediate 
threat.
101
 Meanwhile the United States was also forced to respond to the rise of Germany 
and Japan, in its case by discarding “its traditional stance of disinterest” and involving 
itself in, or at least playing closer attention to, the diplomatic balancing act in Europe.
102
 
Equally significant is Collin’s examination of American culture as an indication of 
the nation’s interest in the outside world. Collin sees the major involvement of Americans 
in the international art market and their enthusiastic support for the development of 
international sporting competition as proof that they were becoming more involved in the 
world around them.
103
 He sees the United States in the 1890s as a nation and a people 
attempting to assert themselves in the world through demonstrations such as the 
construction of the White City in Chicago in 1893 and the redevelopment of the U.S. 
Navy, and in incidents such as the Venezuelan Border Dispute which Collin describes as 
less a diplomatic battle than a “cultural confrontation.”104 For Collin the defining issue in 
the new American foreign policy was the revitalised Monroe Doctrine which was “much 
more significant as a symbolic expression of American nationalism than as a rational or 
intelligent diplomatic policy.”105 All this is a new departure from the theories of export 
markets, social Darwinism and psychic crises: an America expanding into the world in 
almost all aspects of itself from culture to the military, leading to a new assertiveness 
which the rest of world was forced to respond to, but which also forced the United States to 
develop new methods of diplomacy and reassess its own goals and motives. In this way 
Collin sets out a new theoretical approach even if he tends to be conceptual in his approach 
and therefore risks brushing over the impact of individuals on the creation of foreign 
policy. 
Two years after the publication of Collin’s work Michael H. Hunt demonstrated 
another new approach to the study of foreign policy in Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy. 
As the title suggests Hunt’s work explores the power of ideology to shape foreign policy 
from the origins of the nation to the late 20
th
 Century. Hunt’s coverage of the late 19th 
Century is mostly concerned with the War of 1898 and its aftermath, but it does provide 
some interesting insights into the evolution of U.S. foreign policy after the Civil War. In 
particular Hunt readdresses late 19
th
 Century phenomena such as social Darwinism and 
Anglo-Saxonism to illustrate how ideological attitudes were changing at that time while 
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focusing his explanation of why those attitudes changed on a variety of more tangible 
issues such as sectional reconciliation after Reconstruction, anxiety and envy at European 
colonialism and the increased threats to national security brought about by changing 
technology. He also acknowledges that a desire for new markets was a motivation towards 
a more activist foreign policy for some sections of the nation.
106
 All this, Hunt argues, 
combined to create a more activist and assertive nation building upon old visions of 
national greatness and an evangelising zeal for liberty.
107
 Hunt suggests that this return to a 
desire for national greatness was reinforced by ideas of social Darwinism and that by 
placing white Americans at the pinnacle of a racial hierarchy the elite gave credence to the 
idea that foreign policy could be used simply to pursue national greatness. 
While Field may have accused scholars of American foreign relations of being too 
ethnocentric, historians of international foreign relations have given consideration to the 
rise of the United States as an aspect of global history. A fine example of this work is Paul 
Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military 
Conflict from 1500 to 2000 - published in 1990 - which considers the changing status of 
the United States as it was viewed by the outside world. Perhaps the most striking example 
of the differing perspective of an international historian from his American counterparts is 
that Kennedy views the evolving Great Power structure of the 1890s in the light of its role 
in precipitating the First World War, an event that is regularly viewed as the subsequent 
chapter in American foreign relations after the War of 1898 and its aftermath. Kennedy 
compares the enormous industrial might of the United States at the end of the 19
th
 Century 
to that of Great Britain and Germany and suggests that the growth of American trade that 
this created made a more assertive foreign policy inevitable.
108
 Unsurprisingly given the 
enormity of the task of examining the history of multiple nations across five centuries 
Kennedy’s description of American foreign policy as being dominated by Manifest 
Destiny, social Darwinism, and the demand for markets is somewhat derivative, but his 
examination of the United States’ interaction with the world is of considerable interest.109 
In particular, his assessment of the United States as a late-19
th
 Century Great Power which 
remained aloof from the Great Power system partially through choice and partially through 
the difficulty of negotiating alliances due to the division of powers between the President 
and the Senate provides an interesting context to the debate.
110
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The last two decades have seen a variety of interesting perspectives on late-19
th
 
Century diplomatic history. Anders Stephanson’s Manifest Destiny: American 
Expansionism and the Empire of Right, published in 1995, provides an interesting 
discussion of how the traditional ideas of American destiny evolved in response to the 
United States’ changing place in global affairs. Stephanson sees the growth in popularity of 
the concept of America’s civilising mission – as seen in social Darwinism and Anglo-
Saxonism – as a direct copying of European methods for legitimising their own imperial 
acquisitions at the end of the 19
th
 Century rather than as a new development and as a 
means of maintaining America’s self-perceived exceptionalism.111 He also argues that the 
acquisition of an American empire may have begun as a commercial venture, but that this 
naturally took on strategic considerations as the United States found itself being drawn into 
competition with the other Great Powers.
112
 Stephanson does grant a role to Strong, Fiske 
and Mahan, but as men who revised older ideas of Manifest Destiny and so helped justify 
imperialism after 1898, not as the architects of an American empire.
113
 In this sense, the 
work of Stephanson and Hunt could perhaps be seen as an attempt to revive the theories of 
Pratt and Hofstadter in the 1940s and 1950s, but in a severely altered form that seeks to 
explore the significance of ideology as a justification for actions and not purely as a 
motivating force. Overall, Manifest Destiny helps to refine the scholarship of late-19
th
 
Century American diplomacy, but does not attempt to redefine the boundaries of the field. 
Walter Russell Mead’s 2002 work, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy 
and How it Changed the World, is an over-arching study of American foreign policy which 
grants only limited attention to the late-19
th
 Century, but is of interest as an indicator of a 
more internationalist approach to the study of foreign relations. Mead’s work is 
constructed around four foreign policy-making models: Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, 
Jeffersonian and Jacksonian.
114
 Mead is careful to assert that these models are only rough 
sketches which apply differently to different people across the span of American history. 
To some extent this is fortunate since elements of Grover Cleveland’s personality can be 
seen to fit with all the models except the Wilsonian evangelists of democracy. Certainly 
some historians, particularly the Wisconsin school, would no doubt identify Cleveland 
with the Hamiltonians’ desire for a strong alliance between government and business 
aimed at integrating the nation into the global economy, but the evidence for this is 
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disputable.
115
 The Jeffersonian belief in safeguarding American democracy is perhaps too 
parochial for Cleveland, but would coincide with his instinctive conservatism. Overall it is 
the Jacksonian school arguing that both foreign and domestic policy should protect the 
security and economic wellbeing of the nation leading to an instinctive isolationism, but an 
implacable determination when threatened that best encapsulates Cleveland’s personality.  
In relation to the period in question Mead provides some very interesting theories. 
In particular his assertion that the British and American financial systems were so 
inextricably linked as to make the United States a vital piece of the British commercial 
system, a fact illustrated, Mead suggests, by the triggering of the Panic of 1893 by losses 
suffered from British banks following the collapse of the Argentine loan market.
116
 As with 
the work of Kennedy and other international historians, this relates the United States to the 
world around it in a manner that has not traditionally been favoured by historians focussed 
purely on American foreign policy. Mead charts the gradual move of the United States 
towards independence from the British economic sphere – a fact, he argues, that both 
nations recognised leading to Britain showing greater tolerance to the United States in the 
hope of maintaining good relations, and the USA attempting to acquire naval bases in 
preparation for the end of Pax Britannica.
117
 Mead also suggests that there was a broader 
acknowledgement of the economic connections between the two powers that extended far 
beyond the government and led to an understanding amongst those involved with 
international commerce, even as far down as farmers and other producers, of the 
potentially disastrous costs of war with Britain.
118
 He also suggests that a more bellicose 
and assertive popular opinion was beginning to exert a powerful influence on policymakers 
who were under pressure not to allow the nation to appear weak.
119
 Thus even though 
Special Providence provides only a very general overview of policymaking in the late-19
th
 
Century period, it does create interesting foundations for a more specific study. 
One writer who has clearly given considerable thought to the nuances of late-19
th
 
Century American diplomacy is Robert Kagan. In Dangerous Nation: America and the 
World, 1600-1898 Kagan argues that the changes in American foreign policy can be traced 
to at least the 1880s and the changing attitudes of Americans towards the world after the 
Civil War. Kagan emphasises the consistency of American foreign policy, particularly in 
the case of the desire to be the leading power in the Western Hemisphere, with the 
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difference stemming from the increase in American power – aided by European infighting 
– that slowly forced the other Powers to concede U.S. hegemony in the Americas.120 A 
particular example of this can be seen in the isthmian canal negotiations in which, Kagan 
suggests, the United States government showed considerably more interest in securing an 
exclusive right to control such a canal than they did in actually constructing it.
121
 Kagan 
sets out an image of the United States as a growing power seeking hemispheric peace, but 
struggles to define the precise reasons for this policy. While mentioning the attraction of 
commerce and a desire to civilise the peoples of Latin America and Asia he also argues 
that “[the] desire for hemispheric primacy was a stronger motive than the desire for 
commerce.”122 This may suggest a potentially fruitful line of reasoning that perhaps 
increasing American power meant that the original objectives of projects like the canal 
were being forgotten as the projects took on new aspects of their own, but Kagan does not 
state this explicitly. 
One of Kagan’s strengths is his acknowledgement that Latin American and Asian 
nations were not passive recipients of American foreign policy, but played an active role in 
obtaining precisely what they wanted from the Americans. In the case of Latin America 
this is portrayed as a desire for investment and protection from European nations, tempered 
by a lingering suspicion of American motives, while in Asia Kagan suggests that the USA 
was courted by China, Japan and Korea more than it courted them since the United States 
was considered less of a threat to Asian sovereignty than any of the other Powers.
123
 Kagan 
identifies this two-way interaction as a source of weakness in American foreign policy 
with the United States finding itself being dragged into conflicts in which it had little 
interest due to unwise commitments made in the past and subsequently exploited by 
foreign rulers. 
In relation to Grover Cleveland, Kagan draws strong parallels between the enacting 
of American foreign policy under his Democratic administrations and the experiences of 
the strongly Democratic South during and after the Civil War.
124
 He portrays Cleveland 
and Gresham as attempting to reduce the United States’ involvement with the world in the 
face of both public and political opinion which ultimately forced Cleveland to take up the 
Venezuelan Border Dispute as an answer to his domestic critics.
125
 This had the ironic 
result of redefining the concept of a conservative American foreign policy from simple 
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non-intervention to what Kagan calls “isolationist exceptionalism” in which the United 
States proclaimed itself above competition with the other Great Powers and altered 
isolationism to include hemispheric primacy.
126
 Ultimately though, Kagan defines 
Cleveland as the last bastion of the old Democratic Party which the Populist movement 
fundamentally changed, leading to a desire for expanded government and hence an 
expanded foreign policy, leaving Cleveland isolated in his desire not to become involved in 
the Cuban revolution after 1895.
127
 Dangerous Nation may not provide any definitive 
answer to the traditional theories surrounding late-19
th
 Century American foreign policy, 
but it does advance some new lines of enquiry and suggests that the field may be ready for 
a reassessment. 
By comparison, Frank Ninkovich’s Global Dawn: The Cultural Foundation of 
American Internationalism, 1865-1890 – published in 2009 – makes little attempt to 
examine specific foreign policy events, but must be noted as one of the few attempts to re-
examine the fundamental assumptions of the field in recent years. Global Dawn seeks to 
provide a better understanding of the minds and characters of some of the United States 
leading men in the late-19
th
 Century by making a detailed study of liberal journals and 
magazines of the period. By exploring the periodicals from which many politicians and 
policymakers received their information about the world, Ninkovich is able to reshape our 
understanding of those men’s knowledge, interests and assumptions. While it can only ever 
be viewed as a non-specific guide to late-19
th
 Century liberal culture, Global Dawn 
fundamentally questions old assumptions about American interest in the wider world – 
including views on specific regions – and the importance of intellectuals such as Fiske, 
Mahan and Strong on the opinions and actions of policymakers. 
An interesting definition of the current state of scholarship in the field of late-19
th
 
Century foreign policy is to be found in George C. Herring’s 2008 narrative history From 
Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776. Perhaps the most striking 
alteration to previous narrative histories of foreign policy is Herring’s decision to divide 
his chapters on the period in the year 1893 with a distinct chapter for the period between 
1893 and 1901. This indicates an increased awareness of the importance of the period 
before the War of 1898, but this awareness is not justified by the text itself which provides 
only the most fleeting coverage of Grover Cleveland’s second term and thus returns the 
focus to McKinley and the Spanish-American War. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly for a survey narrative Herring describes a wide variety of 
theories that have been put forward to explain the evolution of U.S. foreign policy in the 
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late-19
th
 Century, drawing heavily from the work of Robert Beisner with further references 
to Walter LaFeber, Charles S. Campbell and Ernest R. May. It is interesting to note that 
while Herring states several times that the search for foreign markets was an element in 
U.S. foreign policy of the period he too provides scant evidence for government 
involvement in any such policy.
128
 Herring’s view of foreign policy before 1898 is an 
amalgamation of a variety of theories ranging from the social malaise of the mid-1890s to 
the affect of more activist politicians, most notably James G. Blaine who Herring credits 
highly for designing a blueprint for American imperialism.
129
 One theory that Herring 
proposes repeatedly is a growing sense among a new generation of Americans, born since 
the Civil War and granted a broader awareness of the world by improvements in transport 
and communications, that their nation was a rising power and should assert itself as 
such.
130
 
Given this understanding of the potential power of individuals, particularly in the 
role played by Blaine, it is disappointing that Grover Cleveland is only partially covered by 
the narrative. While Cleveland’s first presidential term might have received deeper 
coverage he is at least well defined as a stubborn politician who was, nevertheless, willing 
to make tough decisions and who injected an “element of morality into an area of 
endeavour and political climate where it was normally absent.”131 It is in the discussion of 
Cleveland’s second term that Herring’s work is most disappointing. While he can be 
forgiven for simplicity in his description of Cleveland’s sense of morality in reference to 
Hawaii and for his difficulty in pinning down Cleveland’s reasons for becoming involved 
in the Venezuelan Border Dispute – both subjects that have provoked lively debates 
amongst historians for the last century and that will require considerably longer to explore 
in detail than a narrative history of this type would allow – it is inexplicable that Herring 
should make no mention of Cleveland’s actions towards the Cuban insurrection of 1895, 
leaving the reader with the impression that the United States’ involvement in that conflict 
began with the inauguration of William McKinley in 1897.
132
 Such an omission is surely 
indicative of the lowly stature that Grover Cleveland continues to hold amongst historians 
outside the specific field of the late-19
th
 Century. 
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If we conclude that a recurring weakness of the current scholarship on U.S. foreign 
relations in the late 19
th
 Century is that too little attention is paid to the men who were 
directly responsible for formulating policy perhaps it is advisable to examine works 
exclusively devoted to those men. In studying Grover Cleveland’s second presidential term 
there are three main figures that can be credited as policymakers: Cleveland himself, 
Walter Quintin Gresham, Secretary of State until his death in 1895, and Richard Olney, 
who replaced Gresham as Secretary of State having previously served as Attorney General. 
Of these men little has been published on either Gresham or Olney while even Cleveland, 
as has already been noted, has been given relatively little attention by scholars. 
Biographies on Grover Cleveland have been sporadic in their publication, but have 
generally emerged at the rate of about one per decade. The most recent examples include 
Henry F. Graff’s Grover Cleveland published in 2002, H. Paul Jeffers’ An Honest 
President: The Life and Presidencies of Grover Cleveland published in 2000, and Richard 
E. Welch’s The Presidencies of Grover Cleveland published in 1988. These three works 
represent the current scholarship on the life and work of Grover Cleveland, but all three 
pay homage to earlier works. The most notable amongst these works is Grover Cleveland: 
A Study in Courage by Allan Nevins. First published in 1932, this still stands as the 
definitive biography of Grover Cleveland while Nevins was undoubtedly one of the 
foremost scholars of the man. The biography itself is a detailed study of Cleveland’s life 
providing excellent detail on all phases of his political career. Nevins was one of the first 
scholars to extensively mine the Grover Cleveland papers and all subsequent scholars are 
indebted to him for his work which included compiling a selection of papers entitled 
Letters of Grover Cleveland published in 1933. If there is any criticism that can be levelled 
against Nevins’ biography on a factual level it is that foreign affairs are not covered in the 
same detail as domestic issues. Nevertheless Nevins does theorise about Cleveland’s 
motives in policymaking and his work has served as a foundation for a popular theme 
amongst biographers since: that of Grover Cleveland as a politician of principle. Nevins’ 
contention is that Grover Cleveland was a man of staunch principle and moral courage who 
enacted his policies on the basis of what he considered to be best for the nation and what 
was morally right. It is this stubborn insistence upon doing what was right that Nevins sees 
as Cleveland’s finest quality – and perhaps his defining attribute. 
Of the more recent biographies Richard E. Welch’s The Presidencies of Grover 
Cleveland stands out as an excellent study of Cleveland’s work as President. Welch 
chooses to compartmentalise the foreign policy of both Cleveland’s terms into a separate 
section thus granting a better overview of foreign relations as a single topic. He too argues 
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that Cleveland’s foreign policy was dictated by a desire to do what was morally correct, 
but he also acknowledges the scholarly debate over foreign policy by referencing the 
differing schools of thought that give credit to economic, political or strategic motives.
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Of the remaining recent biographies H. Paul Jeffers’ An Honest President: The Life 
and Presidencies of Grover Cleveland provides a reasonable account of Cleveland’s life, 
but is ultimately derivative and does not add significantly to the scholarship. His emphasis 
on Grover Cleveland’s use of the executive veto power which, while probably motivated 
by a genuine concern for governmental probity, helped him to gain both political authority 
and public respect is of some interest, but foreign policy is covered in scant detail: perhaps 
an indication of how little known the key events of Cleveland’s presidencies have become. 
By comparison Henry F. Graff’s Grover Cleveland, while only a brief overview of 
its subject, does show signs of originality. His heavy emphasis on Cleveland’s honest 
approach to politics is hardly new, but Graff’s examination of Cleveland’s motives and 
preconceptions does serve to provide some insight and provoke debate. As with Jeffers, 
Graff all but ignores foreign affairs in Cleveland’s second term, limiting his comment to 
the Venezuela Border Dispute and the Cuban revolution. 
The most recent edition to the canon of Cleveland scholarship is Matthew Algeo’s 
The President is a Sick Man. This work has been produced more for the popular market 
than for a scholarly audience, but in its wide-ranging discussion of the United States in the 
late-19
th
 Century it still provides some interesting points. It also provides a uniquely 
detailed study into Cleveland’s battle with cancer of the mouth shortly after his second 
inauguration and the potential impact that the disease - and its treatment - had on 
Cleveland as a man and a politician. Beyond this, Algeo’s work also serves as proof that 
Grover Cleveland has not completely slipped from the public consciousness. 
Only three biographies of Walter Q. Gresham have been written of which the most 
recent is Charles W. Calhoun’s excellent Gilded Age Cato: The Life of Walter Q. Gresham 
published in 1988. This work gives a detailed overview of Gresham’s entire career and 
particularly emphasises the importance of Gresham’s legal background – a point that is 
often raised by Cleveland’s biographers as well. One of the foremost scholars of late-19th 
Century politics of the last few decades, Calhoun’s work clearly benefits from the author’s 
understanding of existing scholarship in the field, even going so far as to refute Williams 
and LaFeber’s theories in his introduction.134 Calhoun’s work is of particular interest 
beyond its immediate subject matter because it also grants us an outsider’s view of Grover 
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Cleveland. Gresham was a career Republican who was persuaded to join Cleveland’s 
cabinet by a combination of frustration with his own party and admiration for Cleveland. 
As such his attitude toward Cleveland is of particular help in understanding the man and 
his policies. Calhoun’s biography reveals many striking similarities between the two men 
that help to explain the motives behind their policies. 
Similarly, Gerald G. Eggert’s biography of Richard Olney titled Richard Olney: 
Evolution of a Statesman - published in 1974 - provides an excellent examination of a 
largely forgotten statesman. The work’s great strength is its efforts to map and understand 
the relationship between Olney and Cleveland and the means by which decisions were 
made by the two men. Eggert and Calhoun’s biographies provide two of the best sources 
for detailed analysis on foreign policy under the Cleveland administration. 
From this analysis we can see that the existing scholarship of late 19
th
 Century U.S. 
foreign policy contains many strengths, but also several weaknesses. Decades of lively 
debate have produced a variety of theories to explain the changes in American foreign 
policy during the period and these theories themselves have been refined under academic 
scrutiny. In its current form the historiography grants a broad insight into the changes that 
took place in American society between the end of the Civil War and the beginning of the 
War of 1898 and examines how those changes may have influenced foreign policy. More 
recent studies have also explored how certain changes such as the rise of social Darwinism 
can be seen as attempts to justify a more assertive foreign policy. A recurring weakness in 
the scholarship is a failure to explain precisely how the theories that have been put forward 
are actually displayed in American policy. In a country as diverse politically, economically 
and socially as the United States of America in the 1890s it is possible to find examples to 
support almost any theory, but that is not to prove that that theory is a true description of 
what actually motivated U.S. policy. 
In particular, the role of policymakers has often been neglected in favour of broad 
theories that can be applied to policy formulation across several Presidential terms. Even 
when policymakers have been recognised they are rarely covered in detail and some 
elements of the scholarship is contradictory. Important exceptions such as the 
biographically based work of Grenville and Young and the broader discussions of ideology 
in foreign policy set out by Michael Hunt and Anders Stephanson have demonstrated that 
this line of enquiry can yield sound results, but as yet such techniques have not been 
applied in a detailed study of the character of President Grover Cleveland and his second 
cabinet. This thesis seeks to address these weaknesses by examining the work of those 
people specifically responsible for creating and enacting United States foreign policy 
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between 1893 and 1897 in order to ascertain the precise reasoning behind their actions and 
thus establish whether larger phenomena such as social Darwinism can truly be said to 
have affected the formulation of policy. Beyond this the thesis explores the roles and 
motives of other individuals who can be declared to have had an effect on policymaking. 
These individuals include not just the President and his Secretaries of State, but also 
cabinet officers, members of Congress (particularly members of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations), diplomats and military officers serving abroad. Such figures can all be 
considered to have had some effect on foreign policy and thus must be investigated while 
the reaction of the White House to resist or accept such interference must also be gauged. 
 
In terms of primary documentation this thesis draws from three main sources. The 
first source is the personal papers of the major protagonists, in particular President 
Cleveland and Secretaries of State Gresham and Olney. The second source of primary 
documentation is the State Department papers compiled in the Foreign Relations of the 
United States series. These papers provide the official record of diplomatic interaction 
covering all the major incidents in foreign affairs during the period as well as a broad 
variety of more trivial issues. One of the secondary aims of this thesis is to attempt to 
establish the potential influence that could be exerted on United States policy in various 
foreign theatres by the diplomats that resided in those countries. The FRUS series will be 
invaluable in achieving this goal. The final sources of documentation are newspapers of the 
period. Due to constraints of time these sources are limited to a selection of newspapers 
that provided informed comment upon the actions of the executive rather than attempting 
to significantly influence public opinion – although the author recognises the extreme 
subjectivity of this selection process. An analysis of attempts to use newspapers to 
influence public opinion on foreign policy could easily form the basis of a thesis by itself 
and so it is imperative to simply attempt to gain an understanding of how Cleveland’s 
actions were perceived rather than studying how they were portrayed to the public. 
 
The fundamental question that must be asked is what was happening to United 
States foreign policy during the 1890s? Was the United States already set on an inexorable 
rise to global power or did that rise come about due to a planned political strategy? Further 
to this we must determine whether Cleveland proved to be a help or a hindrance to the 
expansion of United States foreign policy and whether he was active or passive in 
achieving his aims. These last two questions are of interest on numerous levels. In the 
former case the interest lies in the role of a natural conservative attempting to curb what he 
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considered to be the excesses of his predecessor, Benjamin Harrison, as well as the 
demands of nationalists and industrialists who hoped for a more active foreign policy to 
suit their interests. In this sense Cleveland was attempting to hinder the evolution of U.S. 
foreign policy into something more active and assertive, but whether this marks him down 
as simply a reactionary conservative remains to be seen. This question of Cleveland’s basic 
motives combines with the second issue, that of his activity or passivity in pursuit of those 
goals, to form another fundamental question: was Grover Cleveland an active force who 
played an important role in guiding the development of United States foreign policy in the 
1890s; did he acquiesce in an inevitable change; or did he attempt to fight forces that 
ultimately proved to be overwhelming? The aim of this research thesis is to establish 
which, if any, of these statements comes close to defining the true intent of Grover 
Cleveland’s foreign policy.
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Chapter 1 – Hawaii 
 
 One of the most important diplomatic incidents of Grover Cleveland’s second term 
was already well under way by the time of his inauguration on March 3, 1893. The 
revolution that had taken place in Hawaii in January of 1893 would prove to be the subject 
of some of Grover Cleveland’s first policy decisions in any field upon re-entering the 
White House and indeed had already seen him take action more than a week before taking 
the oath of office. It was the incident that Allan Nevins has suggested should be considered 
the most important of Cleveland’s entire second term in regard to foreign policy and while 
this might be a debatable subject it certainly cannot be denied that Hawaii set the tone for 
much of what was to come from Cleveland in the four years after his inauguration.
1
 
 
 While the roots of the Hawaiian revolution – a term that is perhaps more 
convenient than accurate given the nature of events that led to the deposing of Queen 
Liliuokalani in January 1893 – can be traced back to the arrival of the first American 
missionaries as early as 1819, its direct origins can be seen in the effects of the McKinley 
Tariff Act of 1890. The revolution was born out of the racial politics of the islands – where 
the native monarchy, the wealthy white elite, the native majority and an assortment of 
European and Asian labourers created a fractured and turbulent population – but the 
immediate trigger was probably economic in nature. American reciprocity treaties signed 
in 1876 and 1887 had seen the already American-oriented islands develop an economy 
dominated by the export of sugar to the United States. By 1891 – the last year before the 
McKinley Tariff’s new measures took effect – the islands were exporting 274, 982, 295 lbs 
of sugar to the US mainland and only a mere 285 lbs to all other nations.
2
 Beyond 
dominating Hawaii’s trade, Americans – along with some whites of European origin – also 
owned two-thirds of the islands’ sugar plantations and this granted them a wildly 
disproportionate share of the nation’s wealth.3 This wealth was threatened by the new 
tariff’s abolition of duties on sugar imports and provision of a subsidy of 2 cents per pound 
for domestic American sugar producers. Furthermore, a subsequent treaty granted Cuban 
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sugar preferential entry. Practically at a stroke the Hawaiian sugar growers saw their 
position of strength demolished with their competitors in the United States and Cuba 
suddenly gaining a huge commercial advantage. The Hawaiian economy suffered terribly 
and the wealthy American minority saw the source of their prosperity disappear. 
 Running parallel to the economic calamities, the wealthy American and European 
minority were experiencing political setbacks. On July 1, 1887, a minor uprising against 
King Kalakaua had led to the creation of a new constitution granting much greater powers 
to the white minority that fulfilled certain property qualifications.
4
 The new white-
dominated cabinet survived an abortive attempt to overturn the 1887 constitution in July, 
1889, but came under increasing pressure when Kalakaua was succeeded by his sister 
Liliuokalani in January, 1891.
5
 Queen Liliuokalani hoped to restore Hawaii to the control 
of its native monarchy and remove the white control of government. The economic turmoil 
created by the McKinley Tariff granted her the opportunity to do so, but initial gains were 
undone in November, 1892, when the American-led legislature forced the creation of a 
new cabinet comprising some of Hawaii’s wealthiest men, three of them of American 
descent.
6
 Queen Liliuokalani waited until January, 1893, to respond: on the 12
th
 she 
removed the white cabinet and on the 14
th
 prorogued the legislature and proclaimed a new 
constitution that would grant the monarchy near-absolute power.
7
 The new regime lasted 
for two days. On the 16
th
 Liliuokalani took the advice of her ministers and withdrew the 
new constitution, but her actions were too late to stop the planter community from moving 
against her. 
 In 1892 a small group of white Hawaiian planters had established the Annexation 
Club, a body that sought to bring about Hawaii’s annexation by the United States, by force 
if necessary. The club maintained a representative in Washington who consulted with 
senior members of Benjamin Harrison’s cabinet including Secretaries of State James G. 
Blaine and John W. Foster and Secretary of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy.
8
 Indeed, it 
appears that Foster informed the club’s representative after the elections of 1892 that there 
would be insufficient time left for the Harrison administration to confirm annexation, 
although this information could not have reached the club’s Hawaiian members until 
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January 12 at the earliest.
9
 Regardless of whether the Annexation Club received this 
message, on January 16 they responded to Queen Liliuokalani’s proroguing of the 
legislature by organising a Committee of Safety and requesting military protection from 
the U.S.S. Boston stationed at Honolulu. American marines landed on the afternoon of the 
16
th
 with orders to protect American lives and property and to preserve public order. 
Rather than do this, however, they took up positions near the government buildings in the 
city. On the 17
th
 these buildings were occupied by the revolutionists who proclaimed a 
provisional government and asked U.S. Minister Stevens for official recognition which he 
provided the same day. Stevens’ role in the Hawaiian revolution is open to a degree of 
debate, but it is certain that he was in close communication with the Annexation Club and 
his official dispatches to Blaine and Foster at the State Department during 1891 and 1892 
demonstrate his strong support for American annexation of the islands – indeed it is very 
possible that he was selected for the position because he shared such views with his friend 
Blaine.
10
 Stevens would follow this recognition by declaring an American protectorate 
over the islands, once again at the provisional government’s request, on February 1. In the 
meantime the provisional government had sent commissioners to Washington to negotiate 
a treaty of annexation, which was drawn up, signed and delivered to the Senate for 
approval by February 15.
11
 
 It is at this point that Grover Cleveland first exerted his Presidential authority – 
despite the fact that such authority would not officially be his for several more weeks. On 
February 22, Cleveland met with Walter Q. Gresham – recently selected, after some 
persuading, as the new Secretary of State – and John G. Carlisle, the future Secretary of the 
Treasury. The meeting resulted in Carlisle travelling to Washington in order to indicate to 
the Senate that Cleveland wished to study the Hawaiian situation in greater detail before 
acting.
12
 The treaty was shelved until the inauguration and Cleveland withdrew it from 
Senate consideration on March 9.
13
 It is unclear exactly what prompted Cleveland to 
intervene in this way – it may simply have been his instinctive opposition to overseas 
expansion – but the Grover Cleveland Papers contain a letter, apparently written by a 
representative of Liliuokalani and forwarded to Cleveland by Secretary of State Foster 
which may have played a role in convincing the President-elect to act. The letter described 
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the events that had taken place and clearly stated that the events could not have taken place 
without the complicity of Minister Stevens and the armed force of the U.S.S. Boston and 
its marines. It is possible that reading this letter may have been sufficient to convince 
Cleveland to act to stop the annexation process until he entered office.
14
 
 Two days after withdrawing the treaty Cleveland named James H. Blount, a retired 
congressman from Georgia who had served as chairman of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, as his special commissioner to investigate the circumstances of the 
revolution.
15
 Blount reached Hawaii on March 29 to discover American flags flying over 
the government buildings and American troops still deployed on the islands and 
immediately ordered both practices stopped.
16
 In an investigation lasting over three months 
Blount carried out interviews with a cross-section of Hawaiian society and examined a 
wide variety of documents.
17
 The final report that was received in Washington in early 
August was uncompromising in its conclusion that the Hawaiian revolution could not have 
succeeded but for the exercise of American military force and that Minister Stevens had 
been complicit in all that had occurred.
18
 It also stated Blount’s belief that the majority of 
public opinion in Hawaii supported Queen Liliuokalani and opposed the provisional 
government. 
 It was not until October 18 that Gresham presented Cleveland and the cabinet with 
a plan of action. In a memorandum for a cabinet meeting Gresham proposed that, since 
American military forces had been complicit in the revolution, the United States should 
repair the wrong done that had been done to Liliuokalani and argued that the monarchy 
should be restored.
19
 Despite opposition from members of the cabinet the decision was 
made that the Gresham memorandum should become the basis for U.S. policy in Hawaii 
and the new Minister to Hawaii, Albert S. Willis, was dispatched to the islands with orders 
to begin negotiations with the Queen and the provisional government in order to bring such 
a restoration about. Perhaps unfortunately for the chances of success of the new policy, it 
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was also decided that it was beyond the President’s authority (and against the interests of 
the Hawaiian people) to use force to achieve its goals. 
Almost immediately the flaws in the new policy were exposed. In a letter to 
Gresham written on October 9 the Attorney General (and future Secretary of State) 
Richard Olney had pointed out that if the United States held a responsibility to the Queen 
for deposing her then it also held a responsibility to the members of the provisional 
government for encouraging them to rebel – undoubtedly Olney raised this objection again 
in the cabinet meeting of the 18
th
.
20
 The consequence was an order to Willis that he should 
not approach the provisional government to suggest their resignation without assurances 
from the Queen that she would not seek to exact revenge upon them. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, when Willis met with Liliuokalani for the first time on November 13 he 
found that the Queen had no intention of showing clemency toward the men who had 
ousted her from power and, on the contrary, that she intended to follow the letter of 
Hawaiian law and have the rebels beheaded for treason.
21
 It took two further interviews 
with Liliuokalani before Willis was able to extract a written statement that the Queen 
would grant an amnesty to the rebels and restore the constitution of 1887. With the first 
half of his mission accomplished at long last Willis met with Sanford Dole, president of the 
provisional government, only to be told, with defiant hypocrisy, that the United States had 
no right to interfere in Hawaiian affairs and that Cleveland could only annex the islands or 
accept the provisional government as the rightful leaders of an independent state. 
There has been a certain amount of scholarly debate over whether President Dole 
knew that Cleveland had resolved not to use force to restore the Hawaiian monarchy or 
whether his refusal to accede to American demands was a genuine gamble that Cleveland’s 
conscience, the prospect of a bloody battle to overthrow the provisional government 
(which by then controlled the Hawaiian nation’s admittedly meagre arsenal), or public 
opinion in the United States would compel him to back down.
22
 The discussion is purely 
academic, though, since Cleveland had already changed his government’s course before 
Willis met with Dole. Indeed, it appears that Willis’ report of his first meeting with Queen 
Liliuokalani was sufficient to convince the President that his plan for a restoration would 
not succeed and that another approach was required. It was decided that the entire matter 
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(with the exception of the annexation treaty) should be placed in the hands of Congress. On 
December 18 Cleveland sent a special message to Congress accompanying Blount’s report 
and all other relevant documents. The islands would not be the subject of active American 
foreign policy again until after Cleveland left office in 1897. 
 
From this sequence of events it is possible to identify the men who were 
responsible for creating policy concerning Hawaii in the Cleveland administration in 1893 
and the roles that each man played. As an international incident of great significance in 
American foreign relations of the period it is also an opportunity to establish a model of 
how Cleveland’s foreign policy was to be created and enacted over the course of his term. 
Finally, we can clearly see three key points of policy decision – the withdrawal of the 
treaty of annexation in March, the instruction to Willis to attempt negotiations aimed at 
restoring the Hawaiian monarchy in October, and the move to abandon restoration and pass 
the matter to Congress in December. It is these three points that most clearly display the 
workings of the Cleveland cabinet. 
Unsurprisingly it was Walter Q. Gresham as Secretary of State who can be seen as 
the man most involved in the day-to-day running of policy, most importantly as the focal 
point of diplomatic correspondence both from the United States’ representatives in Hawaii 
and from the provisional government. It is also clear that Gresham was largely responsible 
for the formulation of policy, most notably in his cabinet memorandum of October 18, 
1893. This is not to say that Gresham had a free hand in the creation of policy, however. 
Richard Olney’s letter to Gresham of October 9 demonstrates that the Attorney General 
wished to have his opinion considered and it is notable that several important policy 
decisions were presented for discussion in cabinet meetings, although it is not always 
possible to be sure to what extent the decisions were open to debate rather than simply 
presented as a fixed intention. What is certain is that, by taking these decisions to cabinet 
meetings, Grover Cleveland placed himself as the final arbiter on foreign policy decisions. 
While in the Hawaiian matter he drew advice from at least three members of his cabinet 
(Gresham, Olney and Carlisle whom he had consulted about withdrawing the treaty in 
February) Cleveland did not simply elect to follow the advice of any one of these advisors 
in its entirety, but instead formulated policy based on the advice of all. This would form 
the basis for the handling of future major foreign policy decisions throughout the second 
term with the Secretary of State largely responsible for suggesting the policy direction 
consulting, to a greater or lesser degree, with Cleveland. Cabinet meetings would play less 
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of a role in policymaking as the term continued, but major decisions would usually be 
discussed before Cleveland gave his assent. 
 
 When discussing the relative power of Cleveland and Gresham in formulating 
policy relating to Hawaii in 1893 it is important to remember that this was the first problem 
facing Cleveland when he came to the White House. Under these circumstances it would 
appear certain that the Hawaiian situation would have been very much on his mind as he 
selected his cabinet in January and February, 1893, and particularly so in the case of his 
future Secretary of State. Gresham was not Cleveland’s first choice for the role; he offered 
it to Thomas F. Bayard, who had served in that capacity during Cleveland’s first term, but 
Bayard preferred the position of Ambassador to Great Britain.
23
 Cleveland also offered the 
cabinet place, somewhat bizarrely, to Melville W. Fuller, whom Cleveland himself had 
appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1888; unsurprisingly Fuller declined the 
offer.
24
 There may have been other offers before the President-elect settled upon Judge 
Walter Quintin Gresham, but it would be a mistake to suggest that Cleveland was not 
convinced that Gresham was the right man for the job – several factors would suggest 
otherwise. As a lifelong Republican – who had served as Postmaster General and Secretary 
of the Treasury under Chester A. Arthur – Gresham was not an obvious choice for 
Secretary of State in a Democratic cabinet, nor a popular one. Given that this was only the 
second time in three decades that the Democratic Party had been able to reward its 
members with government jobs, the decision to appoint a Republican – regardless of the 
fact that he was a moderate who had supported Cleveland over Benjamin Harrison during 
the election – to one of the top jobs in government was bound to be unpopular among 
powerful Democrats. However, Cleveland was clearly convinced that he had found the 
right man, demonstrated by the fact that Gresham originally – after some delay, 
presumably while he considered the offer – turned the job down and only agreed to accept 
the post after Cleveland wrote to him a second time asking him to reconsider.
25
 Despite the 
cost to his political capital, Cleveland saw in Gresham a man whose views were well 
aligned with his – something he stated in his first letter to Gresham – and so was 
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determined to convince him.
26
 This in itself suggests that the President-elect already had a 
clear vision for the course he wished his foreign policy to take – which Hawaii would 
inevitably lead – and was seeking for a fellow conservative who would work with him in 
that direction. Such logic does not necessarily have to apply with regard to other members 
of Cleveland’s cabinet – there was no reason for him to select his Secretary of the Interior 
based upon the candidates’ views regarding Hawaii – but a man of Cleveland’s character 
and convictions was sure to pick men who held similar views to himself on moral and 
ethical issues such as the ones raised in Hawaii. 
 
 The most definitive statement of Cleveland’s motives and reasoning in regard to 
Hawaii is his message to Congress of December 18
th
, 1893. In this message – which was 
compiled from drafts written by both Gresham and Olney (with the bulk of the argument 
coming from the latter) but was edited by the President – Cleveland gave his reasons for 
acting as he did, setting out the White House’s case for attempting to restore Queen 
Liliuokalani to the Hawaiian throne.
 27
  This reasoning reveals a great deal about 
Cleveland’s motives. Before examining the message in detail, though, it is perhaps best to 
consider the purpose it was designed to serve. 
 The message of December 18
th
, 1893, was, to a large extent, an admission of defeat 
for the Grover Cleveland administration. The message was accompanied by hundreds of 
pages of other documents that had been previously used by the White House and the State 
Department as they attempted to achieve a satisfactory conclusion to the United States’ 
involvement in the Hawaiian revolution. It was, in effect, Grover Cleveland’s passing of 
the entire matter into the hands of Congress. What is less clear is exactly what Cleveland 
expected Congress to do once they had control over the Hawaiian issue. It eventually 
transpired that Congress did very little and in hindsight it can be argued that the matter 
ceased to be of importance to the United States once Cleveland relinquished control, but 
whether Cleveland expected this to happen is open to debate. The documents passed did 
not include the annexation treaty which would not be resubmitted for Senate consideration 
and without that document decisive action was always unlikely. Similarly, Cleveland was 
well aware that prevailing public sentiment would rule out the invocation of the war power 
by Congress, a measure that he himself had shied away from. Undoubtedly Cleveland ran 
the risk of being presented with a Congressional resolution requiring that he act in a way 
that he did not wish, a request that would be hard to ignore having asked Congress to 
manage the affair, but this was unlikely with both the House and the Senate under the 
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control of the Democratic Party. Conversely, having experienced one term in the White 
House already, it would seem very unlikely that Cleveland truly believed that Democrats in 
Congress might be able to discover a method for settling the issue by themselves. Indeed, 
perhaps the most interesting aspect to the decision to pass the Hawaiian matter to Congress 
is that it represented an implied relinquishing of executive power by the President. By 
passing control of an issue concerning foreign relations to the legislature Cleveland was 
undermining one of the powers of the executive which traditionally claimed precedence in 
managing such affairs of state. This precedent may well have contributed to Cleveland’s 
dispute with the Senate later in his second term over which branch of government 
controlled foreign relations. In 1896 and 1897 Cleveland and Olney would be steadfast in 
denying the right of the Senate to interfere in the executive’s conduct of foreign affairs 
beyond its constitutional power of confirmation of treaties, but in 1894 the President was 
notably less ready to defend executive power. In a written statement given to the press in 
January, 1895, relating to accusations that a visit from a deputation of Hawaiian 
monarchists in the summer of 1894 had affected the administration’s policy on stationing 
naval vessels at Hawaii Cleveland quoted a speech he had prepared for the meeting with 
the Queen’s representatives, but had only been able to pass to them in written form due to 
illness.
28
 This paper stressed the “constitutional limitations of ... executive power” in 
comparison to the “abundant power and authority” held by the Senate and declared that the 
executive – its plans having failed – was thus discharged from responsibility on the matter. 
It is dangerous to speculate too much based on later positions, but it seems unlikely that 
Cleveland – who had caused a minor controversy in his first term by citing executive 
privilege when refusing to release documents requested by Congress – would have ceded 
authority to the Senate willingly. It is possible that he was oblivious to the possibility that 
longer term problems might arise, but for a politician of Cleveland’s experience this seems 
unlikely. In the context of the situation it seems clear that Cleveland recognised that he was 
confronted by an insolvable situation and so had reached the limits of his constitutional 
powers. Under these circumstances he was able to relinquish the matter to Congress 
without any expectation that they would be able to succeed on Hawaii where he had failed 
(thus not endangering the prestige of the presidency). 
 Whatever the extent of Cleveland’s reasoning regarding the long term implications 
of the President passing a foreign relations matter to Congress it would certainly appear 
that Cleveland’s message was not expected to be a rallying cry to Congressional action – if 
anything quite the opposite. Instead it should be viewed as a personal explanation for his 
                                                 
28
 Grover Cleveland, Statement to Press, January 6, 1895, Reel 86, Grover Cleveland Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 
51 
 
actions, a statement of principles, and perhaps even as a warning to Congress that he would 
not accede to a decision that did not meet his standards. In this regard there are, in 
particular, two striking aspects about the message: the first is the extent to which Cleveland 
addresses the Hawaiian issue in moral terms and the second is the way that it is presented 
virtually as an argument in a court of law. 
 The moral aspect of Cleveland’s message appears early in the text and thereafter 
provides a running theme throughout. After a brief reference to his recent annual message 
to Congress (in which he had promised imminent developments on Hawaii) and a short 
paragraph making clear his intention to pass the matter to Congress, Cleveland launched 
into the main body of his message with a declaration that he believed “that right and justice 
should determine the path to be followed in treating this subject.”29 Such an unequivocal 
statement that morality must overrule all other considerations in regard to Hawaii provides 
a potentially powerful insight into the character and thinking of Grover Cleveland. It must, 
though, be treated cautiously since we can assume that in this very public piece of rhetoric 
Cleveland was seeking to justify his decisions to the broader public; such a motive could 
be well served by appealing to the public’s sense of decency and honour. Similarly open to 
interpretation is Cleveland’s subsequent move to place the issue in distinctively American 
terms by referring to “the mission and character of our Government” arguing that the 
United States did not seek territorial expansion or the removal of monarchies at the 
expense of its national honour.
30
 Such a statement, combined with Cleveland’s assertion 
that the conscience of the public would demand better of their politicians, might be viewed 
today as old-fashioned or idealistic for the 1890s – particularly in the light of the events of 
1898 – raising questions as to its sincerity. It is tempting to view the entire message – 
which highlighted President Harrison’s enthusiastic haste in endorsing annexation in the 
face of Queen Liliuokalani’s protest – as political posturing with the Congressional 
elections of 1894 in mind. With Cleveland himself suffering criticism for his handling of 
the economic troubles besetting the nation it would not be particularly surprising for him to 
engage in some party-political jousting. Any such electioneering would appear unlikely, 
though, since Hawaii was an issue which divided the nation on lines which went beyond 
mere partisan politics and thus could not be relied upon as means of winning votes.
31
 
One reason why we may be well advised to accept Cleveland’s statements at face 
value is the second interesting aspect of the message: its legalistic style. It is by no means 
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insignificant that the three men who had, by December 1893, become the major creators of 
U.S. policy in Hawaii (and who would continue to dominate foreign policymaking for the 
rest of Cleveland’s term of office) all had legal backgrounds. Grover Cleveland himself 
and Richard Olney, the Attorney General and future Secretary of State, were both lawyers 
by trade before entering politics and Walter Q. Gresham was not just a trained lawyer but 
also a Judge of almost a decade’s experience on the United States circuit court for the 
Seventh Circuit. This legal background for the three main figures in foreign policy 
formulation during Grover Cleveland’s second term is vital to the understanding of the 
way that foreign affairs were conducted by the administration. In the case of Hawaii its 
influence is immediately displayed in the main body of Cleveland’s message to Congress 
which is set forth in the clear, methodical and reasoned manner of a barrister arguing for 
his client in front of a jury – a role played by Cleveland many times in the courtrooms of 
Buffalo. 
 This legal background may explain the style of the message, but it could also have 
a greater importance in understanding the policies put forward by the Cleveland 
administration. Frank Ninkovich has demonstrated that the liberal elite in the United States 
in the late 19
th
 Century, of whom Cleveland can be seen as a member, took great interest in 
the development and codification of international law that was occurring at the time.
32
 
With this in mind it would hardly be surprising if such legally-minded men as Cleveland, 
Gresham and Olney chose to enact U.S. foreign policy with a view to not just what they 
deemed to be morally justified, but also what they considered to be legally proper. In the 
case of Hawaii this is clearly shown in the message to Congress of December 18, 1893, to 
be overturning the policies of the previous administration. 
Briefly stated, the charge levelled by Cleveland at the Benjamin Harrison 
administration is the use of American force to depose the lawful ruler of Hawaii and 
replace her with a new government whose sole purpose was to bring about the annexation 
of the islands to the United States. The charge is mollified somewhat by Cleveland’s 
decision to abstain from criticising (or even examining) the actions of President Harrison 
or his Secretaries of State beyond the early reference to Harrison’s endorsement of the 
treaty of annexation despite the protest from Queen Liliuokalani: a document that 
Cleveland declares warranted a full investigation of the events surrounding the revolution 
in Hawaii.
33
 Subsequently Cleveland’s attention is focussed purely on the actions of the 
United States’ Minister to Hawaii John Stevens although whether this was an attempt to 
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save the reputation of his predecessor (and thus perhaps avoid upsetting the Republicans in 
Congress), preserve the dignity of the Presidency, or simply a result of lack of evidence 
against Harrison or his administration is unclear. 
The indictment against Stevens is long and detailed and it is of interest because it 
demonstrates both Cleveland’s personal view on the matter and his belief as to how the 
United States should interact with the world. It is particularly telling that Cleveland was 
not overly interested in the precise reasons for the revolution against Queen Liliuokalani’s 
government; he was concerned with how American force was used to expedite that 
revolution. The suspected use of American force had been the underlying factor behind his 
decision to launch an investigation, but it would appear that his focus on that use of force 
in his message to Congress indicates an ideological opposition to annexation. After all, 
with Blount’s final report categorically stating that the Provisional Government could not 
claim the support of the majority of the Hawaiian people, it would have been easily 
justifiable to simply discard the treaty of annexation. Cleveland’s message to Congress was 
an attempt to justify his decision to go beyond withdrawing the treaty and to interfere with 
Hawaiian political affairs. His reasoning was that if the United States was pivotal in the 
overthrow of the Queen it would be justifiable (and perhaps even necessary) for the United 
States to repair the damage. Such reasoning might simply be the result of Cleveland’s 
sense of justice and desire for international law, but it could also be argued to be the result 
of his innate anti-imperialism. In reality the two factors can be seen to be inextricably 
intertwined for Cleveland and his advisors for whom imperialism was itself a violation of 
the moral principles upon which they desired international law to be based. 
For Cleveland the argument also held a historical element drawing upon what he 
believed to be the traditional American ideology of anti-imperialism and isolationism. In 
his opening paragraphs he described the proposed annexation treaty as being “a departure 
from unbroken American tradition” while later he cited the example of President Andrew 
Jackson’s refusal to accept the new republic of Texas’ application to join the Union in1837 
due to a fear that it might be suggested that the USA had supported the revolution against 
Mexican rule in Texas in order to acquire the territory for itself. Such an example weighed 
heavily with Cleveland as a Democrat president who undoubtedly saw Andrew Jackson as 
an exemplar to be followed.
34
 Thus Cleveland set out a case in which American force had 
been used to accomplish an un-American act and he placed the blame for this action 
squarely at the feet of “American and other foreign merchants and traders residing in 
Honolulu” and Minister Stevens who “zealously promoted” the project and “was not 
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inconveniently scrupulous as to the means employed to that end.”35 The victims were, of 
course, the rightful ruler Queen Liliuokalani and the Hawaiian people. The motive was 
greed for the planters – revealed as such in a letter from Stevens to the Secretary of State in 
November, 1892, which highlighted the effects of the McKinley tariff on the islands’ sugar 
growers – but Stevens’ motives were not spelled out so clearly, with letters quoted 
implying a desire for American empire in the Pacific (perhaps even a belief in the necessity 
of such an empire) and strong hints from Cleveland that personal aggrandizement also 
played a part. The process of scapegoating Stevens reached its peak with the declaration 
“But for the notorious predilections of the United States Minister for annexation, the 
Committee of Safety, which should be called the Committee of Annexation, would never 
have existed.” This statement was followed by repeated assertions that the Committee 
would not have acted without the support of U.S. forces and that the Queen would not have 
yielded her authority to the Provisional Government had it not been backed by those 
forces. The strength of feeling within the cabinet about this issue is further demonstrated 
by the repeated references to the Hawaiian Provisional Government as “the Stevens 
government” in Olney’s letter to Gresham of October 9 – a fact that would also suggest 
that, whatever reason Cleveland had for demonising Stevens, it was not overtly party-
political.
36
 
The true meaning of Cleveland’s December 18th message to Congress is stated in 
the concluding paragraphs to his indictment of Stevens and bears quoting at length. 
By an act of war, committed with the participation of a diplomatic 
representative of the United States and without authority of Congress, the 
Government of a feeble but friendly and confiding people has been overthrown. A 
substantial wrong has thus been done which a due regard for our national character 
as well as the rights of the injured people requires we should endeavour to repair. 
The provisional government has not assumed a republican or other constitutional 
form, but has remained a mere council or oligarchy, set up without the assent of the 
people. It has not sought to find a permanent basis of popular support and has given 
no evidence of an intention to do so.
37
 
 
Thus we see Cleveland summarising his case: the revolution in Hawaii in January, 1893, 
was in fact an act of war, perpetrated by a lone agent of the United States acting without 
authorisation and even against the constitution – a very great wrong. This wrong was 
committed not just against an innocent people on behalf of a corrupt and two-faced 
oligarchy, but also against the very character of the United States and must therefore be 
repaired. The decision to attempt to restore the Hawaiian monarchy was not a matter of 
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partisan politics or diplomatic niceties, it was a battle for the nation’s standing overseas 
and perhaps even its soul. Cleveland then proceeded to set out his vision for how foreign 
policy (and American foreign policy in particular) should be conducted: 
The law of nations is founded upon reason and justice, and the rules of 
conduct governing individual relations between citizens or subjects of a civilized 
state are equally applicable as between enlightened nations. The considerations that 
international law is without a court for its enforcement, and that obedience to its 
commands practically depends upon good faith, instead of upon the mandate of a 
superior tribunal, only give added sanction to the law itself and brand any 
deliberate infraction of it not merely as a wrong but as a disgrace. A man of true 
honor protects the unwritten word which binds his conscience more scrupulously, if 
possible, than he does the bond a breach of which subjects him to legal liabilities; 
and the United States in aiming to maintain itself as one of the most enlightened of 
nations would do its citizens gross injustice if it applied to its international relations 
any other than a high standard of honor and morality.
38
 
 
As a lawyer and a liberal Cleveland placed his faith in the ability of nations to conduct 
their affairs in good faith and with regard for the rights of the weak as well as the strong. 
The repeated stress of honour and justice placed foreign policy in a moral context which 
superseded other factors. In the case of Hawaii Cleveland saw it as a matter of national 
honour and decency to repair the damage to its government and institutions that had been 
done in the name of the United States and through its power. This argument of moral and 
legal duties would become a recurring factor in Cleveland’s foreign policy with the two 
aspects being inextricably linked. Cleveland’s policies would generally focus around the 
nation’s rights under its treaties, but there would be occasions when they were based upon 
a legal foundation that was itself often as much to do with concepts of fundamental 
morality as legal precedent. In this respect – as exemplified in Hawaii – Cleveland blended 
the still somewhat diffuse concept of international law with a personal belief in a natural, 
moral justice. This single paragraph of Cleveland’s message potentially carries three 
important themes for a study of the foreign policy of his second term. The first is the extent 
to which this moral, ethical and legal approach can be seen to be dictating foreign policy 
during the period. The second is the question of how broadly Cleveland’s opinion was 
shared both by other American politicians and by the American public, and also by foreign 
powers. The final theme is drawn directly from the text and is perhaps linked to the 
second; it is the implication in the statement that “the United States in aiming to maintain 
itself as one of the most enlightened of nations” that there was a danger that the United 
States might be losing its claim to a superior enlightenment or morality and thus perhaps a 
recognition that America’s place in the world was changing.  
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 The Cleveland administration’s response to the revolution in Hawaii saw three 
moments of decision in 1893. The first of these moments was the decision in February, 
1893, to withdraw the annexation treaty from the Senate upon entering office and to 
commission an investigation into the role played by representatives of the United States in 
the revolution. The second, prompted by the findings of that investigation, came in October 
when it was decided that an attempt should be made to restore Queen Liliuokalani to 
power peacefully. Finally, in December, 1893, the decision was made to pass the matter to 
Congress. Undoubtedly the affair was under constant review throughout this period, 
particularly between April and July when Blount was sending regular reports of his 
progress to Gresham, but it is these three moments that can be viewed as pivotal in the 
progress of the Cleveland administration’s Hawaiian policy. 
 While often disagreeing about Cleveland’s exact motivations for withdrawing the 
annexation treaty from the Senate, scholarly opinion has proved largely united in arguing 
that the incoming President approached the problem with an open mind. Supporting this 
viewpoint is the testimony of James H. Blount himself, as highlighted by Allan Nevins, 
who declared that the President held no preconceived ideas on the matter and only wished 
to ascertain the true facts relating to the revolution.
39
 Similarly, Walter LaFeber declares 
that Cleveland “told close friends that he had not decided for or against annexation, but 
that ‘we ought to stop, look and think.’”40 Such words would suggest in particular that 
Cleveland was disconcerted by the speed with which the Harrison administration had 
brought the matter to the point of decision and it appears certain that he was indeed deeply 
concerned by this haste. Undoubtedly, it would be very much in Cleveland’s nature to 
approach the Hawaiian question cautiously and in such a way as to avoid closing off any 
course of action unnecessarily. However, given the new President’s ideological instinct 
against imperialist expansionism, it might be argued that his open-mindedness may have 
been overstated. The fundamental question is whether, if Blount’s investigation had 
revealed annexation by the United States to be the will of the Hawaiian people, Cleveland 
would have still opposed annexation on principle. 
 To answer this question it is necessary to stray a little beyond the immediate 
boundaries of the Hawaiian revolution and examine a few comparable situations in 
Cleveland’s service as President. This was not the first time that Cleveland had chosen to 
alter the direction of American foreign policy by withdrawing a treaty from the Senate. A 
similar, if somewhat less dramatic, situation had occurred in 1885 when he had been 
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inaugurated as President for the first time. On that occasion Cleveland had reversed 
American policy on two issues by halting the progress of treaty legislation through the 
Congressional process. The treaties in question were the general act of the Berlin 
Conference on international trade in the Congo and the Frelinghuysen-Zavala treaty aimed 
at bringing about the construction of a trans-isthmian canal in Nicaragua. Cleveland 
reversed government policy on both treaties with little or no concern for public opinion and 
on the grounds of what he believed to be the best foreign policy for the United States: a 
rejection of imperialism – be it physically expansionist or economic – and a limited 
isolationism. His actions were based upon his understanding of the advice and precedents 
left by George Washington, Thomas Jefferson and James Monroe, as he himself set out in 
his first inaugural address in March, 1885 when he declared:  
Maintaining, as I do, the tenets of a line of precedents from Washington's day, 
which proscribe entangling alliances with foreign states, I do not favor a policy of 
acquisition of new and distant territory or the incorporation of remote interests with 
our own.
41
 
 
With this in mind, there is every reason to believe that Cleveland was acting according to 
his ideological instinct once again in relation to Hawaii in March, 1893. 
All this is purely circumstantial; as has already been stated, the changing nature of 
American foreign relations in the late 19
th
 Century and Cleveland’s own broadened 
experience since his first inauguration mean direct comparisons should only be made 
cautiously. Certainly there are other signs that Cleveland was hostile to annexation such as 
his letter of introduction for Blount to President Dole of the provisional government which 
makes no reference whatsoever to annexation, instead speaking of cultivating friendship 
between the two nations, but this could simply be an example of Cleveland maintaining a 
diplomatic neutrality.
42
 Rather more solid evidence is provided by a statement that 
Cleveland made to the Associated Press in January, 1898, after he had left the White 
House. In this statement – given to pass grudging comment on the new treaty of annexation 
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proposed by his successor, William McKinley – Cleveland declared “I regarded [in 1893], 
and still regard, the proposed annexation of these islands as not only opposed to our 
national policy, but as a perversion of our national mission. The mission of our nation is to 
build up and make a greater country out of what we have, instead of annexing islands.”43 
This clear statement, shorn of any caveats, would appear to undermine the argument that 
Cleveland approached the matter of Hawaiian annexation with a truly open mind. Once 
again, however, we must approach this statement with an element of caution. Having left 
office – and with little prospect of returning to the national stage – Cleveland was free to 
speak his mind, but he was also in the position of acting with the benefit of hindsight, 
knowing that Blount’s investigation uncovered all the worst signs of American complicity 
in the revolution that he might have feared in March of 1893. That said, however, the 
statement to the Associated Press can be seen as nicely complementing Cleveland’s 
statement in his first inaugural address that it was the President’s duty to enact a foreign 
policy that sought to aid “the settlement and development of the resources of our vast 
territory”, a statement that implicitly rejected overseas expansionism as unnecessary, and 
perhaps even un-American.
44
 Further support can be found in his dismissal of theories that 
he was dissatisfied with the treaty itself, not the concept of annexation: “I was opposed to 
annexation as such.”45 Interestingly, Cleveland’s own explanation for his decision to 
launch an investigation stresses that it had nothing to do with annexation, but was simply 
an attempt to discover the involvement, if any, of the United States in the overthrow of the 
Hawaiian monarchy. It is here that he declares that he acted “without holding any previous 
designs of restoring the monarchy” suggesting that it was not his position on annexation 
that was open to persuasion, but his position on how best to approach the new provisional 
government in Hawaii.
46
 For Cleveland, annexation was non-negotiable as a point of 
principle. 
 The statement to the Associated Press would appear to render meaningless the 
question of Cleveland’s actions if Blount’s investigation had proven annexation to be the 
will of the Hawaiian people. Certainly the fact that Blount, quite predictably, discovered 
that the opinion of the native Hawaiian majority was anything but favourable to the 
concept of annexation means that the question is purely a hypothetical exercise. This does 
not mean though that the exercise cannot prove instructive since the opinions of Cleveland 
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and Gresham relating to the native Hawaiians can tell us a great deal about their anti-
imperialism. 
 As with so much else in foreign policy, Grover Cleveland’s views on popular 
sovereignty were founded in tradition. In his message to Congress of December 18, 1893, 
he declared that he sympathised with the establishment of a new republic in Hawaii, but 
that it was the “settled policy of the United States to concede to people of foreign countries 
the same freedom and independence in the management of their domestic affairs that we 
have always claimed for ourselves”.47 Tellingly, Cleveland also stated that it had been 
American practice to recognise new republican governments “as soon as it became 
apparent that they were supported by the people.” It was this support which Cleveland 
clearly believed the provisional government in Hawaii was lacking when he described the 
provisional government as an “oligarchy” stating that it had “not sought to find a 
permanent basis of popular support and [had] given no evidence of an intention to do so.”48 
What is particularly striking about these statements, besides the obvious dislike for the 
provisional government and its members, is that Cleveland’s support for popular 
sovereignty was apparently not subject to racial discrimination. He took some pleasure in 
reminding his audience that the provisional government had asserted that “the people of 
Hawaii are unfit for popular government” and “can be best ruled by arbitrary or despotic 
power” but did not pass any judgement on this assertion beyond using it to highlight the 
unrepresentative nature of the government.
49
 This is not to say that Cleveland believed that 
the Hawaiian people were ready to form a democracy of their own, but it is clear that he 
preferred a native Hawaiian monarchy to a white oligarchy which claimed to be republican 
in nature. It is this latter point which is most important: Cleveland was determined from the 
beginning to ascertain the wishes of the majority of the Hawaiian population. This is why 
he told the Associated Press that he kept an open mind on whether to restore the monarchy. 
At this stage it is interesting to observe Gresham’s instructions to Blount on how he 
was to conduct his investigation. Here the will of the Hawaiian people received third 
billing behind the current condition of affairs in the islands and the true facts of the 
revolution while all other aspects are simply covered in a general request for information 
that can “fully enlighten the President”.50 This would certainly suggest that the will of the 
Hawaiian people was of interest to Cleveland and his cabinet while, for his part, Blount 
was clearly keen to provide his masters in Washington with as much information on that 
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subject as possible. Blount’s first report on his progress after arriving in Hawaii offers a 
marked contrast between his favourable impression of representatives of the pro-monarchy 
Hawaiian Patriotic League and his statement that “The American minister and consul-
general seem to be very intense partisans for annexation.”51 Subsequently, Blount’s second 
dispatch to Gresham contained a variety of documents that the investigator deemed 
important for the understanding of Hawaii, chief amongst them being a government 
immigration report from 1892. Clearly the ethnic and racial demographics of the islands 
were considered important by Blount.
52
 Hereafter Blount’s dispatches consistently 
displayed his interest in the views of the native majority in Hawaii, as well as in the racial 
mix in the islands. It is unnecessary to go into great detail, but it is important to note that as 
early as May 4 Blount saw fit to report that “At this time the indications are unmistakable 
that a large majority of the people of the Islands are utterly opposed to annexation.”53 
It seems clear that Cleveland’s concerns in Hawaii were not simply limited to fears 
for American honour, but also included a genuine desire to see justice served to the 
Hawaiian people through a respect for popular sovereignty. This much is demonstrated by 
his instructions to Blount to both probe the causes of the revolution – a clear sign of 
Cleveland’s suspicions about American actions – and ascertain the opinion of the majority 
of the Hawaiian population. Does this concern for the people of Hawaii also, however, 
indicate another factor of Cleveland’s personality: a streak of paternalism for weaker 
nations and their inhabitants? Certainly Cleveland’s attitude towards Hawaii, perhaps 
unwittingly, was very much an imperialist one; his position from the start was that of an 
arbiter deciding the fate of a wronged people, a position that would only become more 
apparent after the delivery of Blount’s final report. In many respects this can be seen as a 
natural response for any late 19
th
 Century American president – confirmed in the beliefs of 
a racist age that the Anglo-Saxon race was inherently superior to all others and well-used 
to a paternal role by decades of experience in ruling the United States’ Native American 
population. Cleveland himself advocated policies of education toward Native Americans 
with an ultimate goal of independent citizenship, but he also described them as 
“responsibilities we cannot escape”.54 Outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States, he saw no such responsibility to educate and civilise others and the first two years 
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of his second term would see determined efforts on his part to ensure that the nation did 
not acquire further responsibilities overseas - firstly in Hawaii and then in Samoa. 
The United States’ involvement in Samoa dated back to the Presidency of 
Rutherford B. Hayes, but came to a head during Cleveland’s first term when German 
interference in the islands’ intricate tribal politics saw the invoking of American good 
offices by the Samoan king Malietoa. Trapped by the treaty guarantees of earlier 
administrations, Cleveland his Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard had attempted to 
negotiate a compromise that would have maintained Samoan independence, but without 
success. American warships faced off with their German counterparts with tensions only 
finally defused by a catastrophic hurricane in March 1889 which destroyed the ships and 
killed many of their crewmen. The result had been a new treaty, negotiated and ratified 
during Cleveland’s period out of office which granted a tri-partite protectorate over the 
islands to Germany, Great Britain and the United States.
55
 Upon his return to the White 
House Cleveland seized upon unrest in the islands to make clear his disapproval of this 
protectorate arrangement. In his annual message of 1893 he used an abortive revolution 
against King Malietoa, now supported by the western powers, as an example of “the 
impolicy of entangling alliances with foreign powers.”56 He also took care to state that the 
insurrection had demonstrated that the protectorate was failing in its aim of preventing 
such unrest. One year later, and with a lasting peace in the islands still not apparent, 
Cleveland railed against the failures of the western-backed government in Samoa: 
Our participation in its establishment against the wishes of the natives was in plain 
defiance of the conservative teachings and warnings of the wise and patriotic men 
who laid the foundations of our free institutions...
57
  
 
 
Here we have still more evidence of Cleveland’s instinctive opposition to imperialist 
adventures as being counter to the central tenets of American government as he perceived 
it, but also a clear statement of his belief that the will of the native majority had been 
ignored, with disastrous consequences. Clearly Cleveland was not a believer in the racial 
philosophies that argued that it was the duty of the white races to provide leadership for 
their less civilised neighbours. Indeed, it may even be that the situation in Samoa played 
some role in Cleveland’s later decision making over Hawaii, or at the very least confirmed 
him in his instinctive beliefs. It is not possible to draw a conclusive link between the two 
events, but the fact that Cleveland was weighing up his options in Hawaii at the same time 
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as a previous white protectorate in another Pacific island nation was experiencing 
difficulties with unrest in the native population will have done nothing to improve his 
disposition towards a protectorate. In these sentiments he was undoubtedly joined by 
Gresham who wrote to Carl Schurz in July 1893 about the situation in Samoa stating that 
“Our government should not undertake to maintain a protectorate, either alone or in 
conjunction with other Powers, in the South Sea Islands, or elsewhere.”58 This is a 
categorical statement of Gresham’s beliefs, written only weeks before the arrival in 
Washington of Blount’s report. Fundamentally, it would appear that almost nothing could 
have occurred that would have altered Cleveland and Gresham’s stance on the relationship 
between the United States and Hawaii. Cleveland may have held some paternalistic and 
racist views with regards to those peoples already under his jurisdiction, but he did not 
believe that the United States had a duty to act as a white father to others. Cleveland 
clearly believed that Samoa and Hawaii had demonstrated themselves to be quite capable 
of self-rule without outside interference. All of this is entirely consistent with a policy 
based upon doing what was legally and morally right. For a Jacksonian Democrat like 
Cleveland, government had to be a product of popular will if it was to have legitimacy and 
so the oligarchic rule of the white minority in Hawaii was equally as wrong as the illegal 
interference of the United States which had created it. 
 
The second point of decision relating to Hawaii took place in the cabinet meeting of 
October 18, 1893. This is not to say that the matter had been left unattended between 
March and October; undoubtedly, Cleveland and his cabinet gave the matter a great deal of 
thought in the intervening period. Certainly Gresham was receiving regular updates from 
Blount and the latter’s report was finally prepared on July 17, although it did not reach 
Washington for several weeks.
59
 While the summer recess – during which anyone who 
could took the earliest possible opportunity to escape the heat and humidity of Washington 
D.C. – delayed the Cleveland administration’s action on Blount’s report, the return to work 
in October saw a revival of interest from several members of the cabinet, particularly 
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Gresham and Olney. Regarding our exploration of the role played by factors such as 
justice, national honour, anti-imperialism, and colonialism there are four major documents 
that informed the decision taken at the cabinet meeting: Blount’s final report, Richard 
Olney’s letter to Gresham of October 9, Gresham’s memorandum prepared for the cabinet 
meeting of October 18, and Gresham’s instructions to Albert S. Willis, the new Minister to 
Hawaii, also dated October 18. 
Blount’s report can be dealt with briefly, but it is important because it provides the 
context upon which all three of the other documents were based. The report itself is an 
extensive document that ranges over a broad range of information from interviews to 
census reports to trade statistics. Such things all carry a scholarly interest, but it is the 
conclusions that the report draws that are of greatest significance. Those conclusions have 
already been discussed, but they can be restated simply in three phases. Firstly, the 
revolution can be regarded as a criminal act. This crime was committed primarily against 
Queen Liliuokalani and thus also against the Hawaiian people who are shown to be 
generally in favour of the monarchy. Finally, the United States was demonstrably complicit 
in the revolution, which would have failed without the assistance of American military 
might. These are the facts as presented to Cleveland and his cabinet thus forming the basis 
for the administration’s actions. 
 The letter from Olney to Gresham and Gresham’s memorandum are 
complementary documents. While Olney’s letter is dated October 9 and the memorandum 
October 18 it seems clear that the letter was a response to either an early viewing of a draft 
of the final memorandum or at least some discussion of the problem between the two men. 
With this in mind we can view the Olney letter as a pragmatic response to the somewhat 
idealist vision presented by Gresham. Specifically, Gresham’s memorandum opens by 
setting out a thorough grounding on the findings of Blount’s investigation, presumably for 
any cabinet members who were not completely aware of the facts prior to the meeting. The 
memorandum shows Gresham to be in no doubt that the revolution was the action of a 
minority aided by Minister Stevens who was both complicit in the plans and vital to their 
success. It also demonstrates his scorn for any suggestion that the Provisional Government 
might hold any legitimacy. His final verdict was damning: 
 The Government of Hawaii surrendered its authority under a threat of war, 
until such time only as the Government of the United States, upon the facts being 
present to it, should reinstate the constitutional sovereign, and the Provisional 
Government was created ‘to exist until terms of union with the United States of 
America have been negotiated and agreed upon.’60 
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His proposal of how the Cleveland administration should proceed was phrased in equally 
powerful and emotive language: 
Should not the wrong done to a feeble but independent State by an abuse of 
the authority of the United States be undone by restoring the legitimate 
government? Anything short of that will not, I respectfully submit, satisfy the 
demands of justice.
61
 
 
Thus we can see the Hawaiian matter being couched in precisely the same terms which 
Cleveland would employ when sending the matter to Congress: the “demands of justice” 
and the threat to the national honour of the United States. Gresham’s memorandum also 
presents the matter in precisely the same imperialist terms evident in Cleveland’s earlier 
decision to reject annexation, speaking of a “feeble but independent State” which requires 
American justice, but not American leadership. 
 It is here that the Olney letter presents a contrast. While Gresham presents the 
matter as a simple question of right and wrong Olney is the first to inject a note of 
pragmatism that can be seen to play a significant role in the latter stages of the Cleveland 
administration’s handling of the Hawaiian revolution. Before examining Olney’s letter in 
more detail it is firstly important to note that Olney was included in the discussions of the 
Hawaiian problem at all - clear evidence of the stress which Cleveland and Gresham would 
place on the role of the law in formulating foreign policy. In this case, it is the issue of 
future plans that is of greatest interest in the Olney letter. The Attorney General himself 
agreed wholeheartedly with Gresham’s interpretation “that a great wrong was done under 
the auspices of United States Minister Stevens when the regular constitutional government 
of the Queen was supplanted and the present, so-called, provisional government installed 
in its stead.”62 He also praised “the good sense, the statesmanship and the sound morality” 
of the Secretary of State’s proposal to attempt to rectify matters by returning them to the 
situation before the revolution took place. Further, Olney declared that the threat of force 
was justified to overthrow the provisional government - since that government came to 
power by the exact same threat and thus could not complain - despite the possibility that it 
might constitute an act of war. It is here, though, that Olney’s view of the matter differed 
sharply from Gresham’s. His concern was that the provisional government had been in 
power for so long, apparently with American acquiescence, that any action to displace it 
would require the use of actual force and not just threats. The use of this force, against a 
body that has exercised all the functions of legitimate government for months was, in 
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Olney’s opinion, an act of war and thus outside the President’s powers.63 Moving on from 
questions of the feasibility and logistics of removing the provisional government, Olney 
came to the crux of the problem facing Cleveland and his cabinet: with American force 
having toppled one government to install another, the United States government now found 
itself responsible for the fortunes of both parties. Here we see the ramifications of an 
imperialist mindset as the actions of a previous administration in interfering with the 
affairs of a weaker nation led to an inherited responsibility towards both the deposed 
government and the provisional government for the Cleveland administration due to that 
administration’s paternalist sense of responsibility towards the wronged party. The 
practical result of this was Olney’s suggestion that any offer of aid in restoring Queen 
Liliuokalani to power must include a proviso that she would both uphold the commitments 
entered into by the provisional government and, more problematically, agree to grant an 
amnesty to the members of the provisional government who had overthrown her. 
Throughout this discussion the matter of Liliuokalani’s involvement is presented in largely 
paternal terms, with Olney stating that “the United States should require of the Queen ... 
full power and authority to negotiate and bring about the restoration of her government on 
such reasonable terms and conditions as the United States may approve and find to be 
practicable.”64 Whether for reasons of racial prejudice, the national interest or simply 
practical considerations of negotiating with the Queen’s inveterate enemies Olney was 
effectively demanding that the United States be granted complete control over the Queen’s 
future and thus the future of the Hawaiian government. Ultimately, Olney expressed 
confidence that these terms would be agreeable to both parties, but it may be that the 
difficulties he had anticipated in obtaining the provisional government’s agreement to step 
aside peacefully were already weighing on Cleveland’s decisions at the cabinet meeting on 
October 18. 
 The instructions given to Albert S. Willis, Cleveland’s choice to replace Blount as 
United States Minister to Hawaii, can be seen as the result of the deliberations that 
culminated in the cabinet meeting of October 18. On the same day as that meeting took 
place Gresham wrote to Willis with special instructions to supplement those regarding his 
new post. In a brief description of the history of the case Gresham emphasised that Queen 
Liliuokalani had only yielded to the revolutionaries when it became clear that they had the 
                                                 
63
 Olney also expressed concern that the use of military power was likely, if it encountered resistance from 
the provisional government, to devastate Hawaii thus restoring to the Queen a nation very different to the one 
that she had relinquished. He also, perhaps over-cautiously given Blount’s findings, questioned what would 
happen if it was discovered that the Hawaiian population had come to support the provisional government 
over the monarchy. 
64
 Olney to Gresham, October 9, 1893, Reel 1, Gresham Papers, MD, LC 
66 
 
backing of American forces and on the understanding “that if she surrendered under protest 
her case would afterwards be fairly considered by the President of the United States.”65 
Describing the decision to yield as wise, Gresham declared that the Queen was “relying 
upon the good faith and honor of the President, when informed of what had occurred, to 
undo the action of the minister and reinstate her and the authority which she claimed as the 
constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.”66 The Secretary of State also ordered 
Willis to inform the Queen of the President’s “sincere regret” over the actions of Minister 
Stevens. Clearly, for Gresham at least, the cabinet meeting had not seen a noticeable 
change in the belief that it was the duty of the Cleveland administration to right a wrong in 
Hawaii. By contrast to this effusive concern for the rights of the Queen, the actual 
instructions to Willis are relatively brief with almost equal billing being granted to the need 
to apologise for American actions during the revolution and the real aim of Willis’ 
mission: securing a negotiated restoration of the Hawaiian monarchy. 
 It is in this regard that we see a return to a paternalist attitude by the Cleveland 
administration. Just as Olney recommended in his letter of October 9, Willis was ordered 
to “inform the Queen that, when reinstated, the President expects that she will pursue a 
magnanimous course by granting full amnesty to all who participated in the movement 
against her,” as well as assuming any obligations entered into by the provisional 
government.
67
 Her acquiescence in allowing Willis to negotiate her future for her was 
clearly assumed. Indeed, Gresham informed Willis that Liliuokalani’s agreement to the 
American terms was expected to be speedily obtained allowing him to move on to the 
second phase of his instructions. Here we find a perfectly formed example of the 
imperialist mindset that appears to have rapidly come to dominate the Cleveland 
administration’s deliberations on Hawaii. Willis was instructed that, having obtained the 
Queen’s agreement to the proposed plan of action, he should “advise the executive of the 
Provisional Government and his ministers of the President’s determination of the question 
which their action and that of the Queen devolved upon him, and that they are expected to 
promptly relinquish to her her constitutional authority.” There could hardly be a better 
statement of how Gresham – and, perhaps to a lesser extent, Cleveland and the other 
cabinet members – had come to view the Hawaiian matter in October 1893. While Allan 
Nevins’ claim that Gresham “seems to have felt ... a romantic throb for the defenceless 
queen” is perhaps stretching the evidence somewhat, it is clear that the Secretary of State 
now perceived the entire issue as an American prerogative whereby the defenceless 
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Hawaiians and the greedy planters would calmly accept the wisdom and justice dispensed 
from Washington.
68
 The only indication that Willis’ mission might not be as simple as it 
appeared on paper came from a brief final instruction that “Should the Queen decline to 
pursue the liberal course suggested, or should the Provisional Government refuse to abide 
by the President’s decision, you will report the facts and await further instructions.”69 Once 
again we can note the implication that either action would be little short of insanity, but it 
is telling both that a rejection was anticipated to some extent – and clearly Olney, despite 
his expressions of confidence, had already played the role of devil’s advocate in this regard 
– and that there was no immediate plan for how to respond in such a scenario. This could 
be the ultimate expression of confidence in the plan’s success, but it is equally likely – 
especially when we consider the events of the following months – that there were no 
further options available to the President for Gresham to pass on to Willis. The legalist 
context within which Cleveland and Gresham were framing the Hawaiian situation had 
served them as a guide, but it also imposed limits on their actions. Thus we see the over-
riding imperialism that dominated the second point of decision on Hawaii being 
undermined by occasional hints of concern at the prospect of failure and by calls, led by 
Richard Olney, for a more pragmatic approach. It would appear that Olney’s voice came to 
have an increasing influence on Cleveland’s thinking during the months leading up to the 
third point of decision. 
 This final key point of decision is somewhat confused and is therefore hard to pin 
down exactly. The decision in question was whether to pass control of the Hawaiian issue 
to Congress and it culminated in Cleveland’s special message to Congress on December 
18, 1893. It has been claimed that the decision was taken at a cabinet meeting on 
December 7, but there is evidence to suggest that the move had been under consideration 
long before that meeting.
70
 
 Albert S. Willis arrived in Honolulu on November 4, 1893, and immediately found 
himself immersed in a far more delicate situation than Gresham appears to have believed 
he would encounter. His first despatch, informing the State Department of his arrival, 
noted the arrival in the islands of shipments of rifles and ammunition while also reporting 
that the capital was a hotbed of political rumours.
71
 In a despatch of November 11, Willis 
reported his first meeting with President Dole of the provisional government and explained 
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that he would meet with the Queen in the next few days, but had not believed faster action 
was advisable given the excitement surrounding his arrival.
72
 Hawaii did not exist in an 
information vacuum and the events there were widely reported, whether from rumours or 
official sources, in both the Hawaiian and American press. While Willis’ mission may not 
have been officially declared it certainly was a matter of rumour and gossip with 
Cleveland’s intention to restore the Queen apparently becoming public knowledge in mid-
November.
73
 It was in this highly charged atmosphere and not the calm of the State 
Department or the White House that Willis met Queen Liliuokalani; a meeting that resulted 
in a one line telegram: 
 Views of first party so extreme as to require further instructions.
74
 
 
This telegram arrived in Washington eight days later and provoked an angry response from 
Gresham who replied “The brevity and uncertainty of your telegrams are embarrassing. 
You will insist upon amnesty and recognition of obligations of the Provisional Government 
as essential conditions of restoration.”75 A subsequent telegram of December 3 gave fuller 
instructions of how Willis should handle the Queen’s intransigence, but provided little 
advice beyond the original instructions given to Willis before his departure.
76
 Ultimately, 
Willis did convince the Queen to acquiesce in Cleveland’s demands, only to be met by a 
flat rejection by the provisional government. By this time, however, events in Washington 
demonstrated that Cleveland had long since abandoned hope in the plan. 
 The day after Gresham sent his telegram advising Willis on how to respond to the 
Queen’s rejection of his offer Cleveland sent his annual message to Congress. In this 
message Cleveland declared the affair to be a matter of national honour which could only 
be assuaged by restoring the status of the islands to the condition existing when the 
original American intervention took place.
77
 He reported that no definitive information had 
yet been received on the results of Willis’ mission – perhaps being somewhat economical 
with the truth given that, even considering the brevity of Willis’ telegram, it was clear that 
the first meeting with the Queen had not gone well. Most interestingly, Cleveland ended 
his report on Hawaii with a brief paragraph setting out his intentions for the future: 
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 Additional advices are soon expected. When received they will be promptly 
sent to the Congress, together with all other information at hand, accompanied by a 
special Executive message fully detailing all the facts necessary to a complete 
understanding of the case and presenting a history of all the material events leading 
up to the present situation. 
 
Three days before the cabinet meeting of December 7 – and two weeks before the message 
of December 18 – Cleveland had stated to Congress and the nation that he would be 
presenting the matter to them in full. This is not to say that he knew on December 4 that he 
would be effectively abandoning the Hawaiian matter – it is very possible that he still 
hoped that Willis’ mission might prove a success – but it appears very likely that in the 
interval between Willis’ departure and the annual message Cleveland had come to doubt 
his ability to broker a settlement in Hawaii within the bounds of his constitutional power. 
In this period the Blount report had been released to the public following a government 
leak and Willis’ initial reports had shown both that the situation in Hawaii was potentially 
volatile and that the Queen was not immediately amenable to American proposals. 
Furthermore, while there is no direct evidence to prove it, it is likely that Olney’s urge to 
follow a pragmatic course was influencing Cleveland’s judgement. It was Olney who had 
warned that the use of military force might be necessary to unseat the provisional 
government and for an administration that had already shown itself to be strongly 
influenced by the limitations of the law this would necessitate the involvement of 
Congress. Since Congressional support for military action was highly unlikely given the 
divisive nature of the problem the logical next step was to pass the entire matter to them. 
Whether the cabinet meeting of December 7 was motivated by the passing the day before 
of a fiercely partisan Senate resolution demanding that Cleveland submit all documents on 
the matter to Congress is impossible to know, but it is quite clear that the plan had been in 
Cleveland’s thoughts for some time before either the resolution or the meeting.78 
Ultimately, the Cleveland administration’s combination of respect for the law – both 
international law and constitutional law – and their paternalist sense of obligation towards 
all parties had dictated large elements of their response to the Hawaiian revolution and 
eventually forced them into a cul-de-sac whereby their only recourse was to pass the matter 
to Congress. Their chosen solution to the problem was no doubt noble and honourable, but 
was not realistic. In the end a more pragmatic approach prevailed, accepting the situation 
as it was, but still refusing to submit to the demands for annexation. 
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 Both the House and the Senate considered the evidence provided by Cleveland and 
in the subsequent months adopted resolutions on the matter. The House censured Minister 
Stevens and approved a policy of non-interference which rejected both restoring the 
monarchy and annexation. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee issued a report which 
exonerated Stevens, but saw deep partisan divisions over Cleveland’s actions. Like the 
House, the Senate adopted a resolution against American interference in Hawaiian affairs, 
but unlike their counterparts’ the Senate resolution also warned that similar interference 
from other governments would be considered an act unfriendly to the United States.
79
 With 
Congress predictably not sharing the administration’s qualms about the American role in 
unseating the Hawaiian monarchy there was nothing more for Cleveland and Gresham to 
do but accept the resolutions. In May, 1894, a constitutional convention was organised by 
the Hawaiian provisional government consisting of the 19 members of the provisional 
government itself and 18 elected representatives. If the apportioning of delegates suggested 
a desire to overrule the native majority it was unnecessary – a requirement that voters sign 
an oath of loyalty restricted the electorate to only 4,000, most of whom were foreigners. 
The resultant constitution saw the creation of a new government on July 4, 1894, an act 
which drew protests from Queen Liliuokalani, a mass meeting of 5,000-7,000 Hawaiians, 
and the native groups such as the Women’s Hawaiian Patriotic Association who protested 
to foreign representatives in Honolulu that the new constitution was designed to 
disenfranchise native Hawaiians and Asian immigrants using tactics similar to those used 
by the American deep South to disenfranchise African-Americans.
80
 While Gresham 
would maintain a scathing opinion of the Hawaiian government until his death, Cleveland 
accepted that his hands were tied and extended official recognition in August.
81
 An 
abortive counter-coup in the winter of 1894-95 was detected and easily brushed aside by 
the new government and, despite the continued efforts of pro-monarchy groups to petition 
Cleveland for assistance, the United States played little part in Hawaiian affairs until the 
McKinley administration resurrected plans for annexation in 1897.
82
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 The Cleveland administration’s response to the Hawaiian revolution demonstrates a 
determination from the returning President and his advisors to enact American foreign 
policy upon lines fixed by ideological factors. These factors were delivered to the public as 
an interest in legality and national honour, but these were also expressions of an over-
arching opposition to imperialist expansion (even if they were tempered by a profoundly 
paternalist attitude). The negotiations with the Senate to delay ratification of the treaty, the 
treaty’s swift withdrawal, the interest shown in Blount’s investigation into both the actions 
of American representatives and the sentiment of the local population, and the attempt to 
resolve the problem by restoring the Hawaiian monarchy to power all demonstrate this 
desire to enact a policy founded upon a legal and ethical basis that would actively attempt 
to change the course of American foreign relations. In time these concepts of legality and 
morality would come to define Cleveland’s foreign policy during his second term and, 
while being primarily employed reactively, would eventually be put forward as a template 
for the United States’ interaction with a changing world. This would come later, however, 
and there is an undeniable pragmatic element to Cleveland’s handling of the Hawaiian 
revolution. This is first demonstrated by his decision to pass the matter to Congress once it 
became clear that the problem was unsolvable under the constitutional powers of the 
President. This may be a debatable point since it can be argued that Cleveland placed 
himself in an untenable position by proposing a course of action that was largely 
unrealistic and thus was forced to retreat by the course of events. Under this interpretation 
the decision to pass the matter to Congress is less an act of pragmatism than it is a 
capitulation. There are other incidents, though, which demonstrate that Cleveland was not 
so wedded to his ideological principles as to ignore the national interest entirely. Indeed, it 
is possible to argue that this concern for the national interest formed an underlying factor 
for almost all of Cleveland’s decisions. 
  It is clear that Cleveland’s interpretation of what comprised the national interest 
was rather different from many other American politicians of the period – such as Minister 
Stevens – not least because he was a staunch believer that overseas expansion itself was 
against the national interest. This is not to say, though, that he did not hold certain beliefs 
in common with his more expansionist opponents. Among these commonalities was 
concern at the aggressive imperialism of the European powers and a determination to 
ensure that the United States was not placed at a disadvantage either economically or 
strategically because of it. In the case of Hawaii this was demonstrated by the decision to 
balance the rejection of annexation or even a protectorate for the islands with an 
uncompromising stance in opposition to interference from other powers. Blount’s 
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instructions from Gresham on how to conduct his investigation include a statement to the 
commissioner (obviously intended to succeed Stevens as the United States’ main 
representative in the islands) setting out the United States’ position in relation to Hawaiian 
sovereignty: 
 While the United States claim no right to interfere in the political or 
domestic affairs or in the internal conflicts of the Hawaiian Islands ... this 
Government will adhere to its consistent and established policy in relation to them, 
and it will not acquiesce in domestic interference by other powers.
83
 
 
Clearly there was some concern that other powers might perceive the United States’ 
rejection of annexation as an invitation to attempt to increase their own influence in the 
islands. This concern could only have been exacerbated by the repeated warnings received 
from Minister Stevens throughout March and April that the diplomatic and military 
representatives of both Great Britain and Japan, supported by private citizens of both 
nations, were considering precisely that interference that Gresham had warned Blount 
about.
84
 While it is unlikely that Gresham and Cleveland were, even at this early stage, 
placing any great faith in the impartiality of Stevens’ reports it may be telling that copies of 
his despatches can be found in the Grover Cleveland Papers. The President might have 
distrusted the Minister, but it would have been extreme negligence on his part to ignore the 
warnings. It is possible then that Stevens’ despatches added to the concern displayed by 
Gresham in Blount’s instructions to prompt a series of private meetings between Gresham 
and the British, Japanese and Russian representatives in Washington in which the 
Secretary of State made it clear that the United States would not tolerate outside 
interference in Hawaii.
85
 Similarly, Walter LaFeber describes how Gresham and the 
Secretary of the Navy, Hilary Herbert, were careful to assure London that American 
warships would protect British lives and property and thus kept British forces away from 
the islands.
86
 Here we see a clear demonstration of the Cleveland administration’s stance 
on imperialism in general and Hawaii in particular: the nation could receive all the 
economic benefits of close relations with Hawaii without the burdens of annexation or a 
protectorate simply through careful diplomacy. 
 So does this mean that Cleveland’s rhetoric of a foreign policy governed by honour 
and justice was simply posturing that would ultimately be consumed by the greater needs 
of pragmatism and the larger national interest? Not necessarily. While in the case of 
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Hawaii Cleveland was forced to withdraw from his preferred strategy he had nonetheless 
achieved a significant change in American policy between returning to office and the 
decision to pass the matter to Congress in December 1893. Gresham’s efforts to ensure that 
the United States retained its position of commercial superiority in Hawaii can perhaps be 
seen as a betrayal of principle, but those efforts were not inconsistent with an honourable 
and legal approach to foreign affairs. After all, what would be the use of such a stance in 
Hawaii if, by showing restraint itself, the United States simply allowed other powers to 
move in and declare a protectorate in its place? If the increasing power of the United States 
of America was one of the most significant of the many changes that were taking place in 
the sphere of foreign relations in the late 19
th
 Century then the events surrounding Hawaii 
could perhaps be a demonstration of how that power might be used: not as a means for 
acquiring empire physically, but as a means of asserting principles of a distinctive 
American ideology overseas. In this regard the response to the Hawaiian revolution – and 
potentially much else of late 19
th
 Century foreign policy – ceases to be merely a clash 
between imperialists and anti-imperialists and instead can be seen as a debate over the 
directions in which the growing strength of the United States should be applied. 
Specifically we see a clash between the enthusiastic expansionism of Minister Stevens and 
the cautious conservatism of President Cleveland and Secretary of State Gresham, but the 
debate is not limited simply to the question of whether the United States should annex an 
island chain in the Pacific Ocean, it is a debate over the nature of global politics and the 
way America should conduct itself in that environment. One of the most striking aspects of 
Stevens’ official despatches from Hawaii is that, for all that they can be accused of 
embellishment, rumour-mongering and even outright paranoia, the reader is never left with 
a sense that Stevens did not believe in the truth of what he was saying: that the United 
States was involved in a power struggle in Hawaii and that if America did not annex the 
islands then another nation would undoubtedly do so, with potentially disastrous 
consequences for American commerce and security. In particular Stevens’ despatches 
regularly expressed concern at what he perceived to be the machinations of the British 
Minister, sometimes in conjunction with his Japanese counterpart, in an attempt to place 
Hawaii under a dual or even tripartite protectorate.
87
 Indeed, his despatch of March 15 
1893 even goes so far as to end with a warning “that there is occasion for keeping a sharp 
eye on Tokyo and British and perhaps other foreign intrigues there against our plans of 
predominance in the North Pacific.”88 This final statement perhaps explains the difference 
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in opinion between Stevens and the Cleveland administration. While Cleveland and his 
advisors were concerned about the potential for foreign interference in Hawaii they did not 
harbour plans for American predominance in the region (at least beyond the position that 
the United States already held) while Stevens clearly viewed the situation in much more 
active terms and thus perceived a much greater threat. In much the same way Stevens’ 
wrote enthusiastically of the benefits of the protectorate both to Hawaiian peace and 
security and to the annexationist sentiment in the islands – something that Blount would 
later cast great doubt on – a stark contrast to Cleveland and Gresham’s vision of 
protectorates as entangling alliances which simply burdened the United States with 
obligations.
89
 Cleveland’s lack of worry about the threats perceived by Stevens is, of 
course, amply demonstrated by his refusal to countenance annexation, but we have already 
seen that there was sufficient concern about the issue within the administration for 
Gresham to specifically warn Britain, Japan and Russia not to interfere with Hawaii’s 
sovereignty. The aim of the Cleveland administration was to use such diplomacy to 
advance their interests, something which Gresham believed could best be achieved by 
employing the moral high ground granted to them by restraining any colonialist tendencies: 
Can the United States consistently insist that other nations shall respect the 
independence of Hawaii while not respecting it themselves? Our Government was 
the first to recognize the independence of the Islands and it should be the last to 
acquire sovereignty over them by force and fraud.
90
 
 
 
While it is doubtful that any European power would have protested the imposition of an 
American protectorate in Hawaii – or even outright annexation – this statement can be 
viewed as consistent with a new policy of employing American power to enforce 
American ideology - or at least that of Cleveland and Gresham - overseas. 
There is a final point that should be made regarding the role of Minister Stevens in 
the Hawaiian revolution of 1893. In a period of telegraphic communication and steamships 
the independence of diplomatic representatives in foreign capitals was rapidly shrinking as 
the State Department was able to exercise more immediate control. Stevens’ actions in 
Hawaii, however, prove that, for all the powers of the presidency, the actions of men on the 
ground such as Minister Stevens and Captain Wiltse of the U.S.S. Boston could still exert a 
greater effect on foreign policy than the President, at least in a limited area. This spirit of 
independence in diplomatic representatives would prove to be a persistent problem for the 
Cleveland administration. 
                                                 
89
 Mr. Stevens to Mr. Foster, February 27, 1893, [No. 86], Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, 
affairs in Hawaii (Appendix II), p. 409 
90
 Gresham, Memorandum, October 18, 1893, FRUS, 1894, App. II, p. 463 
75 
 
 
 The contradictions within the actions of the Cleveland administration demonstrate 
the complexity of the situation and the competing factors weighing on their decisions. This 
complexity was reflected in the reaction of American public opinion toward events in 
Hawaii and the administration’s actions. The Grover Cleveland Papers contain numerous 
letters received by the President illustrating both the range of public opinion on the issue 
and a variety of motives behind such feelings. The San Francisco Chamber of Commerce 
supported annexation on the somewhat loose grounds that it was “of vital importance to the 
general interests of the Pacific Coast and will be to the political and commercial advantage 
of this whole country”.91 Others feared that if the United States did not act while it had the 
chance then Great Britain, or even Japan, would seize the opportunity to impose a 
protectorate of their own with potentially dire consequences for the security of the Pacific 
coast.
92
 When the intention to restore the Queen became clear one writer predicted that the 
original wrong could not be put right, denounced the plan as “un American [sic]”, and 
urged the President to request Gresham’s resignation.93 As would become a regular 
occurrence whenever the president seemed likely to find himself in possession of new jobs 
to be dispensed to his supporters one woman attempted to put herself at the head of the 
queue by requesting a position as a teacher should the federal government decide to create 
a new school system in the islands after annexation.
94
 Such letters were often the result of 
the wild speculation taking place in newspapers across the nation and in Hawaii itself, 
occasionally leading to misunderstandings such as the case of one unfortunate US-raised 
Hawaiian who named his son Grover Cleveland after the chief magistrate of the nation that 
he loved in honour of the forthcoming annexation.
95
 Some correspondents sought to advise 
the president on alternative courses of action with one resident of San Francisco - who 
claimed that the residents of California, if polled on the issue, would oppose annexation - 
suggesting that the islands’ neutrality be guaranteed so that they became “the Switzerland 
of the seas”, an idea which would be repeated nearly two years later by another 
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correspondent who suggested making Hawaii a neutral coaling station for all powers.
96
 
Interestingly the letter likening Hawaii’s situation to that of Switzerland based its proposal 
on a recognition of the United States changing position in world affairs, stating: 
We have the power to compel the rest of the world to let them alone to work out 
their own destiny.
97
 
 
Undoubtedly Cleveland also received some support in his stand against annexation - 
several speakers toured the country speaking out against the revolution and the United 
States’ complicity in it while Charles Francis Adams praised the President’s courage and 
reminded him that the United States could not protest the actions of others if it was guilty 
itself.
98
 It is apparent from the correspondence, however, that there was a growing 
awareness amongst the President’s supporters that public opinion was turning against 
them. Gresham himself declared  
I think the American people will respond to a frank appeal to their sense of right 
and justice, but whether they do or not, I have done my duty. When feeling that I 
am right I am not sensitive to abuse.
99
 
 
Sensitive or not, he shortly sought comfort in the thought that “the thoughtful and patriotic 
men of the country are with us in the position we have taken, and in the end they control 
public opinion.”100 The truth of either assertion is debatable and the winter of 1893 saw the 
administration’s supporters resorting to hope that public opinion would eventually come 
around.
101
 Most worrying of all, the opposition to the policy spanned the partisan divide 
raising troubling questions as to the extent to which expansionist sentiment had permeated 
the population as a whole.
102
 It is these last points which are most significant. There is no 
evidence to suggest that the correspondence received by Cleveland - which, as has been 
established, presented a broad array of opinion anyway - played a material role in altering 
his stance on Hawaii and the evidence suggests that neither he nor Gresham were unduly 
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troubled by public opinion on the matter. However, the failure to unite the Democratic 
Party behind his policy was a worrying indicator of problems ahead for Cleveland as he 
sought to lead the Party through a difficult period of domestic government while his 
inability to command the support of the public for his foreign policy would be a political 
liability and, more significantly, would eventually mean the failure of his legalist approach. 
 
Ultimately Grover Cleveland experienced a rebuke in Hawaii: his preferred course 
of action proved to be unworkable in the domestic politics of the islands and this reality 
check forced him to adopt a more pragmatic approach. Similarly the constraints of an era 
of rampant imperialism and highly competitive commerce forced Cleveland and Gresham 
to alter their stance on imperialism somewhat in order to protect the national interest. In 
this case the creeping commercial empire of the United States had become the status quo 
and Cleveland, while opposed to physical acquisitions of territory, was not prepared to 
undermine America’s commercial position by attacking that status quo. The Hawaiian 
revolution of 1893 presents us with numerous elements that made up Cleveland’s policy: a 
desire to act honourably and in conjunction with international law, a pragmatic approach to 
insurmountable problems, a paternalist and even imperialist attitude that nevertheless 
abhorred outright expansionism, a determination to defend the national interest as 
Cleveland himself saw it, and the possibility of a new assertiveness in using America’s 
increasing power to enact American ideological principles overseas. All these factors can 
be seen in the evolution of Cleveland’s foreign policy across his second term of office. 
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Chapter 2 – Walter Q. Gresham, 1893-95 
 
 Walter Quintin Gresham served as Grover Cleveland’s Secretary of State from the 
inauguration in March 1893 until his death on May 28
th
, 1895. During this period he never 
encountered another problem to match the complexity, magnitude and lasting significance 
of the Hawaiian revolution which confronted him when he entered office. He did, though, 
manage a variety of incidents which, while of less importance in the long term, are 
nevertheless of historical interest for what they can tell us about the role played by the 
second Grover Cleveland administration in the evolution of United States foreign policy. 
Two incidents in particular shed light on the legalistic approach to foreign policy and the 
inherent difficulties encountered by a growing power attempting to maintain its traditional 
posture of neutrality and friendly relations with all. These two incidents were the Brazilian 
Naval Revolt that occurred over the winter of 1893-94 and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-
95. Many of the themes that can be identified in Cleveland and Gresham’s management of 
the Hawaiian revolution can also been seen to be at work in these smaller incidents from 
which it is possible to establish an understanding of not just how the men perceived the 
role of foreign policy, but also how they perceived the world and the United States’ 
position in it. In particular the desire for a foreign policy founded upon legal and moral 
values manifested itself repeatedly while the determination to refrain from expansionist 
imperialism remained a constant. There were, though, significant differences in how these 
incidents were handled in comparison to the Hawaiian revolution. Not least among these 
changes was a greater autonomy experienced by the State Department. The discussion of 
key decisions in cabinet meetings that had characterised the administration’s Hawaiian 
policy was not repeated for incidents of less direct importance to the United States.
 1
 
Furthermore, with President Cleveland increasingly distracted by the need to tackle the 
depression that struck the United States in May, 1893, and the domestic unrest that 
followed it – most notably the Pullman Strike that came to a head in the summer of 1894 – 
he had less time to directly supervise all aspects of his Secretary of State’s work. 
Undoubtedly Cleveland still maintained the role of final arbiter in foreign policy, but with 
domestic concerns of far greater importance for the future of the nation Gresham naturally 
assumed a greater responsibility for directing policy. 
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 It is important to be aware of the events taking place in domestic politics during 
Cleveland’s second term since they would eventually have a strong bearing on the fate of 
his foreign policy initiatives as well. The first two years of Cleveland’s second term in 
office were notable for a series of skirmishes with Congress which, while successful to 
varying degrees in themselves, caused immense damage to the administration’s 
relationship with Democrats in Congress and did not achieve the ultimate goal of curing 
the economic troubles that resulted from the crash of 1893. In just over twelve months 
from August, 1893, to August, 1894, Cleveland forced two measures designed to rally the 
struggling American economy past a divided and reluctant Congress. In the summer of 
1893 he called a special session to repeal the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890. This 
act provided for the mandatory purchasing of silver from American mines by the 
government and had been opposed by Cleveland from its beginning. Blaming the Act for 
draining the treasury’s gold reserves and thus reducing investors’ confidence in the 
government, Cleveland threatened to withhold patronage appointments until both the 
House and the Senate had passed the repeal bill.
2
 These strong arm tactics did not endear 
Cleveland to members of Congress and undoubtedly built up considerable ill-will toward 
the administration, but considerably more alarming was the number of Democrats who 
openly opposed their President’s plans in both houses. The disaffection of these men, who 
came largely from the South and the West - regions which either mined the silver or hoped 
to benefit from inflation brought about by a switch to a bimetallic or all silver currency 
base - and Cleveland’s absolute refusal to compromise raised fears of a split in the party 
and angered moderates. This legacy undoubtedly played a role in Cleveland’s second 
major battle - tariff reform. 
 Tariff reform had been a favourite policy of Cleveland’s for even longer than his 
opposition to the Silver Purchase law. In December, 1887, he had devoted his entire 
Annual Message to a call for lower tariff rates, and his re-election campaign had pledged to 
replace the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890. While recognising the utility of tariffs to benefit 
American industry, Cleveland argued that the Republican system of high tariffs placed an 
unjust burden on the working classes who were obliged to pay more for manufactured 
goods due to lack of competition. Cleveland favoured a tariff which gave some protection 
to industry from foreign imports, but lowered costs for all by allowing free entry of raw 
materials. To this end Cleveland himself jointly authored a tariff bill which was introduced 
to the House by Congressman William L. Wilson in December, 1893.
3
 The bill passed the 
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House, but thereafter it swiftly became a political football. In the face of strong Republican 
opposition on principle in the Senate, the bill needed united Democratic support, but 
sectional interests made such unity impossible. Having forced through silver purchase 
repeal, Cleveland had little goodwill left in the Senate to overcome such issues. When the 
bill finally emerged from months of debate it had been heavily amended, so much so that 
some observers thought it identical to the McKinley Tariff. While this was an 
overstatement, Cleveland refused to sign the bill, allowing it to become law without his 
signature as a small improvement on the McKinley Act. Like the silver purchase battle 
before it, the tariff fight had revealed worrying sectional and ideological splits in the 
Democratic Party while Cleveland’s uncompromising style had done nothing to close the 
divisions. This would be a precursor to greater problems in the years ahead. 
 
 Gresham was called to set out a position for the United States by events in South 
America in September, 1893. Politics in Brazil had been unstable for several years, ever 
since the revolution of 1889 which had deposed the nation’s monarchy and replaced the 
empire with a republic. The first President of Brazil was forced to resign in the face of 
opposition from the National Congress shortly after his election in 1891 and his successor, 
Vice-President Floriano Vieira Peixoto faced questions over his rule for the remainder of 
his term. These questions were among the many factors cited by the leaders of a multitude 
of small rebellions that broke out in the following years culminating in the revolt of a large 
section of the Brazilian navy in September, 1893. The various causes of the revolt have 
been summarised by one historian as “personal animosities in the ruling elite, friction in 
federal-state relations and between the president and the congress, militarism, government 
extravagance, army-navy rivalry, and some lingering monarchical sentiments following the 
overthrow of the empire in 1889,” while Walter LaFeber suggests that one of the issues 
which had provoked friction between Peixoto and the National Congress was the reciprocal 
trade agreement signed between Brazil and the United States in 1891.
4
 The leaders of the 
revolt, meanwhile, made various claims to justify their actions. The first proclamation of 
Rear Admiral Custodio José de Mello, the commander of the initial revolt, accused Peixoto 
of misuse of presidential power and embezzlement of public funds while the manifesto of 
Mello’s successor, Rear Admiral Saldanha da Gama, declared that the overthrow of the 
Brazilian monarchy had itself been an illegal act and was at the root of the nation’s 
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troubles.
5
 Clearly there were many factors at work behind the decision to revolt against the 
Brazilian government, but it is notable that Secretary Gresham appears to have had no 
interest in the various justifications that were put forward. While the United States minister 
in Brazil, Thomas Larkin Thompson, kept his superior well-informed of the various 
proclamations and manifestos issued by the insurgents, Gresham displayed no obvious 
interest in their content and did not request further investigation by his minister of the 
charges made by the rebels. In the case of the Brazilian Naval Revolt the over-riding 
determinant of policy would not be the questions of morality that had featured so strongly 
in Hawaii and would reappear in later incidents. Instead American policy would be 
dictated purely by legal precedent. Regardless of the rights and wrongs of the government 
of Vice-President Peixoto, that government was internationally acknowledged to be the 
legal authority in Brazil and was therefore able to manage its internal affairs as it saw fit.
6
 
For Gresham the affairs of the Brazilian government would be peripheral, it was to be the 
actions of the insurgents that formed the foundations of his policy. 
 
 The Brazilian Naval Revolt began on September 6, 1893, when several vessels of 
the Brazilian navy in Rio de Janeiro harbour rebelled against their government. Seizing 
control of all the Brazilian warships in the harbour, Admiral Mello threatened to bombard 
the city if Vice-President Peixoto did not resign. The insurgents found themselves to be in 
a delicate situation: they held the power to dominate Rio harbour and to bombard the city, 
but the government still held the shoreline and the coastal forts due to the unwavering 
loyalty of the Brazilian army. They also found their freedom of action to be restricted by 
the presence of several foreign warships representing Great Britain, France, Italy and 
Portugal.
7
 It swiftly became apparent that Mello’s plan was to bombard the coastal forts 
and the military installations within the city in the hope that popular pressure would force 
Peixoto to resign.  
 Gresham had the choice of three basic options in his response to the revolt: back 
the Brazilian government, openly support the rebels, or adopt a position of neutrality. His 
decision can be seen as coming in two phases: the initial definition of the United States’ 
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basic position in early September, and an elaborated statement of policy that was reached 
in response to the actions of the insurgents during October and was received by Minister 
Thompson on November 2. The initial course was not so much a statement of policy as it 
was an indication of the Cleveland administrations’ priorities. With information at a 
premium and no sure knowledge of how events would unfold Gresham simply was not in a 
position to set out a detailed course in the first weeks of the revolt. Gresham’s first 
telegram to Thompson following the revolt came on September 8 and instructed the 
minister “to concert with other legations and make by separate note representations to the 
Brazilian Government in regard to the suspension of telegraphic intercourse, by which, 
especially at this time, commerce suffers serious injury.”8 This communication was 
followed the next day by a telegram informing the minister, who had requested the 
presence in Rio de Janeiro of an American warship in the wake of the declaration of 
martial law by the Brazilian government, that the U.S.S. Charleston and the U.S.S. Detroit 
had been ordered to the city.
9
 These messages clearly demonstrate Gresham’s priorities: 
the protection of key interests of the United States and its citizens, namely communication, 
commerce and protection of life and property. The availability of telegraphic 
communications permitted Gresham and others in Washington to stay abreast of the 
situation and was also an important tool for American merchants conducting trade in 
Brazil. The presence of American warships in Rio harbour would ensure direct protection 
to American shipping that might be threatened by the rebel ships and to American interests 
on land that Thompson clearly feared might be endangered by the declaration of martial 
law. They also offered another means of information gathering for Washington. A further 
benefit, although it is impossible to know whether this featured in Gresham and Secretary 
of the Navy Hilary Herbert’s thinking in dispatching the warships, was that the United 
States would be assured equal representation with the European powers that had warships 
stationed in Rio. 
 The actions and communications of Minister Thompson support the interpretation 
that Gresham’s initial posture was based upon a belief that the American government’s 
first responsibility was to protect its trade and ensure the safety of its citizens. These 
messages were largely divided between commercial matters and reports relating to the 
progress of the revolt which themselves often focussed on potential consequences of these 
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events for American commerce.
10
 His second message after the outbreak of the revolt 
stressed that he intended, in concert with the other foreign representatives in Rio, to 
conduct his diplomacy with strict neutrality, in this instance by declining an invitation to 
attend a meeting with the vice-president to discuss measures to be adopted in the event of a 
bombardment.
11
 The fact that Gresham did not send instructions to Thompson on how he 
was to conduct himself in relation to either the Brazilian government or the rebels until late 
in September strongly suggests that he approved of this posture of neutrality, a fact borne 
out by later events. While Thompson’s actions and motives would come under a certain 
amount of scrutiny from Gresham in the later stages of the revolt, his early reactions to the 
revolt appear to have been accepted as right and proper by the secretary of state. None of 
this should be surprising for two reasons: firstly, because Thompson, who had been 
appointed by Gresham earlier in the year, clearly was in a position where he knew his 
chief’s mind and recognised his priorities; and secondly because the stance adopted was a 
conservative one which was not radically different to those adopted by the other large 
powers represented in Rio de Janeiro. 
 The development of a more detailed policy towards the revolt was facilitated by the 
arrival in Rio harbour of the U.S.S. Charleston on September 26 and resulted from the 
growing concerns of Minister Thompson at the danger to American life and property posed 
by the rebel fleet’s bombardment of the city. On September 28 Thompson telegraphed 
Washington to report that repeated bombardments had resulted in civilian deaths and the 
destruction of property and that “if approved by the Department he will advise that a 
decided stand be taken against allowing it against a defenceless city.” The minister also 
reported that he had “advised the commanding officer of the Charleston to protect 
American goods on barges against seizure by the revolutionists, and to use force if 
necessary.”12 On the day before he had issued a proclamation to U.S. citizens in Rio that 
all ships and boats involved in landing American cargo or passengers at the port should fly 
the American flag to ensure their protection.
13
 Also on the 28
th
 Acting Secretary Strobel 
cabled Thompson directing him “to furnish the commanding officer of the U.S.S. 
Charleston with a copy of order to the effect that further destruction and bloodshed should 
be prevented by the exertion of all the moral force of the Government of the United States, 
by protest and otherwise, and that the protection of American persons and property should 
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be made the object of every possible effort.”14 While not an enormous alteration from the 
initial position of neutrality, this order still marked a significant change in the United 
States’ posture towards the revolt marking as it did a limitation to the freedom of the 
insurgents. This was certainly not a statement one way or the other on the rightness of the 
rebels’ cause, but it was a declaration that harm to American interests would not be 
tolerated. It was also a statement of the two key principles at stake for the Cleveland 
administration: humanitarianism and trade. The indiscriminate shelling of civilians and the 
seizure of American property in the process of being landed at the port were both to be 
opposed. Once again, however, this shift was by no means a radical one, a fact that is 
demonstrated by Minister Thompson’s telegram of October 2 reporting that a meeting of 
the representatives of France, Britain, Portugal, Italy and the United States had taken place 
in response to an announcement by Mello that he intended to bombard the city again with 
the result that the representatives advised the commanders of foreign warships in the 
harbour to “take measures to prevent such bombardment”.15 On the same day Thompson 
reported that the diplomatic corps had maintained their neutrality by delivering a verbal 
note to the Brazilian minister of foreign affairs requesting that no action be taken by his 
government that might grant the rebels an excuse for attempting another bombardment.
16
 
Regardless of this display of neutrality there may be some significance in the fact that the 
next message Thompson received from Gresham was a brief telegram instructing him to 
“exert himself in favor of the innocent trade of American vessels and of the legitimate 
inward and outward trade of merchandise belonging to the citizens of the United States.”17 
It would appear that the protection of American trade was the secretary’s primary concern. 
 The first major change in the nature of the Brazilian Naval Revolt came on October 
14 although it was not known of in Washington until the 25
th
 of that month. On the 14
th
 the 
rebels established a government in Santa Catharina province and officially petitioned the 
United States and the European powers for recognition as belligerents. This was a 
significant step since recognition of the rebels as belligerents would legally transform the 
revolt into a civil war and therefore grant the insurgents numerous extra rights, not the least 
of which would be the power to declare a blockade of Brazilian ports, an action that clearly 
ran contrary to Gresham’s concept of American interests. Under these circumstances - as 
reported to Gresham by Thompson in a telegram of October 24 and received the next day - 
Gresham naturally fell back on his legal training. Charles W. Calhoun indentifies that 
Gresham drew heavily – and at times quoted verbatim – from Richard Henry Dana’s 1866 
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edition of Henry Wharton’s Elements of International Law which clearly stated that such 
status should only be granted if the insurgents could demonstrate that their government and 
the territory it professed to control was sufficient in size and character to constitute a 
nation by itself.
18
 With no legal obligation to recognise the rebel government and nothing 
to gain from the move, Gresham was able to telegram Thompson and inform him that 
belligerent status would not be granted. Instead he instructed his minister to “observe, until 
further advised, the attitude of an indifferent spectator ... and espouse the course of neither 
side.”19 Once again there was nothing unusual about Gresham’s decision; every other 
power petitioned by the insurgent government received the same response. Finally, as it 
became clear that the rebels would not be receiving international sympathy, Gresham 
cabled Thompson once more to definitively state his preferred course of action. The 
telegram (dated November 1, but referred to thereafter by Thompson as the instructions of 
November 2) came as a response to a query from Thompson as to whether American 
protection would extend as far as Brazilian owned barges being used to unload American 
goods from ships in the harbour – a necessary part of commerce in the port.20 Gresham’s 
reply was unequivocal: 
 There having been no recognition by the United States of the insurgents as 
belligerents and there being no pretence that the port of Rio is blockaded, it is clear 
that if an American ship anchored in the harbor employs barges and lighters in 
transferring her cargo to the shore in the usual way and in doing so does not cross 
or otherwise interfere with Mello’s line of fire and he seizes or attempts to seize the 
barges or lighters, he can and should be resisted.
21
 
 
The secretary of state was determined that commerce should continue as closely to normal 
as possible. He was also keen to ensure that the American position might not be 
misunderstood by the rebels, closing the message with the line: “You will deliver or send a 
copy of this instruction to the commander of the insurgents.” 
 The policy of neutrality was a natural one for Walter Q. Gresham to adopt: it was 
conservative, legalist and did not seek to push any ulterior agenda. It was not, however, 
simply a convenient escape for a man who sought to isolate his nation from world affairs. 
The seriousness with which Gresham approached the policy of neutrality is demonstrated 
by the care he and Secretary of the Navy Herbert displayed in maintaining it. The secretary 
was twice faced with situations in which he feared that neutrality had been compromised 
and on both occasions acted swiftly to ensure that this would not be the case. The more 
serious of these occasions took place almost simultaneously with Gresham’s rejection of 
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the rebels’ request for belligerent status. It involved the arrival at Rio of Rear Admiral 
Oscar M. Stanton aboard the U.S.S. Newark on October 19.
22
 In the first few days after his 
arrival Stanton exchanged visits with Admiral Mello and fired a salute to the rebel 
commander.
23
 Surprised and embarrassed by this unauthorised and unprecedented act of 
hospitality, Gresham and Herbert instantly recalled Stanton. Minister Thompson was 
unwittingly present during Mello’s visit to the Newark, having been unable to leave before 
the Admiral arrived. His report of the meeting stressed its social character and that politics 
had not been discussed, but it is clear that Thompson had been surprised by the meeting 
and would have avoided it if he could.
24
 Although written after Stanton’s recall the 
minister’s version of events would appear to be reliable since he was not reprimanded for 
his actions. Stanton would later claim that he was simply attempting to build a common 
foundation for communications with the rebel commander in anticipation of future 
disturbances, but this was of little consolation for Gresham and Herbert who stoically 
ignored the messages of praise and thanks they received from the Brazilian government for 
their swift action.
25
 The seriousness with which the incident was viewed by the 
administration is demonstrated by the decision to explain it in President Cleveland’s annual 
message for 1893. In this message Cleveland specifically cited the swift removal of 
Admiral Stanton as evidence of the “fixed policy of impartial neutrality” that his 
administration had adopted.
26
 
 The second occasion on which Gresham felt it necessary to reaffirm the policy of 
neutrality related to one of the few notable changes in the condition of the revolt. On 
December 9, 1893, Thompson reported that the previously unaligned Rear Admiral 
Saldanha da Gama had arrived in Rio harbour to take command of the rebel forces in the 
wake of the departure of Admiral Mello in the early hours of December 1.
27
 During the 
intervening period the Brazilian government had ordered all foreign merchant ships to 
evacuate the waterfront area in order to clear a line of fire that would allow its troops on 
the mainland to attack the rebel fleet. The flaw in this plan was quickly exposed as 
government troops found themselves under fire from the rebels, prompting the government 
to once again encourage merchant shipping to use the docks. As Calhoun describes, 
however, foreign commanders including Captain Picking of the U.S.S. Charleston had 
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been ordered not to protect shipping that interfered with the line of fire and were concerned 
at what they perceived to be an attempt by the Brazilian government to use foreign 
shipping as a shield for its forces – a direct breach of neutrality.28 From Thompson’s 
reports it is clear that there was insufficient communication between the minister and the 
naval commander since on December 17 the former was unsure of whether Picking had 
withdrawn protection for shipping and was encouraging Washington to implement the 
instruction of November 1 to resist interference with commerce.
29
 The disagreement 
between the two was summarised in Thompson’s telegram of December 21 in which the 
minister reported Picking’s refusal to protect shipping that entered the line of fire, but 
argued that such firing was so desultory and covered such a broad expanse of the bay that 
viewing it as a line of fire would cause serious damage to American commerce.
30
 At this 
point Gresham’s preference for the legality of his policy over the interests of trade is 
shown by the fact that no order was sent to Picking to alter his stance. A potential 
supporting factor in this decision, noted by Calhoun and given credence by several 
dispatches from Gresham to his minister, is the apparent concern the secretary held over 
Thompson’s credibility and impartiality. In November, after Thompson passed on a 
request from the U.S. consul at Pernambuco for an American warship to protect U.S. 
civilians in the light of reported clashes between the Brazilian army and rebel troops in the 
region, Gresham had sent a brusque reply stating: 
Mr. Gresham, remarking that Mr. Thompson’s telegram of the 19th does not 
afford a sufficient basis for instructions, directs him to confer with the commander 
of the naval forces of the United States, and warns him that he should report facts 
and not rumors.
31
 
 
Then in late December Thompson was forced to defend himself after Gresham specifically 
ordered him to stay in Rio de Janeiro rather than at his residence in Petropolis.
32
 The 
timing of these orders from Gresham suggests a broader lack of trust in his representatives. 
Within days of chastising Thompson for reporting rumours he would send an equally 
scathing message to Minister Willis in Hawaii after his incomplete telegraphic report on 
the failure of his first meeting with Queen Liliuokalani.
33
 Clearly the secretary did not 
appreciate being asked to make a decision based upon anything less than full and detailed 
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facts, although it must be noted that representatives in both Brazil and Hawaii did send 
general reports to Washington that noted local rumours and, particularly in Brazil where 
the government controlled the flow of information, unconfirmed reports. The varying 
degrees of trust in his subordinates would be a feature of Gresham’s period in office and, 
indeed, of the entirety of Cleveland’s second term. One cannot help speculating about the 
likely effects of Gresham’s first major controversy in office – the Hawaiian revolution – 
and the significant part played in that event by a rogue American diplomat upon the 
secretary’s subsequent interaction with his representatives overseas.  
 Gresham’s mistrust of Thompson was, perhaps, somewhat unfair given that the 
minister had deftly handled the question of neutrality in the Brazilian Naval Revolt from its 
beginnings with little prompting from his chief. It was perhaps inevitable though that the 
maintenance of a consistent posture would become harder as the revolt continued. While 
Thompson can be viewed as overly supportive of the Brazilian government, part of his role 
as minister was to facilitate trade and it is understandable that he would take a different 
view to Picking over the matter of what constituted a line of fire given the two men’s 
respective roles. It is also clear from his reports that Minister Thompson very quickly 
became convinced that the naval revolt was doomed to failure. As early as September 19 
he was reporting that the Brazilian people appeared disinterested in the whole affair, 
viewing it as a matter between the army and navy, while his report of the publication of a 
manifesto by Admiral Saldanha da Gama noted that it had resulted in protests against the 
Admiral’s plans to restore the empire with support limited to the minority who had derived 
status from the monarchy.
34
 The intervening period had seen numerous reports reach 
Thompson of the perilous military position faced by the rebels away from Rio. Under such 
circumstances it would perhaps be understandable if Thompson’s professionalism lapsed 
slightly as he began to treat the revolt as a charade. 
Certainly Thompson’s stance was, to a large extent, validated by the final 
substantial twist in the Brazilian Naval Revolt. Shortly after his arrival in December, 
Admiral Saldanha da Gama began to pursue a more active course than his predecessor by 
releasing his new manifesto calling for the overthrow of the republic, demanding 
recognition as belligerents from the foreign powers – swiftly rejected by Gresham – and 
taking a tougher line against the foreign merchant shipping in Rio.
35
 The announcement 
that da Gama planned to stop the landing of all merchandise in the port of Rio prompted 
the diplomatic corps to request that the foreign naval commanders prevent any such action 
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and also to remind the commanders of the outstanding agreement to prevent the 
bombardment of the city which was being violated.
36
 This suggests that Thompson’s 
opinion that the foreign warships should have been providing a more active protection for 
commerce was shared by his colleagues in the diplomatic community in Rio, but this view 
was undermined by the decision of the Brazilian government to fortify positions in the city, 
in breach of the agreement that had been made to deter bombardment. In consequence 
Gresham dispatched another instruction that did little to change the American position with 
the possible exception of making it less clear. Regarding the United States principal goals 
and interests Gresham declared: 
Our principal and obvious duty, apart from neutrality, is to guard against needless 
or illegitimate interference, by either hostile party, with the innocent and legitimate 
neutral interests of our citizens.
37
 
 
This demonstrates that Gresham placed the strictures of neutrality above the protection of 
trade, but his statement that “Vexatious interference with foreign merchant shipping ... is 
as illegitimate as it is intolerable.” and subsequent assertion that the United States had the 
rights to demand a safe anchorage in which to load and unload goods is a clear indication 
of his strong desire to maintain commerce. It can be argued that this new focus on 
commerce as a matter of right marked a slight, but significant change in policy from 
Gresham perhaps as a result of concern at the possibility that the rebels were imposing a 
blockade that their numbers did not warrant through the indulgence of the foreign powers. 
Calhoun argues persuasively, however, that this is not the case and that Gresham was 
simply seeking to better define the complicated situation that actually existed inside Rio 
bay within the abstract concepts of international law.
38
 Whatever the case, the situation in 
Rio harbour would see a significant change before the end of January. 
On January 12, 1894, Admiral A.E.K. Benham arrived at Rio aboard the U.S.S. San 
Francisco.
39
 The Admiral’s arrival was a swap with Admiral Stanton who took over 
Benham’s former duties as commander of the North Atlantic Station rather than a sign of 
dissatisfaction with Captain Picking’s performance. Benham’s arrival initially marked no 
change in the American position in Rio, but within two weeks he was forced to act 
definitively against the rebel fleet. An accusation on January 24 that a rebel ship had aimed 
rifle fire against an American merchant ship was met with the claim by da Gama that the 
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shots had been blanks fired as a warning to a vessel entering the firing zone, but when the 
following day saw a report of live ammunition being fired at an American ship attempting 
to dock at the port Benham was moved to demand an end to such interference from da 
Gama.
40
 It should be noted that Benham stressed to da Gama that his demand was not 
intended to contradict the previous position of neutrality relating to the armed conflict in 
the bay, but da Gama’s refusal to reply prompted the U.S. commander to offer an armed 
escort for American merchant vessels travelling to the docks. Interestingly Minister 
Thompson was either not aware of the harassment of American ships or did not consider it 
significant since he did not mention it in his report of January 26 and declared that 
American trade had not suffered “serious interference”.41 Thompson did note, however, 
that a conference of naval commanders had agreed to oppose the attempts of the insurgents 
to stop the landing of coal – a move which Thompson viewed as a return to the posture of 
early November and thus a vindication of his position in the difference of opinion with 
Captain Picking. It is therefore possible that when Admiral Benham ordered the U.S.S. 
Detroit to escort an American merchantman to the docks on January 29 he was acting in 
conjunction with a more general policy of assertiveness from the foreign naval 
commanders. What is unquestionable is that the exchange of fire between the Detroit and a 
rebel vessel marked the end of the more aggressive tactics used by the insurgents since 
Admiral da Gama’s arrival. On that subject it is important to note, as Calhoun describes, 
that the tough stance adopted by Benham was a response to the actions of the insurgents – 
rather than an active attempt to change the situation in the harbour by the American 
commander – and also a measure that clearly fell within the bounds of Gresham’s 
instructions from the start of November and before.
42
 Certainly Benham’s actions were not 
part of a larger plan in Washington to influence the revolt since Thompson received 
telegrams on January 29 and 30 urgently requesting further information on how and why 
Benham had acted.
43
 Specifically the secretary desired to know whether there had been a 
change in the Admiral’s relations with either the insurgents or the Brazilian government 
and whether the other foreign naval commanders agreed with the action; once again 
neutrality was at the forefront of Gresham’s thinking.44 Thompson’s report, in which he 
gave his wholehearted approval to the Admiral’s orders, appeared to mollify his chief who 
replied that the action was justified within his instructions and, somewhat unnecessarily 
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given Thompson’s enthusiastic reporting of the incident, expressed his hope that 
Thompson was in accord with the Admiral – further evidence of Gresham’s lack of trust in 
his minister.
45
 
Calhoun notes that many observers, both at the time and since, gave credit to the 
Detroit action for bringing the Brazilian Naval Revolt to an end. Calhoun rejects this, quite 
correctly, on the grounds that the insurgency was not defeated at Rio until mid-March and 
that the final mopping-up of forces elsewhere took another month after that.
46
 While not 
wishing to disagree with this analysis, it might be suggested that this ignores one vital 
aspect of the American action. By using force to oppose the interference of rebel vessels 
with merchant shipping the American commander forced his counterpart in the rebel fleet 
to abandon his aggressive tactics. This move, coming in the wake of the failure of the 
insurgents to inspire support – or even interest – among the Brazilian population marked a 
serious setback by ending the insurgents’ slim hopes of acquiring belligerent status by 
imposing a blockade on Rio de Janeiro.
47
 Without ever acting outside the bounds laid 
down by the policy of neutrality, Admiral Benham delivered a heavy blow to the 
insurgency’s chances of success. 
 
 The fact that the Detroit action was able to inflict a damaging blow upon the 
insurgents’ chances of success without in itself breaching the rules of neutrality is 
indicative of how much that policy favoured the Brazilian government. The rebels’ failure 
to prove themselves capable of either mounting a genuine blockade of Rio or establishing a 
viable state of their own robbed them of the benefits that they might have gained from the 
international community under the law. It is wrong, though, to suggest – as William 
Appleman Williams does – that Gresham was actually running an interventionist policy in 
support of the Brazilian government out of fear that the rebels posed a genuine threat to 
American commerce.
48
 Likewise Walter LaFeber’s suggestion that pressure from 
American business had persuaded Gresham to bring about a more aggressive policy with 
the goal of ending the rebellion and perhaps increasing the United States’ share of the 
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Brazilian market is false.
49
 Both theories are refuted by the consistent policy of neutrality 
maintained by the Cleveland administration throughout the revolt and by the simple fact 
that Cleveland and Gresham saw little to be gained from enacting any other policy. While 
the two men undoubtedly believed that it was the role of government to protect and 
facilitate overseas trade, it is clear that the policy of neutrality was always uppermost in 
Gresham’s thinking. 
 Another issue that figures prominently in the historiography is the question of 
whether Gresham was motivated by fear that the European powers might support the 
insurgents if it led to a restoration of the Brazilian monarchy. This malign influence is 
usually attributed to the British, either as a result of direct commercial interests or as an 
attempt to check the growth of U.S. power in Latin America, although at least one historian 
has attributed Cleveland’s refusal to grant the rebels belligerent status to his concern that 
they were receiving support from Germany.
50
 Neither suggestion is borne out by the 
available evidence. In the latter case there appears to be little evidence to show undue 
concern from Gresham at potential German support for the rebels. On the contrary, 
Minister Thompson’s reports in January, 1894, specifically mentioned the German vessels 
in Rio harbour as among the few that were willing to defy the rebel’s attempted blockade, 
stating that only the German commander had maintained the stance taken against Admiral 
Mello after the arrival of Admiral da Gama.
51
 This consistent stance from the German 
officers was confirmed in Thompson’s replies to Gresham’s querying of Admiral 
Benham’s conduct in relation to the other foreign naval commanders.52 The theory that 
Gresham was motivated by concern over British actions is better supported by Thompson’s 
reports, but also more definitively refuted by Gresham’s own words. The cable messages 
sent to Washington by Thompson after December, 1893, gave a strong impression that it 
was the British representatives, both military and diplomatic, who were responsible for the 
change in attitude towards the insurgency and its attempts to frustrate international trade. 
On December 14 Thompson reported that the British naval officers had withdrawn 
protection for shipping and on January 29 he informed Gresham that the British diplomatic 
representative had stated that all other alternatives would have to be exhausted before 
British vessels used force to restore a British merchant firm’s coal trade.53 This message 
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also suggested that the British minister was considering recommending that his 
government should grant the rebels recognition. Perhaps most importantly, on February 1, 
Thompson reported discussions between the diplomatic corps and the naval commanders 
on how to reopen the coal trade in Rio – with the commanders favouring the use of force – 
in which the British minister, Mr. Wyndham, had openly suggested that the foreign powers 
would be better served recognising the rebels as belligerents than using force against them 
since it was in fact the Brazilian government that was drawing out the siege of Rio.
54
 In 
closing this message Minister Thompson gave his view as to why the British minister 
would make such a suggestion – and why his European colleagues would silently approve 
of it – stating:  
With no intention of examining into the merits of the commercial arrangement 
between the United States and Brazil, it can not be denied that it has given to our 
merchants a leverage of which all Europeans are extremely jealous. 
 
This opinion has perhaps been given greater weight by historians than it was by 
Thompson’s political masters. While it is not beyond the realms of possibility that Minister 
Wyndham and his European counterparts should have viewed the improving commercial 
relationship between the newly republican Brazil and the United States – most clearly 
typified by the reciprocity treaty between the two nations of 1891 – with some concern this 
is not to say that the British government was prepared to actively meddle in Brazilian 
internal affairs. It should be remembered that the United States was not alone in having 
diplomatic representatives that were capable of embarrassing their home government by 
acting without authorisation. Indeed, Thompson himself was also promoting U.S. 
investment in Brazil with the same letters that warned of “unfriendly European foreign 
influences” also declaring that Brazil was “wonderfully endowed in natural resources, 
affording a prodigious field for profitable development through an intelligent outlay of 
capital.”55 Most importantly the February 1 report was written after the Detroit action had 
taken place and was only received in Washington on March 19 by which time the revolt 
had collapsed in Rio. The most substantial allegations from Thompson simply could not 
have influenced Gresham’s actions. 
What is certain is that Gresham was sufficiently concerned by the rumours of 
British support for the rebels to investigate the matter further, but was never moved to 
change American policy as a result. Calhoun describes a brief exchange between Gresham 
and the American ambassador in London, Thomas F. Bayard, shortly after Admiral da 
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Gama took command of the rebel fleet in which the secretary of state instructed Bayard to 
inform him of any indication that Great Britain sought to interfere in matters in the 
Americas only for the ambassador to reply that the European powers were far too 
concerned with affairs on their own side of the Atlantic to be bothered by the situation in 
Brazil.
56
 It is important to note too, as Calhoun does, that the Brazilian government was 
itself bringing the rumours of European interference to Gresham’s attention through its 
minister in Washington.
57
 Vice-President Peixoto stood to gain from exploiting American 
suspicions of the European powers in order to end any chances of the United States 
recognising the rebels as belligerents. Ultimately, Gresham’s feelings about the possibility 
of British support for the insurgents are demonstrated by a brief reference to the matter in a 
letter he wrote to Bayard on January 21, 1894 which declared: “I do not believe Great 
Britain, or any other European Power, would attempt to re-establish the Monarchy in 
Brazil.”58 This definitive statement of Gresham’s position came only days before Admiral 
Benham would initiate the action that would severely damage the insurgency’s chances of 
success. 
 The Brazilian Naval Revolt is a perfect example of Walter Q. Gresham’s preferred 
approach to international diplomacy. Through a conservative and legally sound policy the 
secretary of state protected American interests in Brazil without involving the United 
States unnecessarily in Brazilian affairs. By doing so he helped generate good will with the 
both the Brazilian government and its citizens.
59
 As such it forms a minor triumph for 
Gresham’s vision of international relations. This being so, it is ironic that the revolt – and 
Admiral Benham’s actions in particular – was seized upon by the Democratic press as an 
example of an assertive and energetic intervention by the Cleveland administration. The 
administration itself was not so embarrassed by this misinterpretation as to refuse to 
exploit the political capital it generated and subsequently released the correspondence 
covering the revolt to the press.
60
 The true message of the Brazilian Naval Revolt for the 
United States was very different to that put forward by the press, however. While 
Gresham’s policy can be seen as a success, some limitations were still exposed. The mere 
fact that a conservative administration seeking to enact a minimalist foreign policy was 
forced to dispatch multiple warships to a foreign capital in order to protect the nation’s 
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interests demonstrated that the United States, while still not as deeply involved in world 
affairs as a power such as Great Britain, could no longer claim a splendid isolation from 
trouble overseas.
61
 The Cleveland administration had felt obliged to involve itself, even if 
only in a conservative manner, in the naval revolt and American power played a role in 
ensuring the insurgency’s defeat. The revolt itself may have been a victory for Gresham’s 
vision of a conservative and legal foreign policy, but it also hinted at greater problems that 
might be produced by the United States’ growing power in the future. This would be 
demonstrated during the Sino-Japanese War. 
 
 The origins of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 are somewhat complex involving 
three East Asian nations and a collection of foreign powers. Shortly after Grover 
Cleveland’s second inauguration, the United States minister in Korea, Augustine Heard, 
began cabling Gresham that members of an illegal nationalist, xenophobic sect called Tong 
Hâk were openly protesting in Seoul.
 62
 The minister reported the concern amongst Korean 
officials that the sect’s strength in the southern provinces of the country might place 
foreign missionaries and traders at risk although he himself saw more danger from the 
“hordes of discontented and poverty stricken people” that had joined with the movement in 
the south.
63
 Minister Heard’s concerns would prove premature in 1893, but a year later the 
unrest in southern Korea came to be a catalyst in bringing about the Sino-Japanese War. In 
May, 1894, Heard’s replacement at the Seoul legation, John M. B. Sill, reported that 
uprisings in three southern provinces were sufficiently serious to prompt the Korean king 
to request the presence of an American warship at the port of Chemulpo.
64
 When the first 
Korean forces sent to put down the insurrection met with defeat, King Kojong, pressured 
by the Chinese consul in Seoul, requested Chinese assistance.
65
 The American chargé 
d’affaires in China, Charles Denby Jr. – son of the American minister at Peking – reported 
to Gresham that the Chinese official responsible for dispatching the troops to Korea, 
Viceroy Li Hung-chang, had shown great reticence in agreeing to the request and had been 
careful to inform the Japanese and Russian governments that the deployment would only 
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last for the duration of the insurrection.
66
 The reason for this caution was swiftly 
demonstrated as the Japanese government invoked the Tsientsin Convention of 1885 which 
forbade the sending of troops of either nation to Korea and despatched its own forces. Both 
nations refused to withdraw their forces while the other’s remained. With tensions running 
high on the Korean peninsula and in the region as a whole Cleveland and Gresham found 
themselves required to formulate a policy on the matter. Neither man had shown particular 
interest in the region, with events in Hawaii and Samoa demonstrating their lack of 
enthusiasm for further involvement in the Pacific. Once again they fell back on their 
fundamental approach to foreign affairs: the need to protect American commerce and 
American citizens in the region, and a desire to follow the precepts of international law. In 
the instance of the Sino-Japanese War, however, both aspects of this default posture would 
present the president and his secretary of state with unanticipated difficulties. 
 The concern for protecting American commerce and the safety of United States 
citizens in both Korea and China – it quickly became obvious that those resident in Japan 
would be at no risk from military action – was stressed by Cleveland in his annual message 
of 1894. In that message he stated that the war “deserves our gravest consideration by 
reason of its disturbance of our growing commercial interests in the two countries and the 
increased dangers which may result to our citizens domiciled or sojourning in the interior 
of China.”67 He later reiterated the desire to preserve trade and not jeopardise American 
lives as key reasons why he was willing to offer friendly aid to both nations in the interests 
of bringing the war to an end. The message also made clear that the United States had no 
policy in Asia that was endangered by the war and this was something that Gresham would 
also repeat in his dealings with foreign diplomats. In a despatch to Minister Denby in 
November, 1894, Gresham described how he had reassured the Chinese and Japanese 
representatives in Washington of the United States’ neutrality by stressing that the war 
between their home nations did not affect any American policy in Asia.
68
 These repeated 
declarations that the United States did not have a policy in Asia actually runs contrary to 
the general policy of protecting American commerce and citizens in the region. While it is 
true that Cleveland and Gresham were not engaged in an active policy designed to build 
trade, increase influence, or annex territory in Asia – and Cleveland’s reference to the 
United States’ growing trade in the region should not be viewed as anything more than an 
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acknowledgement of the interest shown in China and Japan by private enterprise – the 
presence of American citizens in China and Korea, most of them missionaries, 
demonstrated that American society did hold an agenda towards the region and, while the 
government did not directly support it, it would undoubtedly move to protect those 
engaged in it. This was not a major difficulty in theory – although events in Brazil had 
demonstrated how protecting commercial interests could result in fairly momentous actions 
– but the presence in the Chinese interior of American citizens engaged in a cause which, 
while universally viewed as humanitarian at home, might become the focus of hostility for 
the Chinese population meant that Cleveland’s government was to some extent hostage to 
the situation. In the event American missions escaped the worst of the anti-foreign attacks 
that did take place in China during and after the war, but they presented a cause for anxiety 
and Cleveland was ultimately moved to respond to the attacks through the formation of an 
investigatory commission.
69
 Once again the presence of American interests overseas made 
it impossible for the United States to remain aloof from a regional problem, although in 
this case other motivations led to greater involvement. 
 As with the Brazilian Naval Revolt the lack of any specific American policy in the 
region and the presence of small, but politically significant U.S. interests in China, Japan 
and Korea meant that adopting a neutral stance was a logical decision for Cleveland and 
Gresham. There were, however, several key differences to the situation in Brazil which 
made simply maintaining neutrality insufficient as a policy and demanded greater 
American involvement. The first of these differences was in the humanitarian aspect. 
While a desire to prevent civilian bloodshed in Rio de Janeiro had prompted the American 
representatives in the city to support multilateral efforts from the diplomatic corps and 
naval commanders there the Sino-Japanese War provoked a response on a larger scale. In 
particular the fact that the war centred upon the independence of a state for which the 
United States held a historic affinity in Korea made it far harder for the Cleveland 
administration to remain aloof.
70
 Furthermore, the fact that the Sino-Japanese War was a 
fully-fledged conflict between powerful nations rather than a local insurgency created a 
moral dilemma for the president as to whether or not to use his influence to avert 
potentially large numbers of military and civilian casualties and serious destruction of 
property. While it would, at first glance, appear incongruous that an administration that had 
defined its foreign policy by seeking to limit its involvement in events overseas should 
then be moved to interfere in a war taking place in an area considered to be of marginal 
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interest to the United States, the importance of the moral aspects of foreign policy to 
Cleveland and Gresham should not be underestimated. This is demonstrated by the 
repeated references made by both men to the importance of friendship with both countries 
for the United States.
71
 China and Japan had long been given an almost mythical status as 
potential markets for American manufactured goods, but in reality trade with the region 
was relatively small and most Americans had little knowledge of either nation.
72
 Without a 
driving ulterior motive for wishing to build friendship and influence in the region it would 
appear that the desire to use American power to further the interests of peace and 
international goodwill was a genuine one for Cleveland and Gresham. While moral factors 
were not the only motivation for American involvement in the Sino-Japanese War it should 
be noted that a desire to employ the growing power of the United States in a manner that 
the administration viewed as morally correct once again undermined the simplistic image 
of Grover Cleveland as an isolationist president. 
 Similar flexibility is seen in the second key reason why the Cleveland 
administration engaged in a more active policy than simple neutrality. Having railed 
against the imprudence of American treaty obligations in Samoa during their first 18 
months in office, Cleveland and Gresham showed far less distaste for the United States’ 
obligations towards Korea. The first offers of American good offices to bring about a 
peaceful resolution to the crisis came in June, 1894, and were a fulfilment of a promise 
made in the treaty between the two nations in 1882. Dorwart states that this offer was made 
by Cleveland alone – Gresham was on vacation – and did not represent a serious priority 
for the president, but the fact remains that the offer was made apparently without Korean 
pressure.
73
 It might be argued that this situation differed significantly from Samoa since it 
did not involve entangling the United States with European powers and undoubtedly this 
was a major factor – as would be demonstrated by later events – but the offer nevertheless 
involved entangling the United States, however peripherally, in the affairs of China and 
Japan as well as Korea. As such it is further evidence of the ways in which moral and legal 
factors – in this case the desire to fulfil a promise to a weaker nation – affected the 
formulation of foreign policy. 
 Complicating matters further for the administration was the level of public interest 
in the Sino-Japanese War. While the general population may have been largely ignorant of 
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China and Japan’s cultures and societies this is not to say there was not interest in the two 
nations. This broader interest combined with the newsworthiness of a genuine international 
war - American newspapers gave it front page status and dispatched special correspondents 
to the warzone - to create a general appetite for information on the conflict, as well as a 
readiness to take sides.
74
 This readiness could take on sometimes alarming proportions; 
despite the accepted obligation under international law of a neutral state to prevent the 
recruitment of its own citizens to serve in the armed forces of the belligerents a variety of 
groups and individuals volunteered their services to the Japanese legation in Washington – 
so much so that the legation was forced to issue a notice discouraging volunteers.
75
 Just as 
problematic for the administration was the issue of preventing its citizens from supplying 
the belligerent nations with arms. Since the war provided an extremely tempting market for 
American arms-manufacturers and exporters – including opportunists who seized the 
chance to become gun-runners – this obligation was openly criticised and routinely 
flouted.
76
 While public interest never reached the level it had in Hawaii or would in 
relation to Cuba, the Sino-Japanese War received considerably more attention than the 
Brazilian Naval Revolt, placing greater pressure on Gresham to act. The fact that Japan 
was widely perceived to be the West’s protégé in the region meant that public opinion 
largely favoured Japan and thus raised questions of whether the United States was right to 
be maintaining neutrality at all.
77
 Ultimately, the Sino-Japanese War was not of sufficient 
importance to most Americans to cause real problems for the administration, but it did 
raise troubling questions of how public opinion might react to a conflict closer to home. 
 
 The Cleveland administration’s actions towards the Sino-Japanese War would 
largely be defined by a well-intentioned desire to enact policy that was morally and legally 
‘right’, but those good intentions did not always achieve the anticipated results. Such was 
the case with the decision to grant American protection to the consular buildings and 
archives of both China and Japan on their opponent’s soil and, consequently, providing 
diplomatic protection for both nations’ citizens as well. In theory this did not represent any 
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breach of neutrality since the service was rendered equally to both parties and did not 
involve actively interfering with either nation’s affairs. The move was undermined, 
however, by several factors, not least the disastrous failure of the Chinese war effort. This 
was an eventuality that Gresham may well have not anticipated – an indication of the 
paucity of knowledge and understanding of conditions in East Asia in the State 
Department. Certainly the sweeping success experienced by the Japanese military was not 
being universally predicted before war was officially declared – on July 24, 1894, Minister 
Sill in Korea wrote to Gresham stating that “once [China’s] hordes begin to press across 
the northern border no force here will be able to stay the tide. The Chinese merchants have 
all left here, fearing the looting by their own troops that they say will surely follow their 
first success.”78 No doubt the Japanese government would not have agreed with Sill’s 
assessment at that time and Viceroy Li’s reluctance to dispatch his troops to Korea would 
appear to suggest that he also was less than convinced of his nation’s military superiority. 
The prospect, though, that Japanese troops would not simply prove victorious in Korea, but 
would quickly enter mainland China was clearly not widely countenanced outside Japan. 
The initial dissatisfaction seen in both Chinese and Japanese cities at what was often 
viewed as American partiality to the opposition predictably became more pronounced in 
China as the defeats mounted.
79
 In this way the administration’s policy actively worked 
against Cleveland’s declared aim of protecting American citizens in East Asia by 
increasing resentment towards them in the local populations. Even so, this was only a 
minor failure of diplomacy and one that could be seen to be offset by the goodwill created 
in the Chinese and Japanese governments, but more serious consequences came about as a 
result of another unanticipated difficulty: the unpreparedness of the American diplomats in 
the region to enact the policy both in terms of legal knowledge and intensity of workload. 
This came to a head in the issue of Japanese spies in China. 
 The issue of the Chinese pursuit of suspected Japanese spies would prove to be 
perhaps the most important of the entire conflict for Cleveland and Gresham. Japan had 
spent the years preceding the Sino-Japanese War building networks of agents inside 
mainland China and gaining valuable intelligence on Chinese geography, infrastructure 
and military structures as a result. With the outbreak of war the Chinese government set 
about finding and destroying these networks, but their methods involved suspecting all 
Japanese citizens in China which almost inevitably led to a collision with the American 
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policy of providing diplomatic protection to Japanese citizens in the Chinese Empire.
80
 
With the outbreak of hostilities the American Consul General at Shanghai, Thomas R. 
Jernigan, promised protection to Japanese citizens who chose to remain in the city rather 
than returning to their homeland. Controversy arose almost immediately when two 
Japanese students accused of spying requested asylum in the American consulate on 
August 10 which Jernigan granted. When the Chinese government protested to Gresham in 
Washington the secretary requested an explanation from Denby Jr. who defended 
Jernigan’s actions first on legal grounds, then on humanitarian ones. The legal picture was 
clouded by the existence in Shanghai of a system of international concessions that carried 
their own extraterritorial jurisdiction, a situation further confused by the strictures of 
international law relating to wars between nations. The two men had first been arrested in 
the French concession before being handed over to Jernigan by the French consul.
81
 In the 
face of a legal situation that fell well outside his experience as U.S. circuit judge Gresham 
consulted his friend the legal expert John Bassett Moore who declared that in a time of war 
the Japanese fell under the jurisdiction of local courts.
82
 Gresham ordered the two men 
handed over to the Chinese authorities, but showed his concerned for their fate by 
obtaining what he believed to be a promise from the Chinese Minister in Washington that 
the men would not be tried until Charles Denby Sr. - the American minister to Peking - 
returned to China from his medical leave in the United States.
83
 Consequently the 
execution of the two men two weeks before Denby Sr. arrived back in China was a matter 
of some consternation for Gresham who complained to Chinese Minister Yang Yu that he 
had been placed in an awkward position by China’s actions.84 This was quickly proven to 
be the case as the American press seized on the story, including details of torture that the 
State Department denied. In the Senate, Henry Cabot Lodge turned the incident into a 
party-political cause celebre and introduced a resolution requesting that the President 
transmit all diplomatic correspondence relating to the case in the hopes of proving moral 
cowardice by Gresham.
85
 Writing in The North American Review, Senator Cushman K. 
Davis described the decision to hand over the students - he did not accept that the men 
were spies - as an “abominable transaction” and declared that “The blood of those youths 
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is on our hands.”86 Comparing the incident to the story of Cain and Abel, the Senator 
blamed Gresham specifically and accused him of abandoning his own agreement to protect 
Japanese citizens in China. This aggressive querying of the administration’s foreign policy 
by Congress would prove to be a theme of Cleveland’s remaining years in office, 
somewhat ironically given his readiness to pass decision of the Hawaiian revolution to 
Congress in 1893. In December, 1894, Gresham, seeking to avoid jeopardising new treaties 
he had negotiated with China and Japan and perhaps hoping to calm the ferocity of the 
press attacks, was able to have the resolution delayed in committee until after the New 
Year’s recess by inviting Senators John T. Morgan and John Sherman – the ranking 
Senators from both parties on the Senate foreign relations committee – to the State 
Department to read the correspondence privately.
87
 This cooled matters temporarily, but 
the eventual publication of the documents led to further criticism. All of this demonstrates 
the dangers of following a rigid legalist policy. While it might provide a useful template 
for action, help build a reputation for American honesty and probity, and even build trust 
in appreciative European powers, such a policy was not flexible to the needs of public 
relations and not always comprehensible to the public.
88
 The simple fact was that the 
American public were not going to be won over by legal technicalities and the impression 
had been set that the administration had tamely sent two young men to their deaths. At best 
Gresham was seen as inflexible, at worst he was a craven coward, bowing to the barbaric 
Chinese. In the case of the Japanese spies Gresham’s actions were entirely consistent with 
good legal practice, but nevertheless left him open to charges of cowardice from his 
political opponents such as Lodge and Teddy Roosevelt.
89
 This is an important point and 
one worth digressing briefly from the immediate study of the Sino-Japanese War in order 
to examine. 
As shown by the Hawaiian revolution, the dramatic growth of American power and 
influence in the late 19
th
 Century led to a national debate on how best that power might be 
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used. While Cleveland’s two terms in office were divided by the Republican 
administration of Benjamin Harrison and the foreign policy leadership of James G. Blaine, 
it would not be these two men who led the opposition to his foreign policy.
90
 Instead this 
role was taken by a new generation of men who would eventually do much to shape the 
role of the United States in global affairs, most famously Henry Cabot Lodge and 
Theodore Roosevelt. As Cleveland’s second term continued the debate over the United 
States’ place in the world, its opportunities and its responsibilities was increasingly 
(although not exclusively) conducted between the administration and this new rank of 
young Republicans. This debate itself contained numerous smaller questions one of which 
concerned the nature of American honour. Many historians have speculated, with good 
reason, that the appearance of a generation of politicians in the 1890s who believed that the 
United States should be more active in world affairs and who were largely untroubled by 
the prospect of war with European powers may well have been related to the fact that thirty 
years had passed since the Civil War. At this time the generation that had fought the Civil 
War – as represented by Presidents Hayes, Garfield and Harrison – was retiring from the 
political scene and being replaced by younger men who had been too young to fight in the 
war, but had grown up surrounded by stories of the glory of battle. Cleveland should be 
included with the former group; even though he did not fight himself, two of his brothers 
served in the Union army and having lived through the conflict as an adult he would have 
undoubtedly seen the consequences of war if only from a distance. As is often the case 
those who had seen the horrors of warfare for themselves were less inclined to plunge 
recklessly into situations that might lead to war than the younger ‘jingoes’ best represented 
by Roosevelt. While the often larger than life character of Teddy Roosevelt should not be 
viewed as entirely typical of his political class it does provide an excellent contrast to the 
conservatism of Cleveland and Gresham (himself a Civil War veteran). Roosevelt’s views 
of Cleveland’s actions throughout his second term provide an interesting commentary on 
the administration’s foreign policy. Specifically these views often focus on Roosevelt’s 
conception of national honour which differed markedly from Cleveland’s. Where 
Cleveland’s vision of national honour – which formed the basis of much of his foreign 
policy – was one of justice, honesty, morality and the open-handed and fair treatment of all 
nations regardless of size or power, Roosevelt’s emphasised strength and the necessity of 
earning and keeping the respect and even the awe of others. One noted historian of 
Roosevelt’s effect on the evolution of American foreign policy has even suggested that he 
was convinced that the United States could not act unjustly, an almost total contrast to 
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Cleveland’s concern that the nation must diligently pursue a legally proper course.91 The 
result of this differing conception of American honour was a tendency towards caution and 
passivity from Cleveland and a demand for action from Roosevelt.  
Returning to the Sino-Japanese War, the Cleveland administration’s policy of 
simultaneous neutrality and humanitarianism twice displayed its contradictory nature 
before and after the declaration of hostilities. In both cases the contradiction was based 
around the offering of American good offices to bring about a peaceful resolution to the 
crisis. The first such offer was the one made in late July, 1894, in response to Korea’s 
request under the 1882 treaty, while the second came on November 6 of that year. The 
second offer came as a result of weeks of lobbying by the Chinese government through the 
American legation in Peking and through its own minister in Washington, although 
Gresham was keen to make clear to Minister Denby that it was not the result of an official 
Chinese request for diplomatic intervention by the western powers, news of which reached 
him on the same day that he issued his instructions to both Denby and Minister Dun in 
Tokyo that they should proffer the United States good offices in the interests of making 
peace.
92
 This coincidence of timing would prove somewhat embarrassing to both the 
United States and China since Cleveland and Gresham refused to act in concert with 
European powers in anything more important than an arbitration tribunal for determining 
the size of an indemnity.
93
 This had been the consistent policy of the administration since 
the summer when they had rejected an approach from Great Britain to take part in a 
multilateral effort to defuse the crisis in Korea and declined to take part in a similar 
multilateral intervention proposed by Lord Kimberley shortly after the outbreak of 
hostilities.
94
 Most embarrassingly President Cleveland had turned down a second proposal 
of international cooperation from Lord Kimberley, the British foreign minister, less than a 
month before the offer of November 6.
95
 Gresham explained the decision in a telegram 
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initially written for Denby on November 24, but also sent to Dun two days later. Here he 
stated, in words strongly reminiscent of Cleveland’s statements relating to Samoa in his 
annual messages of 1893 and 1894: 
With a few exceptions the record of our diplomatic history shows no 
departure from the wise policy of avoiding foreign alliances and embarrassing 
participation in guaranteeing the independence of distant states. The United States 
may, however, consistently with that policy, lend their aid to further the efforts of 
friendly powers unhappily at war to compose their differences whenever they 
concur in expressing a desire for our impartial mediation.
96
 
 
Once again Gresham displayed the administration’s desire to stay true to the tenets of 
Washington, Jefferson and Monroe, but the words did not match the reality. The United 
States’ first involvement in the Sino-Japanese War had been an attempt to protect the 
independence of Korea and, while Cleveland and Gresham steadfastly refused to entangle 
the nation in any multilateral intervention, the offering of good offices to China and Japan 
led to the possibility of becoming entangled in the affairs of those nations. While this 
danger might have been acceptable since the offer was intended to be of only minor 
involvement and short duration, in the event American involvement would prove to be 
considerably more entangling than Cleveland and Gresham had wished.  
The entanglement came about as a consequence of a series of incremental steps 
which ultimately culminated in embarrassment for the administration and fears of damage 
to Japanese-American friendship. On November 17 the Japanese foreign minister informed 
Minister Dun in Tokyo that his government would not be taking up the United States offer 
of good offices on the grounds that the war had been a universal success for Japan and that 
there was no reason to believe that the victories would not continue.
97
 Dun was also 
informed, though, that the Japanese government would consider a request for peace 
negotiations if China made the first approach with the American legation in Peking being 
suggested as the best channel for such an offer. This suggestion was in line with the first 
offers of American good offices and was a logical decision given the role that the United 
States had accepted in taking on the diplomatic assets and duties of the warring nations 
within the opponent’s territories. Subsequently American diplomats served as the only 
diplomatic conduit between China and Japan from November 1894 until the final peace 
settlement in April 1895.
98
 This innocent attempt to act as a good neighbour was 
undermined by the unauthorised and increasingly self-interested interference of Minister 
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Denby. In the words of Jeffery Dorwart “Minister Denby did not share Gresham’s narrow, 
legalistic interpretation of messengerial good offices. From the outset, he saw his position 
as an opportunity to change the course of East Asian history and increase American 
influence in the area.”99 As a vital figure in the chain of communication between the 
Chinese and Japanese governments Denby quickly took on the role of advisor to the 
Chinese foreign office, the Tsungli-yamên. In this role he won praise from the Chinese 
Emperor, but he also caused minor problems for his masters in Washington.
100
 As the 
negotiations dragged on, delayed by seemingly endless technicalities and procrastination 
on both sides, this role gradually expanded from one of advising on how best China should 
respond to Japan’s demands to the point where Denby specifically advised Viceroy Li that 
China should sell railroad, banking and mining concessions in order to pay the indemnity 
that Japan demanded as one of the precursors of peace, with the implication that American 
companies would make the best purchasers.
101
 This earned the minister a swift rebuke from 
Gresham who warned that the minister would be beset with concession seekers while a 
subsequent proposal to present the offer of a loan from an American syndicate to the 
Chinese government brought a warning not to involve himself in an official capacity, but 
Denby’s attempts to persuade his political masters that they were missing a golden 
opportunity to expand American commerce and influence in East Asia persisted to the 
point that Gresham’s successor, Richard Olney was forced to instruct him to desist.102 
Matters were yet further complicated by the arrival in China of John W. Foster, the former 
secretary of state during the last days of the Benjamin Harrison administration, who 
claimed to Gresham that he would be utilising his good relations with a Chinese official 
who had been an envoy in Washington in order to assist in bringing about peace.
103
 While 
Foster was an old acquaintance of Gresham’s and had served the Cleveland administration 
at the arbitration tribunal of the Bering Sea seal fishing dispute with Great Britain the 
secretary was troubled by the prospect of an American private citizen interfering with 
negotiations and potentially threatening neutrality as a result. His suspicions about Foster’s 
true motives were revealed in a letter to Ambassador Bayard in London in late December 
shortly after learning that the former secretary of state was involved in a scheme to help 
China raise a $400 million loan to pay the indemnity demanded by Japan where he noted 
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that Foster’s “prospects for becoming a millionaire are flattering.”104 The machinations of 
Denby and Foster demonstrate once again the possibilities for influencing foreign policy 
that still existed for individuals – even private citizens – in the 1890s. This recurring issue 
– best illustrated by the actions of Minister Stevens in Hawaii – was drawing to a close, 
however, with the availability of very rapid communication between the State Department 
in Washington and its representatives overseas thanks to the expanding network of 
telegraph cables and the increasing professionalization of the American diplomatic corps. 
In the event the actions of neither man had a significant impact on the peace negotiations, 
but the incident with Foster did lead to yet further trouble for Gresham in Congress. On 
January 4, 1895, the Senate passed a resolution directing Gresham to inform them of any 
official capacity held by Foster in regard to the Chinese peace negotiations.
105
 Gresham 
was comfortably able to answer this resolution in the negative (aided by similarly 
refutations from Senator Morgan), but the matter was another minor embarrassment for the 
administration.
106
 
 
 In terms of American interests at stake the Sino-Japanese War was a relatively 
minor incident for the Cleveland administration by comparison to the revolutions in 
Hawaii and Cuba or the clash with Britain over Venezuela, but it may hold a far greater 
significance historically as an indicator of issues that were to gain importance in the 
remaining years of Cleveland’s term. The administration’s chosen policy of neutrality 
combined with a morally-based desire to use American power and prestige to first preserve 
and then restore peace can be considered, for all its contradictions and minor failings, to 
have fulfilled its aims. Cleveland and Gresham succeeded in protecting American lives and 
property in East Asia, were influential in the peace process, generated goodwill in China 
and Japan, and preserved the independence of Korea. This last point could be considered a 
major triumph, but it is hard to say exactly how far the administration would have been 
willing to go on Korea’s behalf if Japan had sought to occupy the Korean peninsula 
permanently. Cleveland’s annual message of 1894 stated that he had “felt constrained” 
under the terms of the 1882 treaty with Korea to offer good offices to resolve the problems 
“growing out of the Japanese demands for administrative reforms in Korea”.107 These 
reforms were diligently reported to Gresham by Minister Sill throughout 1894 without 
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prompting any change in American policy towards Japan – indeed Gresham declined a 
specific request from the Korean minister in Washington to organise international 
intervention against Japan’s interference in Korean governmental affairs – and a pro-
Japanese coup that occurred in Korea late in 1895 was also accepted without protest.
108
 
This lack of concern might be explained by the fact that Korea had been gradually 
extricating itself from Chinese suzerainty for several decades and therefore the growth of 
Japanese influence was seen as beneficial in completing this movement. Equally, it might 
be cynically suggested that Korea’s independence was expected to always be reliant on the 
goodwill of one or other of its more powerful neighbours and thus not worth damaging 
Japanese relations. It is interesting that Cleveland chose to remain aloof when Russia, 
France and Germany intervened after the peace settlement to force Japan to abandon its 
claim under the treaty to the Liao Tung peninsula. Gresham had demonstrated his concern 
about the prospect of such intervention if Japan was seen to be over-reaching itself as a 
result of its military successes by warning the Japanese government that they risked having 
a peace settlement imposed upon them by the foreign powers represented in China if they 
upset the balance of power too much. This friendly warning was the furthest the 
administration was prepared to go in restraining Japanese ambitions, but it is open to 
debate whether they would have joined a wider intervention if the fundamental 
independence of Korea had been challenged. When fears arose that Japanese forces 
threatened Peking itself late in 1894 Gresham reluctantly arranged for a contingent of 
marines to be dispatched to Tientsin ready for deployment to the capital, but insisted that 
any such move would only take place in the event of other powers doing the same.
109
 
Dorwart suggests that this indicates a desire to maintain equality with the other foreign 
powers in China and notes the difficulties of reconciling the deployment of marines 
without China’s permission with the policy of neutrality.110 While the latter point is valid 
one might argue that the question of deploying small numbers of marines in China, even in 
the capital, was less a question of equality with other powers and more a matter of 
fulfilling the administration’s aim of protecting American citizens and property of which 
Peking contained some numbers. Finally, it should be noted that Cleveland’s lack of 
opposition to European meddling in the Sino-Japanese peace settlement was in stark 
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contrast to his reactions to British intervention in the affairs of Nicaragua and Venezuela in 
1894 and 1895. 
The administration’s limited policy had achieved success, but there had also been 
failures which may have carried far greater significance than was immediately apparent. 
Cleveland and Gresham’s policy encountered considerably greater difficulties at home than 
it did actually being implemented in East Asia. The administration – and Gresham in 
particular – came under fierce criticism in the press and in Congress over several aspects of 
policy, particularly over the inflexibility of the legally-minded policy relating to the 
Japanese spies and over the actions of John W. Foster. Undoubtedly these attacks had 
much to do with partisan politics – the questions over the role played by the Republican 
Foster were undoubtedly related to his long acquaintance with Gresham – but it could be 
suggested that to a large extent Cleveland and Gresham brought extra trouble upon 
themselves through the narrowness of their policy. Their intentions may have been good, 
but the problems the administration encountered with their own diplomats and the criticism 
their policy sustained both in the press and in Congress suggests that Cleveland was losing 
the debate over the United States’ place in global affairs. 
The administration also left itself open to accusations of losing out in East Asia by 
not seeking to take advantage of the situation commercially. The actions of Denby and 
Foster demonstrate a wider desire to cash in on China’s weakened position which 
Cleveland and Gresham staunchly resisted. LaFeber has noted that Denby was instructed in 
the summer of 1895 to exert himself on behalf of securing “equal and liberal trading 
advantages” in Korea and China while the newly appointed Secretary of State Olney 
changed State Department procedures to make it easier for Americans to invest in Chinese 
concessions, but both moves are indicative of Cleveland’s belief that government should 
facilitate and protect private enterprise, not actively seek to promote it.
111
 At a time when 
the carving up of China into zones of commercial interest by the European powers was 
considered imminent by many observers such instructions are far closer to the Open Door 
policies of Cleveland’s successors and further indicate his belief in the rightness of 
commercial competition on a level playing field. 
 
Both in the Brazilian Naval Revolt and the Sino-Japanese War Cleveland and 
Gresham attempted to follow a policy of legal neutrality. The former case came to be 
viewed as a minor triumph for the administration, but the latter should probably be viewed 
on balance as a failure. This failure was not due to the neutrality policy being wrong or 
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ineffective – indeed for this reason it seems highly probable that Gresham and Cleveland 
would not have agreed that there had been a failure – but to domestic factors and, in 
particular, a failure to lead public opinion. Ironically it might be argued that the success of 
the Brazilian Naval Revolt came about when the neutrality policy slipped and American 
force was applied against the rebels; this is not entirely true – the action was legally sound 
within the policy – but it is clear that Gresham was briefly concerned that the Detroit 
action might have been a breach of neutrality. In both cases the neutrality policy was an 
attempt to maintain the status quo while, at most, boosting goodwill towards the United 
States, and it is here that the problem arose for the Cleveland administration. The decision 
not to attempt to use the Brazilian Naval Revolt or the Sino-Japanese War for commercial 
gain was a natural one for Cleveland and Gresham both because it was legally correct and 
because it was politically conservative. For Cleveland in particular actively using foreign 
policy to expand American commerce was anathema. For Cleveland it was the role of 
businessmen and merchants to seek out new and larger markets overseas and the role of 
government to facilitate this work and to protect legitimate American interests once they 
were established. Cleveland saw no merit in acquiring colonies when the continental 
United States contained seemingly limitless resources of its own that had been only 
partially tapped by industry; similarly he had no desire to open new markets using force – 
whether actual or threatened – preferring instead to allow the power of American industry 
to assert itself and win foreign markets through its own efficiency and strength. His 
preferred method for facilitating this – while achieving a variety of other benefits – was 
tariff reform. However, while President Cleveland and Secretary of State Gresham were 
content to adopt policies that were legally sound and presented the United States to the 
world as a paragon of virtue, an opposition was swiftly taking shape that believed the 
nation should be seeking to gain more from its foreign relations and the Brazilian Naval 
Revolt and the Sino-Japanese War indicated that public opinion was moving to follow this 
new vision of the United States in the world. In Brazil the conflict had been limited and in 
an area of only relatively minor interest for most Americans being outside the immediate 
Caribbean sphere although Gresham still found himself being lobbied by some areas of 
industry and commerce. Supporting one side over the other would have seen little obvious 
benefit to the United States and therefore the media found little to criticise in neutrality. 
Finally, the Detroit action appeared to demonstrate greater aggression – and to carry 
greater weight in ending the revolt – than was actually the case resulting in a public 
relations success which had little to do with policy. By comparison, the Sino-Japanese War 
was a major conflict between two nations with which American citizens were familiar and, 
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more importantly, about which they had preformed opinions. For a variety of reasons, not 
least of them racial, the American people were predisposed to view Japan favourably over 
China as the nation of progress and enlightenment in a backwards and superstitious region. 
It is no coincidence that the public relations difficulties encountered by the Cleveland 
administration occurred against a backdrop of heightened opposition to Chinese 
immigration and racism against Chinese already resident in the United States.
112
 This 
obviously created a climate in which a policy of neutrality could be viewed as 
unnecessarily favouring backwards China over progressive Japan; even though Gresham 
himself probably sympathised with those who viewed Japan more favourably, describing 
China as “a vast inert mass of humanity.”113 Under such circumstances it was easy for the 
Republican press to build the story of the executed Japanese spies into a public furore. 
Equally, the reluctance to exploit the situation for commercial gain met with greater 
opposition in the Sino-Japanese War than in the Brazilian Naval Revolt. Unlike Brazil the 
region of East Asia, and China in particular, had been portrayed for generations as an 
unlimited market for American manufactured goods. While it is open to debate how widely 
this vision was accepted by either American manufacturers or the American public 
undoubtedly it does serve to illustrate that the region was the subject of popular interest. 
The efforts of Minister Denby to extract commercial gains without consulting his political 
masters demonstrates that at least some Americans believed there were opportunities to be 
taken in China. Overall the picture of Cleveland and Gresham’s foreign policy that 
emerges from the Brazilian Naval Revolt and the Sino-Japanese War is one of principle, 
but also of stubbornness and even a refusal to work towards the nation’s material interests 
due to a belief that policy should be governed by less base motives. That said many of the 
policies pioneered by Cleveland and Gresham – in particular relating to the Sino-Japanese 
War – would be reprised to a large extent by William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt 
in their handling of Chinese trade, the Boxer Rebellion and the Russo-Japanese War. The 
Cleveland administration’s desire for limited action and legal neutrality can be viewed as 
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laudable policy in a general sense, but in the partisan and racist atmosphere of the 1890s it 
was not necessarily good politics. 
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Chapter 3 – Nicaragua, Venezuela and the Monroe Doctrine 
 
 Grover Cleveland’s second presidential term saw a variety of minor foreign policy 
incidents from around the world, but three incidents in particular have acquired a 
prominent place in the historiography of the presidency. Two of these – the revolutions in 
Hawaii and Cuba – bookended the presidency, but the third reached its climax almost 
exactly at the midpoint of Cleveland’s term. The Venezuelan Border Dispute was a major 
event in the history of American foreign relations in the late nineteenth century and, while 
it has suffered in recent years from the same neglect that has seen the events in Hawaii and 
Cuba come to be overwhelmed by the War of 1898 in most textbooks, it has been credited 
as forming a turning point in U.S. foreign policy in a variety of ways. At different times it 
has been suggested that the Dispute brought the United States close to war with Great 
Britain, can be seen as the beginning of the ‘Special Relationship’ between the American 
and British governments, and reinvigorated – and even reinvented – the Monroe Doctrine.1 
Such claims obviously warrant investigation and it can reasonably be argued that the 
Venezuelan Border Dispute is deserving of restoration to greater prominence in the larger 
narrative of American foreign relations.  
 It may be, however, that the Venezuelan incident is not the only such event that has 
been unfairly neglected by historians. For over a year before the United States became 
involved in the Venezuelan Border Dispute events in Nicaragua had occupied much of the 
attention of the State Department. While largely relegated to little more than a handful of 
paragraphs even in histories of late-nineteenth century foreign policy, these events covered 
a full range of the largest issues facing American policymakers at the time. The situation in 
Nicaragua involved questions of the sovereignty of a Central American republic, the rights 
and responsibilities of a European power in the Americas, the United States relationship 
with its smaller brethren in the western hemisphere, a potential challenge to the Monroe 
Doctrine, and a threat to the commercial interests and investments of thousands of 
American citizens. As such, while the events in Nicaragua may not have held the long term 
significance of the Venezuelan Border Dispute, they form something of a case study in the 
changing position of the United States in the world. 
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 The Venezuelan Border Dispute would prove to be a significant - albeit short-lived 
- domestic political event in itself, but events in Nicaragua were always overshadowed by 
greater issues at home in 1894. Despite the Cleveland administration’s best efforts in 
repealing the Sherman Silver Purchase Act and passing the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act, the 
recession that plagued the country after 1893 did not improve. These difficult economic 
conditions resulted in working class unrest which raised fears in some areas of outright 
revolution. In areas of the West hit hardest by the recession bands of unemployed men 
coalesced into ‘armies’ which demanded measures to ease the financial suffering of 
farming communities - usually by creating currency inflation - and threatened social 
upheaval. The most significant of these ‘armies’, led by Jacob Coxey, marched on 
Washington to demand the issue of $500,000,000 in paper money for highway 
construction. It was viewed seriously enough by Attorney General Richard Olney for 
government agents to infiltrate the march and report on its progress. Cleveland himself, 
however, was unconvinced of the threat and he would eventually be proven right as Coxey 
failed to gather support as he marched and ultimately arrived at Capitol Hill with only 300 
followers, where he was immediately arrested for trespassing on the grass.
2
 Coxey’s march 
had proven to be something of a joke, but considerably more troubling was an increase in 
worker unrest with 1894 marked by a series of strikes - most notably the Pullman Strike 
which took place in June and July. A strike which began over wage cuts and rent increases 
at the Pullman railroad car works near Chicago spread to become a general railroad strike 
which eventually affected rail traffic in 27 states and crippled the transportation network in 
some areas.
3
 In early July Olney intervened. Believing that if he could destroy the strike at 
its epicentre in Chicago it would fail everywhere, Olney demonstrated his skill as a former 
railroad lawyer - a connection which undoubtedly swayed his sympathies toward the 
railroad managers - by using the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to draw up an injunction against 
the strikers interfering with railroad traffic in Chicago on the grounds that it was 
obstructing the federal mails.
4
 When the strikers ignored this injunction Cleveland ordered 
federal troops to the city sparking rioting and clashes between unemployed workers and 
the soldiers in which as many as 25 people were killed.
5
 In the wake of the bloodshed, the 
strike leaders were arrested and the strike came to an end, but not without raising fears of 
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social upheaval in the middle classes and angering workers who believed the Cleveland 
administration had acted as the tools of the railroad directors. These factors, coming on top 
of the continuing failure to restore the nation’s economy and perhaps also some 
dissatisfaction at the refusal to annex Hawaii in 1893, combined to cause a landslide in the 
Congressional elections of November, 1894, in which the Democrats lost 113 seats in the 
House and 5 in the Senate and lost control of both houses. Perhaps as troublingly, the 
Democratic Party struggled to put up a united front in the election with their energies 
“expended primarily in castigating party enemies, instead of fighting Republican 
opponents.”6 The extent to which these events affected the Cleveland administration’s 
foreign policy in 1894 and 1895 has been the subject of lively debate; what is certain is 
that they forecast further troubles for the administration in its final two years. 
 
 As the domestic troubles of 1894 unfolded, the Cleveland administration found 
itself also responding to other problems several thousand miles away in the Central 
American republic of Nicaragua. The United States’ involvement in Nicaraguan affairs 
centred on a debate over the sovereignty of the Mosquito Indians who occupied a large 
reservation on the Central American country’s southeast coast.7 The reservation had been 
guaranteed to the Indians since 1860 when Nicaragua signed the Treaty of Managua with 
Great Britain. It had previously been a British protectorate and, while this status was 
officially relinquished under the treaty, a stipulation remained that the Indians should 
maintain a measure of self-government under Nicaraguan sovereignty.  Complicating 
matters further was Britain’s insistence that they were entitled to intercede on behalf of the 
Indians in any dispute with Nicaragua, a position that was reinforced in 1881 when the 
Emperor of Austria delivered an arbitration decision that practically rendered the Mosquito 
Reservation independent of Nicaraguan rule excepting the appointment of a Nicaraguan 
commissioner to protect its sovereign rights.
8
 Such potential for British involvement in 
Central American affairs in spite of the Monroe Doctrine was clearly unwelcome for the 
United States and the Emperor of Austria’s appointment as arbiter was never accepted by 
the American government, continuing to be a matter of discontent in 1894.
9
 Ironically, 
however, the arbitration decision may have played a large part in increasing American 
influence in the region and, ultimately, bringing an end to the British pseudo-protectorate. 
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The decision of 1881 granted the Mosquito Indians the right to exercise all the powers 
necessary to regulate trade in the reservation. Whether this played a role in the subsequent 
increase in American investment in the region is open to debate, but it is indisputable that 
this freedom from Nicaraguan control came to be seen by merchants and investors at the 
reservation’s capital, Bluefields, as vital to their economic welfare. 
 The increase in American investment and commerce in the Mosquito Reservation 
was dramatic. Beginning in the 1880s, American businessmen poured capital into the 
exploitation of the rich resources to be found in the territory. While bananas and other fruit 
were the largest exports, the investors also sought to capitalise on the reservation’s natural 
wealth in minerals, timber and hides.
10
 By 1893 American investments in the Mosquito 
Reservation amounted to $2,000,000, with overall trade with the United States totalling as 
much as $4,000,000 per year.
11
 More importantly, American firms had taken up a 
dominant position in the region’s economy, conducting 90% of the commerce and holding 
90-95% of the reservation’s total wealth.12 By this standard, the Mosquito Reservation is 
indicative of the change taking place in the United States position in the world. Having 
built such strong commercial ties with this small corner of the Western Caribbean, and 
with such substantial investments at stake for American citizens, the United States 
government found itself more deeply involved in local affairs than it might have wished. 
 This American presence in Nicaragua became relevant to the State Department 
early in 1894 when the outbreak of hostilities between Nicaragua and Honduras led to B.B. 
Seat, the U.S. Consular Agent at Bluefields, requesting that a warship be sent to protect 
American citizens and their property in the reservation.
13
 Although Gresham arranged with 
the Navy Department to have the U.S.S. Kearsage dispatched to the region, there appeared 
to be little cause for concern since Bluefields was well-removed from the scene of the 
invasion at Cape Gracias á Dios. However, the crisis with Honduras exposed deep flaws in 
the relationship between the Nicaraguan government and the authorities on the Mosquito 
Reservation. The Indian government – which by 1894 was largely controlled by the foreign 
community and by black Jamaican immigrants in particular – disputed the right of 
Nicaragua to mobilise troops within the reservation without its permission and threatened 
to make an official protest to Great Britain. They also made moves to form their own 
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defence militia.
14
 Under these circumstances, it is possible that Seat’s request for a warship 
was as much motivated by concerns about Nicaragua’s potential actions as by the 
possibility of an invasion by Honduran forces. Certainly the need for an American military 
presence at Bluefields became more urgent shortly afterwards when Nicaraguan troops 
occupied the town on the night of February 10-11.
15
 
 This occupation would prove to be the first of many in 1894 with troops from 
Nicaragua and British and American marines all being deployed at various times in an 
attempt to maintain order in Bluefields and the surrounding reservation. In general this was 
the result of the failure of the leading figures on the reservation and the Nicaraguan 
officials sent to work with them to create a workable settlement that would allow the 
reservation’s diverse community to govern itself. As the failure to bring about a political 
settlement continued through the summer Gresham was also forced to confront the issue of 
involvement by American citizens and even American diplomats in local affairs. 
Ultimately he presided over the United States’ response to a British occupation of the port 
of Corinto on Nicaragua’s Pacific coast in 1895. Once again, much of his policy would be 
based upon a foundation of strict legality. 
 The existence of the Treaty of Managua and Britain’s consequent assertion of a 
right to intervene on the behalf of the Mosquito Indians in any dispute with the Nicaraguan 
government meant that any unrest involving the Mosquito Reservation was always going 
to be a matter of concern for the United States. Under the Monroe Doctrine, opposition to 
European involvement in the affairs of the American continents had, of course, been the 
United States’ declared policy since 1823, but enforcement of the doctrine varied 
throughout the 19
th
 century. This was specifically true in relation to Nicaragua where a 
succession of diplomatic exchanges demonstrate the flexible interpretation of the doctrine. 
First, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 between Great Britain and the United States had 
attempted to ensure that neither nation could construct and own an inter-oceanic canal in 
Central America and also stipulated that there was to be no colonisation of Central 
American nations including Nicaragua and the Mosquito Coast. While a strong 
endorsement of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was 
somewhat undermined by the differing interpretations placed upon it by the United States 
and Britain with the British protectorate then in existence over the Mosquito Coast being a 
particular source of controversy. This area of dispute was supposedly removed by the 
Treaty of Managua in 1860 when Britain acknowledged Nicaraguan sovereignty over the 
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Mosquito Reservation, but the issue was clouded by the subsequent British claim to 
intercede on the Indians’ behalf. It arose again in 1879 when Nicaragua agreed, without 
consulting the United States, to submit the question of the extent of its sovereignty over the 
Mosquito Reservation to the arbitration of the Emperor of Austria-Hungary. At the time 
the United States did not protest, but the arbitration decision handed down in 1881 was 
never acknowledged as binding by the American government and the actions of both 
Britain and Nicaragua clearly still rankled with some members of the State Department in 
1894.
16
 Finally, as recently as 1888 the Nicaraguan government had appealed to the United 
States for assistance after the British government had threatened to intervene against 
perceived infringements of Mosquito sovereignty. The Secretary of State at the time – 
Thomas F. Bayard who held the post of Ambassador to Great Britain in 1894 – stated: 
The matter is one in which the Government of the United States feels at least an 
equal interest with that of Great Britain, inasmuch as a number of our citizens are 
now engaged in business within the reservation and by far the larger part of the 
foreign commerce of that region is at present carried on between the ports of 
Bluefields and New Orleans.
17
 
 
In a lengthy instruction to the American Minister in London, Bayard made plain that the 
United States would not tolerate any attempt to re-establish a British protectorate on the 
Mosquito Coast.
18
 This led to a denial that the British government had any such intentions, 
but at least one of Gresham’s predecessors found this declaration to be rendered worthless 
by their continued assertion of the right of intervention.
19
 
 It is clear from these events that the United States government was becoming 
increasingly assertive of its declared position under the Monroe Doctrine in Nicaragua 
during the later years of the 19
th
 century. It could be argued that this was simply the result 
of the increasing American commercial interest in the region, but the actions of Bayard and 
Gresham – both natural foreign policy conservatives – suggest that this growing 
assertiveness was more likely to be a consequence of expanding American power on the 
world stage. This argument would be supported by the events of 1894 and 1895 and thus 
forms an interesting counterpoint to the fundamental conservatism of Grover Cleveland’s 
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foreign policy with its generally limited aims and reluctance to involve the United States in 
the affairs of other nations. 
 Gresham had shown little concern over the events taking place on the reservation in 
January and February of 1894, but was moved to act when reports reached Washington of 
the landing of British marines at Bluefields on March 5. Within days of the landing 
telegrams were sent to the American representatives in Nicaragua and Great Britain 
seeking more information on the landings and specifically querying the “alleged grounds” 
and “the occasion” for the British action.20 If doubt remained as to the reason for 
Gresham’s questions – and apparently Minister Baker in Nicaragua did not fully 
comprehend his chief’s thinking – it was decisively removed by his second telegram to 
Nicaragua which stated: “Did Great Britain land troops under asserted right of sovereignty 
or only for protection? Prompt answer desired.”21 Clearly the State Department was 
troubled by the prospect that Britain had forcibly asserted its claim to intercede for the 
Mosquito Indians in direct opposition to the Nicaraguan government’s attempt to assert its 
own sovereignty over the reservation. 
 This anxiety was only partially alleviated by Ambassador Bayard’s replies from 
London. Bayard’s cabled report on his meeting with the British Foreign Minister, Lord 
Kimberley, declared “I believe landing of forces was to extend safety to residents and 
check violence” while his more detailed written report of the same meeting stated his belief 
that the commander of the U.S.S. Kearsage would also have landed marines to protect 
American lives and property if that vessel had arrived at Bluefields before its British 
counterpart.
22
 A subsequent dispatch based on an official memorandum from Lord 
Kimberley explaining the British actions at Bluefields also demonstrated Bayard’s belief 
that the landing was intended to protect white traders rather than the Mosquito Indians, 
going further to suggest that the discussions taking place between the British Consul and 
the Nicaraguan general in the town aimed at restoring order could be taken as proof that 
Britain recognised Nicaraguan sovereignty.
23
 Gresham, however, clearly did not share 
Bayard’s confidence in British intentions. In a lengthy dispatch on April 30 the Secretary 
of State stated his belief that the British government had been aware of an abortive 
agreement between its representatives in the reservation and the Nicaraguan commissioner 
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there concluded on March 4, but negotiated several days earlier, and had also been fully 
apprised of a second agreement that was announced on March 25, six days after it was 
negotiated.
24
 He was supported in this belief by reports from Captain Watson of the U.S.S. 
San Francisco (the Kearsage having been wrecked en route to Nicaragua) and Mr. Braida, 
U.S. Consul at San Juan del Norte, both of whom visited Bluefields in March and April 
and reported that the British consul was working directly with the Nicaraguan government 
to create a new authority for the reservation.
25
 Gresham, it seems, was concerned that 
Britain was only withdrawing its support from the Mosquito Indians in order to enter into a 
partnership with the Nicaraguan government which would contravene the Treaty of 
Managua still further. This is confirmed by a personal letter that Gresham wrote to Bayard 
on May 2 in which he wrote “For some reason the Government of Nicaragua now appears 
to be unfriendly to the United States, and it is believed here (not without reason), that 
English interests have brought about this feeling.”26 At the close of the April 30 dispatch, 
Bayard was instructed “to express to Lord Kimberley the President’s hope and expectation 
... that no foreign agency shall be permitted to dictate or participate in the administration of 
affairs in the Mosquito Reservation.”27 
 All of this combined to form a surprisingly aggressive opening stance from 
Gresham towards Great Britain over the Mosquito Reservation. In a region in which the 
United States held commercial interests that, while dominant, were not of any great 
significance the cautious Secretary of State was setting out a very active position that 
questioned the interaction of the British and Nicaraguan governments and it appears clear 
that this was designed to forestall any attack on the Monroe Doctrine by Britain. No other 
convincing explanation has been put forward for Gresham’s stance. Of the little that has 
been written on the subject, the most expansive is that of Walter LaFeber, written in 1963. 
In The New Empire LaFeber states “Gresham maneuvered England out of its strategic 
position in Nicaragua and led the United States into the newly created political vacuum to 
replace the British.”28 This argument credits Gresham with greater aggression than he 
actually applied. While LaFeber has repeated this claim in more recent works, there is no 
evidence that Gresham actively sought to place the United States in a position from which 
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to exert control over Nicaragua and such a move would not have been in character with his 
actions in Hawaii and Brazil.
29
 A more convincing interpretation is that of Charles W. 
Calhoun who suggests that, in formulating American policy towards the region, Gresham 
was forced to choose between American businesses that had flourished under the British 
pseudo-protectorate and the international standing of the Monroe Doctrine and ultimately 
chose the latter.
30
 This theory is in character with Gresham’s legalistic approach to foreign 
policy and is borne out by his stance towards the governments of both Britain and 
Nicaragua. It also raises questions about the anti-imperialism of both Gresham and 
President Cleveland. While there was no attempt to influence Nicaragua’s actions, the use 
of the United States’ growing power to more actively assert the Monroe Doctrine 
potentially placed it in a position that can be viewed as imperialist. The late 19
th
 Century 
had already seen Central American nations invoke the Monroe Doctrine while appealing to 
the United States for help in disputes with European powers (as illustrated by Nicaragua 
itself in 1888). By actively asserting the Monroe Doctrine, Gresham and Cleveland 
essentially placed the United States in the position of regional hegemon, if a benign and 
conservative one. Whether this constitutes imperialism is then a matter of definition since a 
lack of desire to directly influence the actions of other governments in the Americas did 
not negate a paternalistic stance towards those governments. However one chooses to 
define the policy, once again it can clearly be seen as an attempt by Cleveland and 
Gresham to set out their vision of how American power should be applied to defend the 
United States’ traditional sphere of influence in the Western hemisphere. This would be 
even more starkly demonstrated in relation to Venezuela the next year. 
 
 Further evidence of Gresham’s determination to defend – and perhaps even 
reinvigorate – the Monroe Doctrine can be seen in his next exchange with Bayard. In a 
meeting on May 22, Lord Kimberley responded to Gresham’s stern warning of April 30 in 
decidedly conciliatory terms, declaring once again that Great Britain had no intention or 
desire to impose a protectorate over the reservation regardless of the large foreign 
community that had grown up at Bluefields since the Treaty of Managua was signed.
31
 
Furthermore, the Foreign Minister had disavowed the actions of the British consul in 
involving himself with the negotiations to form a new government for the Mosquito 
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Reservation. Most remarkable was Bayard’s description of Kimberley’s desire to follow 
the United States’ lead in Nicaragua: 
 His lordship further expressed a strong desire to learn what the United 
States Government considered it advisable should be done in the present status of 
affairs at Bluefields. 
 He said the United States are, as it were, “on the spot,” and could judge 
what line of action was necessary to produce requisite and reasonable security for 
persons and property in that region. 
 He appeared to be disposed to follow in the line which should be approved 
and adopted by the United States, so that a coincidence of view and action should 
be arrived at by the United States and Great Britain.
32
 
 
While it is notable that Bayard’s third statement is considerably more conjectural than the 
pair that preceded it, that such sentiments should be expressed by the British Foreign 
Secretary is quite remarkable. As such they may mark a recognition in the British 
government – or at least the Liberal government that Lord Kimberley represented – that the 
United States was now sufficiently strong that competing with them in Central America 
would be a mistake. This could be seen as direct evidence of Mead’s argument that 
growing threats to Britain’s dominance in the late 19th Century saw a reappraisal of British 
interests and relationships in the Americas and a new desire to placate the American 
government.
33
 Whatever the case, Bayard was left convinced that “They do not desire to 
have any but the most friendly and mutually accommodating relations with the United 
States,” and that British intentions in Nicaragua were entirely benign.34 
 All of this would appear to have been an impressive victory for Gresham’s foreign 
policy, but the Secretary of State was determined not to yield anything to his British 
counterpart. Indeed, he did not simply reject the British advances, but seized on the 
opportunity to make a forceful statement about American intentions. In a dispatch of July 
19, Gresham instructed Bayard to reject the implied offer of working with Britain to create 
a new government for the Mosquito Reservation on the grounds that it “might imply a 
willingness on the part of this Administration to depart from the consistent policy pursued 
by previous Administrations in dealing with Central American questions.”35 This carried a 
dual significance: firstly Gresham was unwilling to compromise the Monroe Doctrine by 
granting legitimacy to the British interest in Nicaragua through joint action between the 
two nations. Secondly, the Secretary of State specifically would not accept any 
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governmental arrangement at Bluefields that did not conform to the traditional American 
interpretation of the Treaty of Managua. This is particularly significant since the previous, 
foreign-dominated government, that had existed at Bluefields before February, 1894, was 
not considered to have been in line with the initial intentions of the treaty and thus he was 
in effect demanding a radical alteration in the political situation on the Reservation. 
Denying that there was any major difficulty to be solved at Bluefields, Gresham insisted 
that the “alien administration” that had dominated the Indian population must be removed. 
He made no comment on what should take its place, but declared that “The sovereignty of 
Nicaragua over the whole of the national domain is unquestionable.” In this case the strict 
interpretation of the Treaty of Managua – and by extension the Monroe Doctrine itself – 
precluded any alternative government, even one that might benefit the United States or its 
citizens:  
No matter how conspicuous the American or other alien interests which have 
grown up under the fiction of Indian self-government, neither the United States not 
Great Britain can fairly sanction or uphold this colorable abuse of the sovereignty 
of Nicaragua. 
.... This being so, the United States could neither participate in nor sanction any 
device whereby the ultimate authority and international responsibility of Nicaragua 
in respect to American citizens in the reservation might be impaired or restricted. 
 
All of this was a forceful declaration of American intent and one which can be seen as a 
significant victory for Cleveland’s administration, but it is not immediately clear as to why 
Gresham felt motivated to make such a bold statement. Certainly the move conforms with 
LaFeber’s suggestion that Gresham was seeking to manoeuvre the British out of Nicaragua 
in order to allow the United States to take their place, but both Gresham’s rhetoric and 
subsequent events speak against this. It is possible that Gresham was specifically seeking 
to reinvigorate the Monroe Doctrine, but there is no readily apparent reason why he should 
wish to do this. A far more likely explanation is that Gresham was simply acting in 
accordance with his preferred policy earlier in the administration. Events in Hawaii, Brazil 
and China had all demonstrated that a concern for legal probity was the Secretary’s 
preferred policy foundation and, this being the case, the declarations of his July 19 dispatch 
form a logical train. Gresham was correcting what he perceived to be a legal injustice 
under the terms of the Treaty of Managua because he deemed himself to have a legal and 
moral obligation to do so. Once again the growing might of the United States – and, 
perhaps more importantly, the rising threat to Great Britain of Germany and Russia – was 
granting the Secretary of State the power to act, if not as a global policeman, then certainly 
as a hemispheric legal counsel. 
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On that subject, it should be noted that one reason why Gresham was able to enact 
his policy was that Britain had little material incentive to dispute the case with the United 
States; Americans dominated the local commerce and Britain’s interests in the region were 
limited to some black Jamaican immigrants and the historical protection of the Mosquito 
Indians, an arrangement that was of little obvious benefit to the British government in 1894 
and one which Ambassador Bayard suggested the Foreign Office would be happy to 
relinquish.
36
 It has been suggested that the potential construction of an inter-oceanic canal 
through Nicaragua meant that the region continued to be a matter of interest to Great 
Britain, but by the 1890s the only significant efforts to build any such canal were American 
in origin.
37
 While it might be argued that a continued British presence in Nicaragua might 
have been useful in frustrating American plans to construct a canal, the strong position 
held by Britain both strategically – in terms of its Caribbean possessions – and legally – 
under the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty which forbade either nation from constructing a Central 
American canal for their exclusive use – meant that physical control of Nicaraguan soil 
was an unnecessary burden. In all, it might be argued that the deferential attitude shown by 
the British government over Nicaragua formed the first tentative stage of an Anglo-
American cooperative movement that would eventually culminate in the ‘Special 
Relationship’ of the twentieth century. While this might be overstating the case somewhat, 
it does appear clear that the British government of the time was happy to abandon its 
historic obligations to the Mosquito Indians in order to improve relations with the United 
States. It is equally possible that Gresham’s repeated assertions to Bayard that the United 
States would not support any of its own citizens who attempted to manipulate the situation 
in the reservation in order to set up a government more responsive to their needs were 
intended for British consumption and designed as reassurance that the American 
government was not seeking to profit directly from the British withdrawal.
38
 
Although British interest in constructing an inter-oceanic canal had declined, 
Nicaragua’s promise as a possible location for such a project made it a nation of interest to 
some American politicians who hoped that a canal would facilitate the growth of American 
commerce with China and Japan. Cleveland, while not totally opposed to the concept of a 
trans-isthmian canal, does not appear to have shared their enthusiasm and certainly his 
record in office showed little desire to encourage such a project.
39
 In 1885, Cleveland’s 
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first foreign policy decision as President had been to withdraw the Frelinghuysen-Zavala 
Treaty from Senate consideration on the grounds that it constituted an entangling alliance. 
The treaty had granted the United States the right to construct a trans-isthmian canal 
through Nicaragua which was to be jointly owned and operated by the two who would be 
thenceforth connected by an alliance and a promise of American protection of Nicaraguan 
territory.
40
 Undoubtedly it was the proposal of an alliance and an open-ended commitment 
to defend Nicaraguan territory that prompted Cleveland to put an end to the treaty, but he 
also did not believe that it was the role of government to take the lead in such projects. In 
this he was opposed not simply by Republicans who held a broader vision of the rights and 
duties of government, but also by some in his own party. Most notably Senator John T. 
Morgan of Alabama, who served in the Senate for 30 years and was Chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations during the first two years of Cleveland’s second 
term, was a keen Democratic supporter of a trans-isthmian canal in the belief that the 
economic development of the Caribbean would see an end to the South’s status as an 
economic colony of the North.
41
 Morgan and others saw the crisis in Nicaragua as an 
opportunity to push forward with the canal project, but despite repeated lobbying found the 
President and Grehsam to be intransigent.
42
 When Morgan attempted to secure a 
government guarantee for $70 million worth of bonds for the Maritime Canal Company - 
an American company which had begun operating in Nicaragua in 1889 - Cleveland 
threatened to veto the bill.
43
 Gresham would defend the rights of the company when the 
Nicaraguan government threatened to terminate its concession in 1894, but only as a 
standard diplomatic procedure while he also ordered the American Minister in Managua to 
disavow any intimation that the United States might guarantee the company’s credit or 
assist in finishing its work.
44
 Whatever their objectives in Nicaragua, the Cleveland 
administration was not seeking to facilitate the construction of a canal. 
 
While Gresham’s handling of American policy relating to events in the Mosquito 
Reservation held less long-term significance than his dealings with Great Britain, it still 
serves as an example of many of the problems facing the Secretary of State in the mid-
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1890s. Foremost amongst these are Gresham’s basic approach to policy, the difficulties of 
communicating with and controlling diplomats across great distances, and the problems 
created by the personal agendas of local American residents. The first of these was 
relatively simple: consistent with his actions in Hawaii, Brazil and China, Gresham sought 
to place his policy on a solid legal foundation. Under international law and the treaties 
recognised by the United States, the Nicaraguan government was indisputably, in 
Gresham’s eyes, the sovereign power in the Mosquito Reservation. This being so, the 
Secretary of State’s policy can largely be viewed as an extension of his neutrality policy 
elsewhere. If the government of Nicaragua lived up to their treaty obligations toward 
American citizens residing in the country then the United States government had no right 
to interfere with Nicaraguan internal affairs. This was a message that was emphasised 
repeatedly in his instructions to the State Department’s representatives in the region.45 
 If creating the policy was a relatively easy decision for Gresham, then enacting it 
proved to be a far more difficult proposition. This was due not so much to the opposition of 
either Nicaragua or Great Britain, but to the machinations and various agendas of the 
Americans in the region. Of these, perhaps the most problematic were the State 
Department’s own representatives: Lewis Baker, the U.S. Minister in Managua, A.C. 
Braida, the U.S. Consul for the region who was based at San Juan del Norte, and B.B. Seat, 
the U.S. Consular Agent at Bluefields. As in Hawaii and Brazil, Gresham found himself 
repeatedly having to restrain these representatives of the American government and 
compensate for their actions. While none of them came close to emulating Minister 
Stevens’ efforts at creating U.S. foreign policy in Hawaii, all three frustrated the Secretary 
of State with their actions and served to illustrate the difficulties of enacting centralised 
policy at a distance in the late 19
th
 century. 
 A major contributor to this problem was simply the matter of the distance between 
the United States and Nicaragua and the difficulties of communicating with the State 
Departments representatives there. By comparison with the incidents in Hawaii or China, 
Gresham was able to communicate with his minister in Nicaragua very easily: telegraph 
networks connected Washington to Managua, enabling the Secretary of State to request 
and receive urgent messages from Minister Baker in a matter of hours. In this respect 
Baker was as accessible as his counterparts in European capitals. Beyond the vicinity of 
Managua, however, the situation was very different. Internal communications within 
Nicaragua itself were slow and unreliable. During one crisis Minister Baker reported that 
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the sole telegraph line between Managua and the Mosquito Reservation was down, thus 
precluding any hopes of speedy communication between the capital and Bluefields.
46
 He 
also noted that in times of crisis the Nicaraguan government would only convey letters or 
telegrams that were “entirely agreeable to them.” Further to this, surface communications 
between Bluefields and Managua were extremely difficult. Baker described to Gresham 
how his journey to the Mosquito Reservation had involved “a most difficult trip, changing 
conveyances nine times in consequence of the low stage of water in the San Juan River,” 
and only arriving in Bluefields courtesy of the U.S.S. San Francisco.
47
 Surface 
communications between Nicaragua and Washington were little better with diplomatic 
dispatches between Baker and the State Department taking anything from two to six weeks 
to reach their destination – by contrast regular transatlantic shipping allowed America’s 
ambassadors in Europe to deliver full written reports in less than two weeks. Indeed, due to 
the easy access to Caribbean shipping routes from Bluefields, it was often possible for 
Braida and Seat to communicate with Washington more swiftly than their superior in 
Managua could. This was highlighted in the summer of 1894 when Minister Baker 
informed Gresham that the presence of an American warship at Bluefields meant that 
Washington could now be in possession of reports from the reservation in as little as 6 or 7 
days, much faster than he himself could be.
48
 All this combined to create a situation 
whereby it was virtually impossible for the Secretary of State, his minister in Managua, 
and the American consular representatives in the reservation to be in full possession of the 
same facts and instructions at any one time and thus effective control of the situation from 
Washington was also an impossibility. Under such circumstances the State Department 
was forced to place its trust in the good judgement of its officers overseas, something that 
Gresham would consider to be seriously lacking in Nicaragua. 
 All three American diplomats involved in the events surrounding the Mosquito 
Reservation opened themselves to criticism in some way and, in many respects, they are 
illustrative of the issues facing the State Department at the end of the 19
th
 century. 
Consular Agent Seat was accused by the Nicaraguan foreign minister of sympathy towards 
the rebellion against Nicaraguan sovereignty that occurred in the first week of July, 1894. 
The foreign minister cited comments by Seat reported in the American press as further 
evidence that he was prejudiced against the Nicaraguan government.
49
 Worse, from 
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Gresham’s point of view, were the actions of Seat and Consul Braida in involving 
themselves in the attempts to form a provisional government for the reservation after the 
first landing of British marines in March. Braida, in particular, had to be restrained by a 
cabled admonishment from Gresham after acquiescing in a system that saw Seat appoint 
two Americans to sit on the five man council that would take up the task of municipal 
government. Gresham declared: “You are not authorized to perform diplomatic functions, 
and will not meddle in political affairs in Mosquito.”50 Braida, meanwhile, was also the 
subject of accusations from the Nicaraguan government that he was acting in collusion 
with the British Consul against them, something he denied, claiming instead that it was the 
British who were colluding with Nicaraguan officials.
51
 In this way the inadequacies of the 
communication system became obvious as telegrams gave only a partial picture of the true 
situation while the written reports that were designed to provide clarity took weeks to reach 
their destination and often passed fresh instructions travelling from Washington on the 
way. Under such circumstances Gresham was reliant on his minister in Nicaragua to 
control matters on his behalf and provide him with regular reports. 
Minister Baker failed to fulfil either of these tasks. During the confusion that 
followed the first landing of British marines in March, 1894, Gresham was twice forced to 
cable his minister for information about the grounds under which the landing had taken 
place and eventually had to directly order him to visit Bluefields personally in order to 
report on the situation first hand.
52
 Having already requested a full report on the situation 
in the aftermath of Braida and Seat’s involvement in the new municipal council, Gresham 
eventually lost patience with Baker’s reluctance to take personal control of the situation 
and, in words strongly reminiscent of the message sent to Minister Willis in Hawaii after 
the failure of his  initial interview with Queen Liliuokalani, declared: “Your failure to send 
full information in regard to Bluefields incident has been embarrassing here. You should 
go there at once. No officer of this Government was authorized to participate with 
Nicaraguan authorities and British consul in organizing provisional administration.”53 Thus 
we see a powerful condemnation of Baker’s failure to provide his chief with information 
and to manage his subordinates, but these were not his only failings. Baker clearly had 
little respect for Nicaragua’s government or its people: he repeatedly argued to both 
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Gresham and the Nicaraguan foreign minister, José Madriz, that Nicaraguan rule was 
damaging American businesses in the reservation, prompting the latter to politely suggest 
that such feelings were inevitable in a community that was used to governing affairs for 
their own benefit.
54
 Further to this Baker angered Gresham, first by negotiating with the 
Nicaraguan commissioner at Bluefields to have Nicaraguan soldiers withdrawn from the 
town – a violation, as Gresham saw it, of Nicaraguan sovereignty – and then, when the 
troops were returned to the town after Baker’s departure, misrepresenting the facts of the 
agreement in his report to the State Department.
55
 In this latter incident, it is interesting to 
note that the Nicaraguan government appealed directly to the State Department about 
Baker’s interference with their affairs and that Gresham appeared to put more faith in the 
information he received from Nicaragua’s minister in Washington than he did in that 
supplied by his own minister at Managua.
56
 As early as May 2, 1894, Gresham’s opinion 
of Baker was sufficiently low to lead him to write to Bayard “Mr. Baker’s appointment to 
Nicaragua was an unfortunate one. He is a vain, weak man, and it may become necessary 
to recall him.”57  
Such fundamental failings of the State Department hierarchy as were seen in 
Nicaragua are characteristic of the difficulties faced by U.S. Secretaries of State in the late 
19
th
 century. In particular, the staffing of diplomatic missions with untrained, underpaid 
appointees – a product of the spoils system – created a fertile situation for unauthorised 
actions based on personal agendas. Charles Calhoun has suggested that Gresham 
contributed to his own difficulties in Nicaragua by delegating the task of managing 
department patronage instead of superintending it himself, but the combination of poor 
communication and lack of either the financial incentive to attract good applicants to 
unglamorous posts such as Managua or the training to professionalise the service made 
such problems largely inevitable.
58
 Certainly Gresham repeatedly showed more faith in the 
reports delivered by professional naval officers than in those delivered by diplomats.
59
 
Contributing to this was the divergence between Gresham and Cleveland’s conception of 
what constituted good American foreign policy and the views of more activist thinkers 
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amongst whom Baker, Braida and Seat could be numbered. This difference of opinion is 
well illustrated in a message from Baker to Gresham of June 7, 1894. On May 12, 
Gresham had instructed Baker to await instructions on how to proceed and that in the 
meantime he “should take care to say nothing tending to disparage Nicaragua’s rightful 
claim to paramount sovereignty or to encourage pretentions to autonomous rights 
inconsistent therewith.”60 In his June 7 reply Baker stated: 
I will say that I have on all proper occasions affirmed Nicaragua’s rightful claim to 
paramount sovereignty over the Mosquito territory; but, while conceding this, I 
have expressed the hope that the American citizens who have gone to that territory 
and invested money and labor and procured titles to property under certain treaty 
stipulations will be protected in the rights that they have acquired by proper 
arrangement between the two Governments. 
 
This argument treads a fine line between protecting the property and livelihoods of 
American citizens and the creation of a de facto protectorate in which the U.S. government 
pressured Nicaragua into granting its citizens special status. Gresham’s conception of 
foreign policy was that the fair and equitable treatment of foreign governments under the 
law as set out in international treaty rights was sufficient to guarantee American citizens 
their rights abroad and that it was not the place of the government to give them an 
advantage. In Nicaragua, Baker, Braida and Seat all expanded this conception and thus 
attempted to manipulate events – the formation of a new government on the reservation, 
the exercise of Nicaraguan authority and taxation, and the placement of Nicaraguan troops 
– for the benefit of American commerce. 
 Gresham’s defence of Nicaraguan sovereignty over the Mosquito Reservation 
inevitably placed him in opposition, not just to Baker, Braida and Seat, but also to many of 
the Americans residing in the region. Amongst this expatriate community there was 
undoubtedly opposition to Nicaraguan rule due to a combination of reluctance to relinquish 
their privileged position under the previous administration in the reservation and concern 
over potential damage that new Nicaraguan taxes and regulations might do to their 
businesses.
61
 There may also be evidence to suggest a genuine desire from the American 
community to see full representation of all the major groups in the reservation - American, 
British, native and Creole - on any ruling council, although this may very well have been a 
convenient method of reducing the influence of the Nicaraguan commissioner and his 
chosen representatives.
62
 As has already been noted, Secretary Gresham saw no merit to 
such ideas, arguing that the foreign community that had grown up in the reservation since 
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the Treaty of Managua held no legal right to separate representation in government. By 
contrast, Gresham saw it as his duty to attempt to control the actions of the American 
community in and around Bluefields, ordering his representatives in the country to urge the 
expatriates not to become involved in the political instability in the region. This came to a 
head when another insurrection broke out against Nicaraguan rule at Bluefields on July 5, 
1894, prompting the U.S.S. Marblehead to land marines to protect life and property, and 
culminating in an attack by the insurgents on a detachment of Nicaraguan soldiers – killing 
two, wounding one and capturing six or seven and a large cache of weapons.
63
 Reports that 
American citizens had been involved in the insurrection were clearly concerning to 
Gresham who once again requested an immediate report from Minister Baker.
64
 These 
reports were clearly widespread since Seat’s original report on the incident had sought to 
dismiss any such claims as inevitable Nicaraguan propaganda and had suggested that at 
most “two or three irresponsible parties” might have been involved.65 While it is clear that 
Gresham was alarmed by the prospect that American citizens might seek to provoke an 
armed rebellion against Nicaraguan rule of the Mosquito Reservation – perhaps with the 
aim of creating a new independent state as a result – the insurrection of July 5, 1894, did 
also lead him to toughen his stance towards the Nicaraguan government. This came as a 
result of the arrest – and subsequent deportation without trial – of two American citizens 
named Lampton and Wiltbank who had taken up positions in the provisional government 
that briefly ruled the reservation after the ousting of Nicaraguan forces.
66
 Tellingly, 
Gresham’s anger upon learning of the arrests from the naval commander at Bluefields was 
not confined simply to the “lawless proceeding” whereby the men were seized after being 
invited to visit the Nicaraguan commissioner, denied permission to speak to family or 
friends, and transported to Managua.
67
 The Secretary of State also noted that arrests in such 
fashion violated the treaty between the United States and Nicaragua that had been signed in 
1887 and was “an ungenerous response to the friendly disposition recently manifested by 
this Government respecting the sovereignty of Nicaragua over the Mosquito territory.” 
Clearly Gresham was annoyed to have his dual policies of legal probity and respecting all 
nations as equals under the law treated so shabbily. LaFeber has suggested that this attempt 
to convince the Nicaraguan government to allow Lampton and Wiltbank to return to 
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Bluefields was a violation of his own policy of neutrality, but it seems likely that Gresham 
was motivated simply by his own conviction that international law should be paramount 
and that the men’s legal rights had not been respected.68 This being so, it is interesting to 
note that when Minister Guzman explained the Nicaraguan government’s actions to 
Gresham a month later he did so by directly responding to Gresham’s charge that the 
Treaty of 1887 had been violated and explaining that the men in question had forfeited 
their treaty rights by engaging in armed rebellion against Nicaraguan rule.
69
 While making 
this defence, however, Guzman also informed Gresham that the two men would be allowed 
to return to Bluefields for a sufficient period necessary to settle up any outstanding 
business affairs – a period that was later extended indefinitely, possibly due to Gresham’s 
continued probing into the events surrounding the men’s arrests and the summary manner 
of their deportation.
70
 It seems the Nicaraguan government, having made its point, did not 
wish to alienate the United States further. 
 One reason why the Nicaraguan government may have considered it prudent not to 
risk damaging relations with the United States became clear in November, 1894. On 
November 20 the Mosquito Indians formally surrendered their special privileges under the 
Treaty of Managua and agreed to incorporate themselves and their reservation into 
Nicaragua. This was a very satisfactory conclusion to the events of 1894 for Gresham, 
bringing a permanent settlement of the matter and marking a success for his policy of 
supporting Nicaraguan sovereignty over the region. Almost immediately, however, another 
difficulty arose as within days of the agreement being signed – and, indeed, several weeks 
before he received confirmation of the signing from Baker – the Nicaraguan minister in 
Washington reported to Gresham that the British minister at Managua was refusing to 
recognise Nicaraguan sovereignty over the Mosquito Reservation and had requested that a 
British warship be sent to Bluefields.
71
 At the same time that he reported these events 
Minister Guzman also requested that the American government send a cruiser of their own 
to the port in response. What followed provides a fine illustration of Gresham and 
Cleveland’s perception of proper American foreign policy. The British refusal to accept 
Nicaraguan sovereignty was not, as Minister Guzman implied, a last-ditch attempt to save 
Britain’s claims to the Mosquito Reservation, but was actually a result of the arrests and 
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deportations made after the July 5 insurrection. At the same time that the two Americans 
were arrested, twelve British subjects including the British Vice-Consul, Edwin D. Hatch, 
were also taken into custody and summarily deported and, unlike the Americans, were not 
swiftly permitted to return.
72
 It was for this reason that Britain refused to recognise 
Nicaragua’s assumption of sovereignty until compensation had been agreed. As early as 
November 24, Ambassador Bayard was reporting that he had discussed the matter of the 
“rough treatment of Mr. Hatch” with Lord Kimberley and that the Foreign Secretary : 
“[desired] explicitly to have it understood that any action in the way of obtaining 
redress from Nicaragua which Her Majesty’s Government may hereafter decide is 
necessary in the premises is wholly unconnected with any political or conventional 
question touching the Mosquito Reservation, but is simply a proceeding, on the 
grounds of international law, to obtain satisfaction for an affront.”73 
 
This statement largely set the tone for the events of the next six months as British pressure 
for monetary compensation from Nicaragua increased, culminating in the seizure by 
British marines of the port of Corinto on April 27, 1895. During this time Gresham came 
under repeated attack from the Republican press, but it is clear that he always had 
confidence that Britain would honour the Monroe Doctrine.
74
 Even as he instructed Bayard 
to investigate the Nicaraguan claims that a British warship was being sent to Bluefields in 
November, 1894, Gresham declared that “this information is not fully credited here,” and 
Bayard’s subsequent report that the refusal to acknowledge Nicaraguan sovereignty was 
simply a caveat pending settlement of the Hatch incident seems to have satisfied the State 
Department.
75
 Indeed, a telegram sent to Bayard on December 17 informing the 
Ambassador “Statements in newspapers of to-day about action of United States, based 
upon what Great Britain has done or may do at Bluefields, pure fabrication” demonstrates 
that a greater concern was that miscommunication across the Atlantic might create a 
diplomatic controversy where none existed.
76
 In general it appears that there was a strong 
mutual desire between the State Department and the Foreign Office not to allow the events 
in Nicaragua to create a rift between the two countries.
77
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 One manifestation of this fact was in Gresham’s refusal to intercede directly with 
Great Britain on Nicaragua’s behalf over the matter of compensation. As British pressure 
increased, the poverty-stricken Nicaraguan government – after some convincing by 
Gresham – belatedly granted the same amnesty to the British subjects arrested at Bluefields 
that had been given to Lampton and Wiltbank, but found the Foreign Office to be unmoved 
in its demand for compensation.
78
 On April 13, 1895, Minister Baker cabled Washington 
that “The Nicaraguan Government begs me to ask intervention my Government in their 
behalf for the settlement of indemnity question with Great Britain.”79 This appeal was 
rejected by Gresham who saw no legal case for American involvement in the dispute, but 
he did instruct Bayard to informally suggest to Lord Kimberley that accepting a 
Nicaraguan request for two weeks clemency “would avoid embarrassment to commerce of 
this and other countries and be very satisfactory to the United States.”80 In the event this 
request was not granted, but even the physical occupation of Nicaraguan territory – 
although Calhoun notes that Corinto was “as far from Mosquito as possible” – prompted 
only a gentle warning, even if it came directly from President Cleveland, that Britain 
should give Nicaragua the chance to settle the demands on condition that British troops 
withdrew from Corinto.
81
 While it is possible that a lengthy occupation might have led to 
greater difficulties between the United States and Great Britain, Cleveland’s remonstrance 
proved unnecessary when the government of El Salvador agreed to guarantee the payment 
of an indemnity for its neighbour the following day.
82
 
 
 The tumultuous events in Nicaragua between February, 1894, and May, 1895, are 
illustrative of many of the problems facing American policymakers in the late 19
th
 century. 
The expansion of American trade and investment forced the State Department to take an 
interest in areas that previously were of little concern while the difficulty of 
communicating with isolated regions left the Department groping for information and 
struggling to control representatives who often acted according to their own perception of 
what was in the national interest. In particular, Nicaragua demonstrated the affect that 
growing American power and influence was having on the Monroe Doctrine. While the 
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Sino-Japanese War may have suggested that American power was still developing on the 
global stage, the conciliatory attitude displayed by Great Britain suggested that the United 
States could be in a position to place a greater emphasis on the enforcement of the Monroe 
Doctrine as international law. The Monroe Doctrine had always been rather convenient for 
Great Britain as it formed a barrier to colonial acquisitions in the Americas by its European 
rivals, but the forcefulness with which Cleveland and Gresham asserted the Doctrine in 
Nicaragua and the willingness with which the Foreign Office acquiesced may be an 
indication of a significant change, not least because neither Cleveland nor Gresham desired 
to expand American authority in Central America. Finally, the dangers of this changing 
position were also demonstrated by the attempt from the Nicaraguan government to use the 
Monroe Doctrine to make the United States its shield against European demands. While 
this was not a new event – having occurred in Nicaragua itself only half a decade earlier – 
changing public opinion in the United States meant that such requests were guaranteed a 
more receptive audience. Gresham and Cleveland’s legalist policy may have allowed them 
to avoid becoming entangled in Nicaragua’s problem in 1895, but the decision to assert 
that policy more actively would lead to a much greater controversy in Venezuela later that 
same year. 
 
 The Venezuelan Border Dispute has been one of the most keenly debated events in 
American foreign policy of the late nineteenth century, but in common with much of the 
field has drifted into obscurity in recent decades. Among historians of the period, opinion 
has been divided as to the dispute’s significance in the evolution of American foreign 
policy. Assessments have varied from Calhoun’s claim that it formed “the most important 
incident in the foreign policy of the second Cleveland administration, with the possible 
exception of Hawaii, and one of the most important in all of the nineteenth century” and 
LaFeber’s declaration that only the 1893-97 depression and the battle of Manila Bay 
during the War of 1898 played a greater role in bringing about the creation of an American 
empire, to Richard Welch’s suggestion that the dispute had comparatively little long-term 
impact beyond a possible reawakening of interest in the Monroe Doctrine among the 
American public.
83
 Allan Nevins criticised the tendency of the first historians to examine 
Cleveland’s record on foreign policy to focus on the dispute, suggesting instead that the 
administration’s actions towards Hawaii were of greater significance.84 This disagreement 
is the result of several factors, not least the dispute’s somewhat sensational character that 
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made it headline news at the time and saw the creation of a brief war scare with Great 
Britain. This sensationalism – and the war scare in particular – may have combined to 
suggest a greater significance for the Venezuelan Border Dispute than it in fact merited. 
Undoubtedly, however, the dispute touched on numerous subjects of interest including the 
growth of American power, commerce, and relations between the United States and 
Europe and Latin America. 
A major reason why the dispute has been the subject of such debate is simply the 
difficulty of accounting for the actions of Cleveland and his advisors. The key dispatches 
and declarations that make up the heart of the dispute appear, at first glance, to be utterly 
out of character with the rest of Cleveland’s foreign policy, being assertive almost to the 
point of aggression, lacking the usual careful moderation and legal conservatism, and even 
somewhat risking the peace and well-being of the nation. Adding to this difficulty of 
comprehension is a record of contemporary correspondence that is substantial, but far from 
conclusive in supporting any argument. Most tantalizing of all is the fact that the 
Venezuelan Border Dispute is the one foreign policy event of Cleveland’s presidencies that 
he subsequently sought to explain himself. In a series of lectures at Princeton University 
that were subsequently published as the final – and lengthiest – chapter in his book 
Presidential Problems, Cleveland set out his vision of the dispute and the United States’ 
part in it, but did so in such a way as to still leave many questions about his actions – and 
the reasoning behind them in particular – unanswered. 
 
The United States’ involvement in the Venezuelan Border Dispute is much easier to 
describe than it is to explain. The events forming the Cleveland administration’s 
participation in the dispute are characterised by sporadic moments of action separated by 
months of inactivity. The dispute itself centred on the boundary between Venezuela and 
the colony of British Guiana, but ultimately it stemmed from the earliest colonisation of 
South America with the competing claims of the governments of Venezuela and Great 
Britain being founded upon the boundaries of the first European colonies. These claims 
were, at best, ill-defined since neither Spain nor the Netherlands, the original colonisers, 
had found it necessary to delineate a precise border between their possessions through 
unsettled jungle. Even after sovereignty passed from Spain and the Netherlands in the early 
19
th
 century little attempt was made to formalise the boundary. In its constitution of 1811 
the new state of Venezuela claimed the Essequibo River as its Eastern border – a line that 
was also claimed in 1822 by the short-lived Republic of Colombia, of which Venezuela 
formed a part between 1821 and 1830 – but the newly independent republic was never in a 
137 
 
position to assert this claim except on paper.
85
 It was only in 1840 that the British 
government, who had come into possession of the territory that became British Guiana 
through the Convention of London in 1814, sought to firmly establish the extent of their 
possessions by commissioning Robert Schomburgk to produce a survey based upon the 
Dutch government’s claims. The line proposed by Schomburgk in 1841 was immediately 
challenged by the Venezuelan government with the result that the British Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Aberdeen, ordered the removal of markers placed at Point Barima – a 
sensitive site due to its proximity to the mouth of the Orinoco River – and subsequently 
offered a concessionary agreement that would have seen a partition of the disputed 
territory between the Essequibo and the Orinoco. Venezuela’s rejection of this offer led to 
half a century of increasingly bitter wrangling during which time the significantly swifter 
expansion of British settlement first reduced the willingness of Great Britain to concede 
territory and then led to a steady increase in the amount of land it claimed beyond the 
Schomburgk Line. Venezuela first brought the matter to the attention of the United States 
in 1876 and apparently received no reply, but from 1881 a steady stream of 
correspondence passed between the two nations on the subject, culminating in the formal 
tendering of American good offices to end the dispute to the British government in 
February, 1887. Such offers and suggestions of arbitration were made several times 
between 1887 and the return of Grover Cleveland to the White House in 1893. 
It is debatable whether Cleveland had already determined to act upon the 
Venezuelan Border Dispute before his second inauguration. Certainly he was acquainted 
with the dispute since his previous administration had been the first to offer American 
good offices to bring about a settlement. These low-key suggestions ultimately culminated 
in a dispatch of February 17, 1888, in which Thomas Bayard – then Cleveland’s Secretary 
of State – informed Minister Phelps in London of a growing concern within the 
administration about the expansion of British claims.
86
 This dispatch was, in Phelps’ 
opinion, unlikely to help matters and so he chose not to transmit it to Lord Salisbury, the 
Foreign Secretary.
87
 That Cleveland maintained at least a passing interest in the dispute is 
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demonstrated by the fact that he referred to it in his Annual Messages of both 1893 and 
1894. The first such reference, however, is extremely brief – simply declaring the 
desirability that diplomatic relations between Britain and Venezuela, which had been 
broken off by the latter in 1887, be restored with a view to ending the dispute – and gives 
no indication that the issue would become one of great importance for the President later in 
his term. This might not be the case regarding the 1894 Message in which Cleveland 
declared: 
The boundary of British Guiana still remains in dispute between Great 
Britain and Venezuela. Believing that its early settlement on some just basis alike 
honorable to both parties is in the line of our established policy to remove from this 
hemisphere all causes of difference with powers beyond the sea, I shall renew the 
efforts heretofore made to bring about a restoration of diplomatic relations between 
the disputants and to induce a reference to arbitration...
88
 
 
Certainly this was a more forceful statement, suggesting that the Monroe Doctrine might 
interest the United States in the dispute and raising the possibility that its involvement 
might go beyond merely facilitating a restoration of diplomatic relations and instead 
involve a push for arbitration of the dispute itself. 
 The period between Cleveland’s second inauguration and his 1894 Annual Message 
appears little different to the previous decade in terms of American interest in the 
Venezuelan Border Dispute. In October, 1893, Secretary Gresham met with Dr. David 
Lobo, the interim chargé d’affairs at the Venezuelan legation in Washington, who 
subsequently presented him with a written summary of the dispute as Venezuela perceived 
it.
89
 Unfortunately, it seems it is no longer possible to identify who requested this meeting 
– and, indeed, what its primary purpose was since it coincided with the Venezuelan 
government closing the Orinoco River to shipping – but it is perhaps telling that the 
meeting coincided with the Venezuelan government beginning to put pressure on the 
American minister in Caracas to have the United States once again tender its good offices 
in the interest of bringing the dispute to a conclusion.
90
 Whatever the case, Gresham did 
not respond to Venezuela’s pressure with any great urgency. On January 8, 1894, he met 
with Jose Andrade, the new Venezuelan minister in Washington, specifically to discuss the 
boundary dispute, at which time he requested clarification of Venezuela’s position. This 
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clarification came in the form of a 29 page memorandum delivered by Andrade on March 
31, accompanied by a note that once again requested American good offices in securing 
arbitration of the dispute. This lengthy history would form the basis for much of the 
Cleveland administration’s argument in their exchanges with Great Britain, but it did not 
lead to an immediate change in the administration’s stance. Once again, Gresham 
instructed Bayard to raise the matter of restoring diplomatic relations with the British 
Government in the summer of 1894, a mission which the Ambassador pursued with so 
little alacrity that Gresham reminded him to press the matter 5 months later.
91
 
 It is possible that this lack of action on Gresham’s proposal was the reason for 
Cleveland’s slightly more emphatic declaration of American interest in the dispute in his 
Annual Message of 1894. It may also have been the result of increasing pressure from 
Venezuela. The Venezuelan foreign minister, P. Ezequiel Rojas, seized on several 
opportunities to praise what he saw as American sympathy for his nation’s plight. In 
January, 1894, he wrote to Cleveland to thank him for his reference to the dispute in the 
Annual Message of 1893, and in that same month Gresham had to gently disabuse Rojas of 
the belief that a map published by the U.S. Department of Agriculture showing 
Venezuela’s western border to be the Essequibo River could be construed as official 
recognition of his country’s case.92 Of rather greater significance was the work of a former 
U.S. Minister to Venezuela who agreed to work for the Venezuelan government in 
promoting their cause in the United States. 
 In 1894 the Venezuelan government hired William L. Scruggs to work for them in 
Washington to raise the profile of the border dispute. Scruggs was familiar to the 
Venezuelan government having served as the United States minister in Caracas several 
years earlier, a position from which he was removed after he attempted to bribe the 
Venezuelan president.
93
 He set to work energetically, writing a pamphlet entitled British 
Aggressions in Venezuela, or the Monroe Doctrine on Trial which he distributed widely to 
Congressmen, State Governors, newspaper editors, and cabinet members, as well as being 
sold to the public on newsstands.
94
 He also met many of these leading politicians and 
public figures in person, including both Gresham and Cleveland himself.
95
 Scruggs’ most 
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concrete achievement came in January, 1895, when he successfully lobbied his 
congressional representative, Leonidas Livingston of Georgia, to introduce a resolution of 
Scruggs’ own writing supporting Cleveland’s call for arbitration for the dispute as 
expressed in the Annual Message of 1894. The resolution passed both houses unanimously, 
with only minor changes, and received Cleveland’s signature on February 20.96 
 The combination of Venezuelan pressure and British disinterest combined to 
gradually increase Cleveland’s interest in the dispute sufficiently that by March, 1895, he 
called a cabinet meeting involving Gresham, Treasury Secretary John G. Carlisle, 
Secretary of War Daniel S. Lamont, and Attorney General Richard Olney at which it was 
agreed that Gresham should compile a detailed report on the history and legality of the 
dispute and the best means for bringing it to an end.
97
 The Secretary of State began work 
on this report and also enlisted the help of his friend, the legal scholar John Bassett Moore, 
to prepare a new instruction to Bayard aimed at soliciting action from the British 
government. Apparently concerned at the extent to which Gresham was championing the 
Venezuelan cause, Moore succeeded in moderating the language and the April 9 dispatch 
was only slightly more assertive than its predecessors.
98
 This would prove to be Gresham’s 
last act in the dispute. In early May he was incapacitated by illness – one of several that he 
had suffered during his time in Washington – and on May 28 he died. 
 Gresham’s replacement at the State Department was Richard Olney, the former 
Attorney General. He went to work producing a new report on the dispute which now took 
the form of a diplomatic dispatch that Bayard would pass to the British government. 
Olney’s report was written in June and early July, slightly revised (but enthusiastically 
approved) by Cleveland, and dispatched to London on July 20. While no draft exists of 
Gresham’s planned report it is generally agreed that Olney took a very different stance to 
his predecessor. In one move it altered the American position in the dispute from one of 
increasingly frustrated observer to outright involvement in all but name. In the course of 
eighteen pages Olney endeavoured to deliver a reasonable and measured argument for both 
arbitration and the right of the United States to intervene under the Monroe Doctrine.
99
 He 
succeeded in presenting an argument that was heavily biased towards Venezuela, 
seemingly designed to provoke outrage from its British audience, and loaded with high-
handed rhetoric and sweeping claims of American power. The message ranged across a 
history of the dispute that was clearly drawn from the Venezuelan versions supplied by 
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Lobo and Andrade earlier in Cleveland’s second term and a lengthy discussion of the 
origins and history of the Monroe Doctrine before finally discussing its applicability to the 
dispute. The early section contains numerous factual errors – such as the declaration that 
every Presidential administration since Monroe had examined and approved the doctrine – 
but these pale into significance by comparison with the claims made later in the dispatch. 
Of these the most notable are the statement that “distance and three thousand miles of 
intervening ocean make any permanent political union between an European and an 
American state unnatural and inexpedient” and that “the United States is practically 
sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its 
interposition.”100 More than a century later it might be possible to argue that Olney was 
largely correct in his assertion that distance made long-term political union between 
Europe and America “unnatural”, but even today his prophecy has not been entirely 
fulfilled and to make such a suggestion to the government of an empire that still claimed 
sovereignty over a territory as vast as Canada or as diverse as the West Indies – not to 
mention British Guiana itself – was both insulting and nonsensical. The declaration that the 
United States was “practically sovereign” in the Americas only served to further the insult 
and extend it to the independent republics of the hemisphere. Beyond such rhetoric, 
however, Olney attempted to make two fundamental arguments: that the United States’ 
proximity and commercial and political ties to the other nations on the American 
continents meant that the subjugation of one of them by a European power harmed the 
United States and thus invoked the Monroe Doctrine, and that, should the United States 
accept the expansion of European territory on the continent once, it would result in 
numerous such expansions, bringing the United States into close proximity with all the 
European powers. This would force it to maintain an army and navy equivalent to its 
European rivals and thus undermine and fundamentally alter the nature of American 
society.
101
 
 Having delivered this inflammatory dispatch – and it is apparent from the opening 
paragraph of the message which stated the President was aware “of the serious 
responsibility in any action now to be taken” that its nature was clear to everybody 
involved – Cleveland and Olney then found themselves in the faintly absurd position of 
waiting nearly five months for a reply.
102
 This was the result of many factors, not least the 
explicit instruction to Bayard that the President desired an answer in time for his next 
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annual message at the opening of Congress in early December.
103
 This lengthy timeframe 
would seem to demonstrate that Cleveland and Olney were not seeking to provoke the 
British government any more than was necessary, although Olney’s two enquiries to 
Bayard in the intervening period indicate a degree of impatience. Matters were not helped 
by the fact that the new British Prime Minister – the experienced statesman Lord Salisbury 
– who was also fulfilling the role of Foreign Secretary, found himself distracted by minor 
crises in Turkey and Russia which further delayed his giving attention to a question that 
was of comparatively little concern to Great Britain.
104
 Despite this the two-part reply was 
written early enough to be cabled, either in part or full, to Washington in ample time for 
the convening of Congress, but was instead sent by ship and thus was not delivered to 
Cleveland by the British Ambassador, Sir Julian Pauncefote, until December 7. In the 
meantime Cleveland had been forced to content himself with a statement in his Annual 
Message of 1895 that informed Congress of the sending of the July 20 dispatch and briefly 
outlining its argument and aims before promising a full report to Congress when the 
awaited reply was received.
105
 
 Salisbury’s reply, when it arrived, was delivered in two parts. The first dealt 
specifically with the Monroe Doctrine as a concept while the second discussed the border 
dispute. Neither dispatch made good reading for Cleveland and Olney. The first dismissed 
the Monroe Doctrine as a policy that – despite being tacitly endorsed at one time by Great 
Britain as sharing the common goal of protecting the fledging American republics from 
European domination – had long since ceased to be relevant. Rejecting Olney’s argument 
that American republics needed to be protected from predatory European powers, 
Salisbury declared “The dangers which were apprehended by President Monroe have no 
relation to the state of things in which we live at the present day.”106 The Prime Minister 
depicted the doctrine as an American curio, understandably treasured, but of little weight 
in the real world of international politics.
107
 Having so summarily dismissed both the 
validity and the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine, Lord Salisbury’s decision to produce 
a second dispatch dealing with the Venezuelan Border Dispute specifically was a 
somewhat strange one.
108
 The first message had not explicitly denied that the United States 
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might have a legitimate interest in Venezuelan affairs – simply that those interests could 
not derive purely from geography – but it had made clear that Great Britain considered the 
matter to be a private one.
109
 It is possible that it was intended as a gesture of respect to the 
United States or, perhaps more likely, an attempt to correct American misapprehensions in 
the hope that it would induce them to reconsider their position on the subject. The latter 
explanation would certainly be consistent with the form of the dispatch, which was given 
over almost entirely to setting out a British version of the history of the dispute with 
Salisbury acknowledging that Great Britain’s policy of treating the matter as a private 
dispute between two nations had inevitably led the United States to base its position on 
information provided by the Venezuelan government.
110
 However, if the Prime Minister 
was seeking to convince Cleveland and his advisors to moderate their support for 
Venezuela, he did so in a remarkably indelicate manner. His tone throughout both 
messages has been described as “that of the peremptory schoolmaster trying – with fading 
patience – to correct the ignorance of dullards in Washington” and everything about the 
messages – from timing to tone and style – suggested that Salisbury had badly misjudged 
both the importance of the dispute and the level of American interest in it.
111
 
 While the delay had been frustrating, it seems that Cleveland was not unduly 
concerned about the matter. Only days before Salisbury’s reply was delivered the President 
had written to Olney informing him that he was leaving Washington for a weeklong 
hunting trip and that any message from London could be kept “in [Olney’s] pocket” until 
he returned since he had no intention of being hurried on the matter.
112
 From this it would 
appear that Cleveland, like Salisbury, had misjudged the situation across the Atlantic and 
was not expecting the blunt rejection not just of American involvement in the dispute but 
of the Monroe Doctrine itself. That said, the possibility of outright rejection must have 
been seriously discussed in the months between July 20 and December 7 because Olney 
was able immediately to set to work preparing a response in the form of a special message 
to Congress which rebutted Salisbury’s arguments relating to the Monroe Doctrine and, 
more significantly, proposed a commission of inquiry to be created by the United States in 
order to ascertain, once and for all, the true facts of the dispute.
113
 It has been suggested 
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that Olney thus swayed Cleveland’s judgement in the tone and content of the message, but 
this is unlikely, firstly, because the President had clearly had some time to consider a 
variety of possibilities during the autumn of 1895 and then subsequently spent many hours 
revising Olney’s work, and secondly because he was later quoted as saying “I do not think 
that, in all my experience, I have ever had to deal with any official document, prepared by 
another, which so entirely satisfied my critical requirements.”114 The special message 
concluded with a declaration that it would be the duty of the United States to “resist by 
every means in its power as a wilful aggression upon its rights and interests the 
appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction 
over any territory which after investigation we have determined of right belongs to 
Venezuela.”115 The potential significance of this was underlined by the statement: “In 
making these recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred, and keenly 
realize all the consequences that may follow.”116 
 The December 17 special message brought the Venezuelan Border Dispute to a 
head and raised the spectre of war between the United States and Great Britain, but it also 
marked the first step in a movement towards a settlement. While the solemn references to 
the potential consequences of the commission of inquiry caused a stir in the media on both 
sides of the Atlantic and led to a brief dip in the New York stock market, undoubtedly 
Cleveland, Salisbury and others most closely involved in the matter recognised that war 
was neither likely nor desirable for either nation. In Presidential Problems Cleveland 
makes no mention one way or the other as to whether he considered war to be a serious 
possibility, but two works published shortly after his death gave the recollection of those 
around him at the time. George F. Parker quoted a letter sent to him in 1909 by 
Cleveland’s Secretary of the Interior, Hoke Smith, who declared:  
I heard him refer to this message, shortly after he sent it to Congress, as his “peace 
message,” and as “the only way, in his judgment, to prevent a probable collision 
between the two nations.” I have no doubt that he sent the message to Congress 
believing that with it the risk of trouble was far less than if diplomatic negotiations 
continued in the ordinary way.
117
 
 
A work of 1910 included a brief report of a meeting between the author and Cleveland’s 
former private secretary, Henry Thurber, who told him that the President responded to the 
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suggestion that the message was too strong with the words “Thurber, this does not mean 
war; it means arbitration.”118 
 While such recollections – revisited more than a decade after the event – may have 
benefited somewhat from hindsight, it seems clear that Cleveland did not consider war to 
be a likely consequence of his special message. At the time he made no attempt to prepare 
the nation or its military for war and neither he nor Salisbury rushed to reopen diplomatic 
correspondence. War became even less likely a little over two weeks after the special 
message when it was revealed that the German Kaiser had responded to a failed raid by 
British colonial police into the Transvaal by sending a congratulatory telegram to Paul 
Kruger, the Boer President, that was widely regarded as meddling in a British sphere of 
influence and perhaps hinting that Germany would offer material support if asked. This 
provoked a far greater indignation in the British public than had Cleveland’s special 
message and, while not completely soothing ruffled feathers, placed the Venezuelan 
Border Dispute in perspective. At a cabinet meeting on January 11, 1896, it was agreed 
that an amicable settlement of the dispute was desirable and that the first step in bringing 
this about would be to informally approach Ambassador Bayard through an unofficial third 
party.
119
 This contact went ahead on January 12 through the medium of Lord Playfair, a 
British chemist who had married an American. Playfair would prove to be the most 
important of several unofficial intermediaries who, while ultimately achieving little of 
substance themselves, did help to establish the form and structure of the deal that was 
eventually reached between Great Britain and the United States later that year. Official 
negotiations reopened in early March when Lord Salisbury, encouraged by signs of 
American flexibility in the unofficial discussions, agreed to Olney’s suggestion that direct 
negotiations take place between himself and Sir Julian Pauncefote in Washington.
120
 
Progress was slow, but with the brief wave of jingoist sentiment in the United States long 
subsided by the summer of 1896 there was little need for urgency.
121
 This is not to say that 
Cleveland and Olney were willing to allow matters to drag on indefinitely; with Salisbury 
finally showing a willingness to negotiate and with the British government distracted by its 
problems in Turkey and South Africa there was an incentive to press the matter in order to 
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achieve a favourable settlement. Olney’s primary tool for maintaining this pressure was the 
commission of enquiry announced by Cleveland in his message of December 17. Despite 
British requests to withdraw or suspend the commission Olney insisted that it continued its 
work unless an agreement was signed.
122
 Desiring to placate the United States as a kindred 
people who could ensure the neutrality of the Americas on their behalf, the British 
government showed a new willingness to retreat from its declared position. The 
negotiations swiftly developed into a discussion of the length of time for which any site 
had to have been occupied by either side before it could become ineligible for arbitration. 
With opening positions of 10 years and 60 years for Great Britain and the United States 
respectively, the final agreement of 50 years’ occupation was an undoubted victory for 
American diplomacy. The result was an Anglo-American agreement concluded on 
November 12, 1896, which would form the basis of a treaty between Great Britain and 
Venezuela. The agreement provided for an arbitral tribunal which would investigate and 
define the new border. Areas that had been settled for over 50 years were to be exempt 
from arbitration with other settled regions given special consideration.
123
 Venezuela, which 
had been utterly excluded from the negotiations, was presented with the fait accompli to 
sign. The news that British settlements of 50 years were to be excluded from arbitration – a 
proposal which had been rejected many times by the Venezuelan government in its own 
negotiations with Britain in previous decades – sparked riots in Caracas, but the agreement 
was eventually signed, reluctantly, on February 2, 1897.
124
 Bruised Venezuelan feelings 
were not assuaged by the eventual arbitration ruling in October, 1899, which granted most 
of the disputed territory to British Guyana, with the exception of the mouth of the Orinoco 
and 5,000 square miles in the interior.
125
 Looking back on the incident in 1901, Cleveland 
expressed himself satisfied with the decision.
126
 
 
 During this process there were three moments of decision for the Cleveland 
administration which require further investigation in order to better understand their 
actions. One came in 1893 or 1894 when the administration first chose to put pressure on 
the British government to bring the dispute to a conclusion. The second occurred in April, 
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1895, when it was decided that the United States would have to force the issue, ultimately 
resulting in the July 20 dispatch. Finally, the period between sending the July 20 dispatch 
and the delivery of Cleveland’s special message of December 17 – and especially the ten 
days following the receipt of Lord Salisbury’s reply on December 7 – also requires 
examination. 
 It is impossible to say exactly how much Venezuelan agitation served to provoke 
Cleveland’s interest in the border dispute and to what extent his interest was a result of his 
previous work on the matter during his first presidency. Likewise it is hard to judge 
whether the reference to the dispute in his annual message of 1893 was the result of the 
first applications of Venezuelan pressure in October of that year or a decision taken by 
Cleveland himself. Since the reference showed no signs of presaging any greater action 
than that undertaken during his previous term – or by Benjamin Harrison’s administration 
– it would seem that this pressure served as a reminder at most. Indeed, it is perhaps more 
likely that the annual message of 1893 was more significant in that it demonstrated to the 
Venezuelan government that they might have an audience in Washington that would be 
receptive to further pressure. Certainly the first months of 1894 showed a rise in American 
interest in the dispute, beginning with the meeting between Gresham and Minister Andrade 
on January 8 that resulted in the Venezuelan minister supplying the State Department with 
a lengthy history of the dispute on March 31. It was this document which Cleveland 
himself took to be the starting point of his second administration’s involvement in the 
dispute when he wrote Presidential Problems.
127
 This version of events explains the 
renewed attempts to convince the British government to reach a settlement with 
Venezuela, but the slow pace of progress in 1894 – with dispatches sent to Ambassador 
Bayard in July and December – does little to explain the dramatic increase in American 
urgency in 1895. 
 One potential reason for the change that took place in 1895 is the work of William 
Scruggs. Exactly how much influence Venezuela’s propagandist had on the growing 
determination of the Cleveland administration to act is difficult to ascertain and has been 
the subject of some debate. Scruggs has been credited by some historians with raising the 
profile of the dispute in the United States and, directly or indirectly, altering the 
administration’s stance as a result.128 Others, however, have played down Scruggs’ 
importance and even suggested that his efforts may have been counter-productive as far as 
                                                 
127
 Cleveland, Presidential Problems, pp. 247-248 
128
 Campbell, Transformation of American Foreign Policy, p. 197; Welch, Presidencies of Grover Cleveland, 
p. 181 
148 
 
the administration was concerned.
129
 Correspondence between Cleveland and Olney 
shortly after the pair left office starkly illustrates the low opinion both men held of Scruggs 
with Olney expressing concern over Scruggs’ “lack of character” and Cleveland calling 
him “a high grade liar.”130 Gresham too disliked Scruggs and his efforts to manipulate 
public opinion in order to bring pressure to bear on the administration.
131
 Such dislike does 
not necessarily rule out the possibility of Scruggs successfully influencing policymakers in 
the administration, but it would seem strange that Cleveland and his Secretaries of State so 
wholeheartedly accepted the Venezuelan version of history if they had such a low opinion 
of the man who was doing most to promote it. Perhaps more likely is the possibility that 
Scruggs’ notable success in drafting the resolution passed by Congress on February 20, 
1895, calling on Cleveland to recommend arbitration of the dispute to both Britain and 
Venezuela – something he had already been attempting for some time – was indicative of a 
more effective influence on the White House. In his letter to Olney of December 3, 1895, 
Cleveland informed the Secretary of State that he would not be hurried on the issue “even 
if the Congress should begin grinding again the resolution-of-inquiry mill.”132 While this 
letter related to a later moment of decision it shows that Cleveland was not oblivious to the 
wishes of Congress, even if he did not always bow to them. Much of Cleveland’s second 
term was spent battling with Congress – and the Senate in particular – over a variety of 
issues, both foreign and domestic and, while Cleveland may not have been overly troubled 
by the prospect of battling with Congress over another issue, it is possible that he was more 
willing to take the lead on the issue if it meant pre-empting yet another disagreement. The 
fact that Henry Cabot Lodge had published a profoundly anti-British article in the North 
American Review in June, 1895, stating that Congress would act to defend the Monroe 
Doctrine in Venezuela during its next session may also have weighed on the President’s 
mind.
133
 That said, the 53
rd
 Congress was a lame duck by the start of 1895 and went into 
recess in early March granting Cleveland a full nine months before the opening of the 54
th
 
Congress on December 2. Under these circumstances there was no reason for Cleveland to 
fear Congressional interference at any point in the most critical period of escalation in the 
Venezuelan Border Dispute. 
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 At best it is possible to say that the influence of Scruggs and pressure from 
Congress may have played a part in prompting action from the Cleveland administration, 
but questions over Scruggs’ character and Congress’ power to influence the President’s 
actions would suggest that this influence can only have been contributory. Clearly the 
escalation of the dispute resulted from at least one other influence. The timing of this 
escalation is particularly telling. Cleveland called his cabinet meeting to discuss the issue 
in March, 1895, and this – and the resulting decision to have Gresham compile a report on 
the dispute – can be seen as the beginning of serious American interest in forcing a 
settlement. The date of the meeting would suggest that the Congressional resolution played 
at least some part in prompting Cleveland to devote attention to the dispute. Further to this 
it is clear that he was starting to become frustrated by the British government’s cool 
responses to the offers of American good offices the year before. In Presidential Problems 
Cleveland specifically refers to a dispatch from the British Foreign Office to Ambassador 
Pauncefote dated February 23, 1895, which described recent meetings with Ambassador 
Bayard in London and reiterated Great Britain’s insistence that any arbitration of the 
dispute should exclude the Schomburgk line as well as complaining of Venezuelan 
violations in January, 1895, of British territory.
134
 Cleveland himself states that this 
dispatch was a turning point, declaring that “It now became plainly apparent that a new 
stage had been reached in the progress of our intervention,” and that national honour and 
duty now necessitated that the administration define its stance.
135
 Finally, an incident 
which took place in the disputed territory on January 2, 1895, in which Venezuelan 
soldiers arrested two British policemen on the upper Cuyuni River may also have played a 
part in changing American attitudes. The Venezuelan government swiftly sought to 
disavow the arrests in the hopes of preventing a diplomatic incident, but Cleveland states 
in Presidential Problems that it was not the incident that concerned him so much as the 
fact that the British government was treating the Schomburgk line as a de facto border.
136
 
 The decision to have Gresham compile a report on the dispute can be seen as a 
turning point in American involvement, but one other factor played a major role in the 
evolution of the administration’s policy. Gresham’s death on May 28, 1895, prompted a 
reshuffle of Cleveland’s cabinet and saw Richard Olney, the former Attorney General, 
promoted to Secretary of State. This change was significant for several reasons involving 
both the dispute itself and the Cleveland administration’s approach to foreign policy more 
broadly. In many ways Olney was the logical choice to succeed Gresham at the State 
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Department. Given the difficulties Cleveland had experienced in filling the post in 1893 
and the extent to which domestic and foreign events had seen the administration subjected 
to criticism from Congress and the press in the intervening years it made sense to promote 
a trusted member of the cabinet rather than appoint an outsider to such a senior position. 
Similarly, the growing interest in the Venezuelan Border Dispute and the outbreak of 
revolution in Cuba in the spring of 1895 meant that having a Secretary of State who was 
already well acquainted with the administration’s position on foreign affairs was desirable. 
Cleveland and Gresham’s preference for a foreign policy based on the rule of law meant 
that the Attorney General was likely to be well acquainted with their actions and also the 
man best positioned to replace Gresham. Olney had already shown interest in foreign 
policy questions - most notably demonstrated by his October 9, 1893, letter to Gresham on 
the subject of the Hawaiian revolution - and was trusted and liked by Cleveland. 
Despite this continuity the appointment of Olney to replace Gresham heralded a 
change in approach to foreign policy. The two men approached legal practice in differing 
ways and this difference in style would be replicated in their diplomacy. Gresham had 
spent most of the previous 25 years as a federal judge, arbitrating in the disputes of others. 
Olney, by contrast, had spent the majority of his career as a corporate lawyer – mostly for 
railroads – where he had shown a particular skill for finding and exploiting legal 
loopholes.
137
 He was, however, a conservative intellectually, even if his methods might be 
more inventive than Gresham’s. Under Cleveland’s leadership – and with another legal 
mind running the State Department – the administration’s foreign policy was to retain the 
foundation of legality and conservatism that it had developed under Gresham, but Olney’s 
personal influence opened the possibility of a more expansive interpretation of legal 
precedent if it was believed necessary to achieve that policy’s objectives. 
In terms of personality, too, Olney may not have been the ideal choice to manage 
the nation’s foreign relations. Described by one historian as “a man who raised truculence 
to an art form,” he was not suited to the delicate diplomacy of which Lord Salisbury was a 
master and his frustration with European diplomacy was demonstrated in a letter to 
Cleveland in the summer of 1896 - when progress on a treaty to settle the dispute seemed 
slow - in which he declared: 
Undoubtedly all this backing and filling is true diplomacy. There may be something 
very profound in it. But my impression is that it is a sort of pettifogging which 
accomplishes nothing and which is in truth not in keeping with the serious 
character of the grave issues involved.
138
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Under such circumstances it was to be expected that the conduct of American foreign 
policy would take on a new directness and urgency and this can certainly be seen to be the 
case with the July 20 dispatch. While no copy of Gresham’s first drafts of his report on the 
dispute are known to still exist, historians and biographers are agreed that his version 
would not have been anything like as aggressive or assertive as Olney’s dispatch.139 That 
said, it has also been argued that Gresham was equally as determined as Cleveland to have 
the dispute settled, but would simply have taken a more reserved approach which might 
still have yielded the desired results without insulting Great Britain.
140
 Certainly his 
growing distrust of the Venezuelan position meant that he suggested an independent 
investigation shortly before his death, although whether Cleveland was made aware of the 
idea is unclear.
141
 
It would be an overstatement to suggest that Olney’s appointment as Secretary of 
State fundamentally altered the United States approach to the Venezuelan Border Dispute. 
Undoubtedly Olney brought a different – and unorthodox – style of diplomacy to the State 
Department, but the aims of the Cleveland administration remained largely unchanged. 
Most importantly, Cleveland himself was heavily involved in both formulating the 
objectives of the administration and supervising and approving the work of his 
subordinates. In particular, he gave his wholehearted endorsement to Olney’s draft of the 
July 20 dispatch describing it as “the best thing of the kind I have ever read” and praising 
Olney for placing the Monroe Doctrine “on better and more defensible ground than any of 
your predecessors – or mine.”142 The President may have suggested “a little more softened 
verbiage here and there”, but such strong praise can leave little doubt that he was an 
enthusiastic supporter of taking a strong stand on the matter. The question remains of why 
the normally conservative Cleveland would endorse such a dramatic statement of 
American authority. Charles S. Campbell has suggested that Cleveland was more willing to 
approve Olney’s work because “presumably he did not want to offend his new Secretary of 
State at the very beginning of the latter’s duties.”143Such an argument would seem unlikely 
for a man of Cleveland’s character even if his new Secretary of State was a complete 
stranger, but by the summer of 1895 the correspondence between the two men reveals a 
very convivial relationship between the two founded upon a mutual love of hunting and 
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fishing as well as a similarity of views that would see the men discussing political issues 
together for years after they left government. In the summer of 1895 Olney used his 
connections with New England railroads to arrange for a private carriage to take the 
families of both himself and the President to their summer residences on Cape Cod and a 
month later used those same contacts to arrange to have a private physician brought in 
from Boston without the Clevelands’ knowledge in case of an emergency when Frances 
Cleveland gave birth to their third child.
144
 Indeed, it can be further argued that, far from 
being surprised by Olney’s aggressive tone in writing the July 20 dispatch, Cleveland was 
well aware of his new Secretary of State’s style and methods before appointing him. The 
Pullman Strike of 1894 had seen Cleveland and Olney adopt a similar working relationship 
to that seen in the Venezuelan Border Dispute with the President supervising and 
approving the policy devised by his subordinate. In the case of the Pullman Strike, Olney 
had shown the same aggressive approach to a problem and innovative interpretation of 
legal statutes – the Sherman Anti-trust Act of 1890 – that he would demonstrate in the July 
20 dispatch. Cleveland knew how Olney worked; he may even have considered this 
approach to have been exactly what was needed to induce movement in the dispute. 
If the July 20 dispatch was a result of Olney’s aggressive style and a growing 
frustration with British intransigence then the December 17 special message can be seen as 
an extension of these same causes since nothing occurred between July and December, 
1895, to reduce the effect of either. Indeed, the result of the July 20 dispatch was an 
exacerbation of the original causes. The frustration Cleveland had experienced in the 
spring of 1895 was vastly increased both by Lord Salisbury’s categorical rejection of the 
dispatch’s argument and the slightly patronising tone in which it was delivered. In 
particular, Salisbury’s careful noting of the inherent problems with arbitrating a dispute – 
the problem of finding a qualified and unbiased arbitrator, the difficulty in insuring 
compliance with any verdict – and outright refusal to consent to the transferring of British 
citizens to Venezuelan rule were a direct snub to the President’s many requests that the 
dispute be submitted to arbitration.
145
 Some evidence of this irritation can be seen to still 
be persisting many years after the event in his likening in Presidential Problems of Lord 
Salisbury to “the shrewd, sharp trader who demands exorbitant terms, and at the same time 
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invites negotiation, looking for a result abundantly profitable in the large range for dicker 
which he has created.”146 Furthermore, having set out such an aggressive stance in the 
dispatch, Cleveland and Olney found themselves in a position from which retreat was 
difficult. In the closing words of his special message Cleveland declared that “national 
self-respect and honor” were now at stake beyond the issues of the dispute itself.147 There 
is little to suggest, however, that Cleveland and Olney desired to back down. While the 
special message did not repeat the more outlandish claims of the July message – in 
particular the points relating to the United States’ practical sovereignty in South America 
or the unnatural relationships between European powers and their American colonies – it 
was still largely devoted to a defence of the Monroe Doctrine rather than a rationalisation 
for American involvement in the border dispute. By December 17 the dispute itself had 
ceased to be the sole issue and the Monroe Doctrine and the broader question of American 
authority within the Western hemisphere had also become key points of debate. To some 
extent this was also true of the concept of arbitration which Cleveland had so repeatedly 
suggested to be the best means of settling the dispute and which Lord Salisbury had called 
into question in his reply to the July 20 dispatch. Both the Monroe Doctrine and arbitration 
would be dealt with before the Venezuelan Border Dispute was finally settled by the treaty 
signed on February 2, 1897: the doctrine by the proposition of an international conference 
on the subject which Olney rejected on the grounds that the United States, having made its 
point, only stood to lose by opening the subject to general debate when a successfully 
negotiated settlement of the dispute would vindicate the July 20 dispatch, and arbitration 
both in the final settlement of the dispute itself and by a separate General Arbitration 
Treaty with Great Britain. 
This treaty had its origin in a Congressional resolution passed in 1890 asking the 
President, when he saw fit, to attempt negotiations for an agreement whereby 
disagreements which could not be solved through diplomacy would be submitted to 
arbitration. When the British Parliament passed its own resolution acknowledging their 
American counterparts and expressing hope that the British Government would act toward 
such an agreement Cleveland raised the subject in his annual message of 1893.
148
 The 
subject of international arbitration appealed to Cleveland and Gresham as a means of 
promoting international peace through application of the law, but subsequent discussions 
produced little of substance. The subject of a general arbitration agreement was reignited 
by the Venezuelan negotiations. An initial proposal by Lord Salisbury that the Venezuela 
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dispute be included in the negotiations for a broader arbitration treaty was swiftly rejected 
so as not to delay the Venezuela agreement and the two negotiations proceeded in 
parallel.
149
 In the event the negotiations for the arbitration agreement were concluded 
shortly before those for the Venezuelan treaty – perhaps due to the less emotive subject 
matter as well as to the good will felt toward the project by both sides. Unlike the 
Venezuelan treaty, however, the Olney-Pauncefote Treaty – as the General Arbitration 
Treaty was officially titled – found itself at the mercy of Senate ratification. A Baltimore 
Sun editorial of February 26, 1897, suggested that posterity would view the arbitration 
agreement as the Cleveland administrations “greatest and most beneficent 
accomplishment” in the field of foreign relations, but by this point the treaty was already in 
trouble.
150
 Almost immediately Olney found himself defending the treaty against charges 
that it would see the arbitration of the Monroe Doctrine – a particularly galling accusation 
since the defence and vindication of the doctrine had been one of the administration’s great 
successes in relation to the Venezuelan Border Dispute.
151
 Worse was to follow as the 
administration’s opponents in the Senate continued to question every aspect of the treaty to 
the point that Olney wrote to a friend in New York suggesting that he organise public 
meetings in support of the treaty to ensure that it was not simply killed by Senate 
indifference.
152
 While the treaty was not ultimately the victim of indifference, Olney’s 
fears would be confirmed shortly after the Cleveland administration left office when the 
severely amended treaty failed to be ratified by the Senate.
153
 An article in the New York 
Herald the next day noted that “25 out of the 31 who voted or who were paired against the 
treaty were advocates of the free coinage of silver” and placed the blame for the treaty’s 
rejection on “the jingo spirit which characterizes the doings of the Senate, combined with 
fanatical opposition of silver men of all parties to anything emanating from Cleveland’s 
administration.”154 For his part, Olney spread the blame a little wider, naming jingoism, 
“dislike of anything emanating from the Cleveland administration” and pressure from ship-
building interests who feared the treaty would put an end to naval expansion. His chief 
target, however, was the Senate itself which he accused of making a bid for control of 
foreign policy. Noting that the treaty had the support of the McKinley administration and 
of the public, Olney told a friend: 
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The Senate immediately assumed an hostile attitude. The Treaty, in getting itself 
made by the sole act of the executive, without leave of the Senate first had and 
obtained, had committed the unpardonable sin. It must be either altogether defeated 
or so altered as to bear an unmistakable Senate stamp -- and thus be the means of 
both humiliating the executive and of showing to the world the greatness of the 
Senate. 
 
Whether this bid for power was real – and a clash between the President and the Senate 
had played a major role in the evolution of American policy toward Cuba in the last years 
of the Cleveland administration – it seems clear that Cleveland’s inability to maintain the 
support of his own party in Congress had helped to produce the failure of the treaty. 
Ultimately, the Olney-Pauncefote Treaty was a failure, but it was still an important 
indicator of Cleveland and Olney’s approach to foreign policy. A General Arbitration 
Treaty had not been a priority of the administration when they came to power, but when 
the opportunity to create such an agreement had arisen they pursued it seriously. In 
negotiations lasting nearly a year and Senate debates lasting several months Olney showed 
his commitment to the treaty as a practical instrument designed to change the face of 
international relations. It was particularly significant as an attempt to create a lasting 
foreign policy legacy for the Cleveland administration beyond the examples set in the 
handling of foreign incidents and to actively promote a legalist approach to foreign affairs. 
Most notably, both the British and American governments expressed their hopes that the 
treaty would not simply be an agreement curious to their relationship with one another, but 
would serve as a model for the handling of disputes with other nations as well.
155
 This was 
not to be, but the Olney-Pauncefote Treaty did at least stand as further proof of the 
growing accord between Great Britain and the United States which was also demonstrated 
in Nicaragua and the Venezuela agreement itself. 
 
All this explains how the Cleveland administration found itself becoming 
increasingly caught up in the Venezuelan Border Dispute, but it does not fully explain why 
Cleveland was convinced that it was necessary to act in the first place. In Presidential 
Problems Cleveland was unequivocal in his declaration that the decision to intervene had 
come because the Monroe Doctrine was at stake. Writing specifically about his special 
message of December 17, 1895, he declared: 
... it was necessary in order to assert and vindicate a principle distinctively 
American, and in the maintenance of which the American people and Government 
of the United States were profoundly concerned. It was because this principle was 
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endangered, and because those charged with administrative responsibility would 
not abandon or neglect it, that our Government interposed to prevent any further 
colonization of American soil by a European nation.
156
 
 
This explanation, however, only suffices for the special message. Cleveland had not 
invoked the Monroe Doctrine during his first term in office and, indeed, admitted to 
Bayard in a letter written shortly after his special message that he was largely ignorant of 
the differing opinions over the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine to the dispute.
157
 The 
Monroe Doctrine was invoked in the July 20 dispatch, but if Cleveland was freely 
admitting some 5 months later that he was not an expert on the subject then it is likely that 
the doctrine itself was not always the primary issue. A more convincing explanation is that 
the President and his Secretaries of State became alarmed at the expansion of British 
claims in the late 1880s and early 1890s and subsequently employed the Monroe Doctrine 
as the best justification for American intervention. In a dispatch sent to Bayard on July 13, 
1894, Gresham noted that between 1885 and 1886 the British claim had “silently increased 
by some 33,000 square miles” and had then expanded again in 1887 “to embrace the rich 
mining district of Yuruani”.158 Such suspicions were encouraged by the Venezuelan 
government who made a point of informing the State Department of any British proposals 
to develop the infrastructure within the disputed territory and thus, in Venezuela’s opinion, 
further their claims.
159
 Tellingly, this theme was picked up again in the July 20 dispatch 
with the crucial addition of two further British claims. In the dispatch Olney highlighted 
the line put forward by Lord Salisbury in 1890 which “fixed the starting point of the line in 
the mouth of the Amacuro west of the Punta Barima on the Orinoco,” as well as the most 
recent claim, made in 1893, which “carried the boundary from a point to the west of the 
Amacuro as far as the source of the Cumano River and the Sierra of Usupamo.”160 It is 
clear from this that the administration was concerned not simply by the gradual expansion 
of the British claims, but by the significance of the territory those claims were beginning to 
encompass. In the July 20 dispatch Olney made no reference to the mineral-rich area 
around the Yuruan River, but he twice specifically noted that the last two British claims 
had expanded past the mouth of the Orinoco River, the tributary system of which 
dominated communications – and therefore commerce – in the Northern section of South 
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America.
161
 This may provide the key to understanding why President Cleveland chose to 
intervene in the Venezuelan Border Dispute in 1895. The expansion of British claims to 
the Orinoco – as well, perhaps, as the Venezuelan reports that the colonial authorities in 
Guyana were seeking to build a communications infrastructure in that territory – raised a 
genuine fear that a major change might come about in the strategic and commercial 
balance of South America. This change did not have to threaten existing American 
interests in order to justify action – there was, after all, nothing in the United States’ 
existing or even potential trade with Venezuela and the surrounding region to justify 
risking good relations with Great Britain, the nation’s biggest trading partner. The 
European powers had recently portioned out amongst themselves the vast majority of the 
continent of Africa. To a man of Cleveland’s conservative temperament in foreign affairs 
this was outside the purview of the United States as defined by the Monroe Doctrine and 
Washington’s Farewell Address. The transferral of control over the Orinoco, however, 
risked sparking a similar ‘Scramble’ for Latin America in which the European powers 
reacted to Britain’s coup by seizing any other territory of potential significance. This was 
the scenario set out by Olney in the July 20 dispatch, and while Salisbury may have been 
correct to scoff at such a theory, the potential severity of such a course of events justified 
forcing a conclusion to the dispute. Cleveland might have resisted the temptation to act if 
he had believed that Great Britain had a genuine case to support its claims, but his 
conviction that the European power was bullying a weaker opponent without justification 
provided a moral imperative to act beyond the broader power politics. 
 Thus we see that the concerns over the potential consequences of Great Britain’s 
expanding claims compelled Cleveland to act. This being so, he and his Secretaries of State 
sought out a legal precedent that would allow them to intervene and so invoked the 
Monroe Doctrine. They did so in such a way as to necessitate an elastic and expanded 
interpretation of the doctrine. LaFeber has gone so far as to suggest that if the Monroe 
Doctrine had not existed the July 20 dispatch would have been written anyway, with the 
term “American Self-Interest” taking its place.162 This is an over-simplification since the 
history of Cleveland’s diplomacy during his second term is one of following legal 
precedent in order to justify foreign policy decisions, but it is true that Olney brought a 
more flexible and aggressive approach to legal interpretation than his predecessor had 
done. Once the Monroe Doctrine had been invoked it had to be defended against Lord 
Salisbury’s attack. Eggert states that Olney wanted to drop all reference to the doctrine 
once it became apparent that Salisbury was willing to acknowledge the United States’ right 
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to intervene to bring the dispute to a conclusion.
163
 According to Eggert it was Cleveland 
who recognised that Salisbury’s challenge to the Monroe Doctrine could not go 
unanswered and so devoted much of his special message on December 17 to defending 
it.
164
 This is consistent with Cleveland’s history of seeking to achieve his desired result 
through a dogged pursuit of his chosen method rather than simply accept a swift victory in 
the matter at hand. Such tactics had failed in Hawaii where it proved impossible to arrive at 
a negotiated settlement to restore the Hawaiian monarchy, but in the case of the Monroe 
Doctrine he was in a position to stand his ground. The result was, in some respects, an 
implicit victory for the Monroe Doctrine since the Venezuelan Border Dispute was brought 
to a conclusion despite Salisbury’s denouncement of the doctrine and with Cleveland’s 
defence of it left unanswered. All of this demonstrates, once again, the growing might of 
the United States in world affairs. If Grover Cleveland was willing to flex the nation’s 
muscles – even if only very slightly – in defence of his conservative principles and was 
able to uphold those principles against the opposition of an experienced statesman of the 
calibre of Lord Salisbury then the United States was clearly a powerful force, particularly 
within its own hemisphere. 
 
 The specific legacies of the Cleveland administration’s actions in Nicaragua and 
Venezuela were fleeting at best. Olney’s expanded interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine – 
what became known as the Olney Corollary to the doctrine – that declared the right of the 
United States to intervene in disputes anywhere in the Americas was a radical change, but 
it was not intended to set the tone for the future development of either the doctrine or 
American relations with Latin America. The Olney Corollary was superseded by the 
Roosevelt Corollary – which declared an American right to directly interfere in the internal 
affairs of American nations in order to stabilise their currencies – in 1904 and thus formed 
the foundation for a more assertive interpretation of the Doctrine. As such the Olney 
Corollary can be seen as a trailblazer for the more radical interpretation of its successor, 
but it is clear that this was not intended by either Olney or Cleveland in 1895. Indeed, as 
one historian has recently noted, Olney was very careful to qualify his interpretation of the 
Doctrine – denying that it served as a protectorate, insisting that American states still had 
to observe their obligations to other nations, and rejecting interference with American 
states – in an attempt to ensure that men such as Lodge and Roosevelt would not be able to 
use the Doctrine to propose a more aggressive approach to foreign policy.
165
 However 
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radical its approach to the Monroe Doctrine may have been, the Olney Corollary only 
sought to protect American nations from European interference and it certainly did not 
countenance the direct interference in the internal affairs of those nations. This being so, it 
can be seen as another stage in the debate between Cleveland and the young Republicans 
such as Roosevelt and Lodge over how to exercise the nation’s newfound might. 
 Neither the events in Nicaragua nor the Venezuelan Border Dispute led to a greatly 
improved profile for the United States in Latin America, or an identifiable increase in trade 
with the region. The Venezuelan incident in particular seems better designed to alienate 
South American nations than ingratiate the United States to them. Dexter Perkins notes the 
mixed reaction in Central and South America to Cleveland’s special message with 
appreciation of the United States’ stand against the European power tempered by concern 
at Olney’s claims of American sovereignty.166 For Venezuela in particular the positive 
reaction to the special message was quickly destroyed by the exclusion of the Venezuelan 
government from the treaty negotiations in London resulting in a settlement that was far 
removed from that government’s original demands. All things considered, if Cleveland had 
hoped to use the dispute to raise the United States’ profile in Central and South America he 
went about it in a remarkably ham-fisted way. 
 Ultimately, the most lasting legacy of the two Latin American incidents was the 
growth of American authority over the Western hemisphere in European eyes and, in 
particular, the improvement of Anglo-British relations. While it still may be saying too 
much to suggest that the Special Relationship began in Nicaragua or the Venezuelan 
Border Dispute, the two incidents are indicative of a new understanding between the two 
governments as both tried to comprehend the implications of the growth of American 
power. The former indicated a willingness on the part of Lord Rosebery’s Liberal 
government to work with the United States in Central America and a commensurate 
willingness of the Cleveland administration to acknowledge the right of Great Britain to 
insist upon payment of debts by American nations; the latter achieved the more difficult 
task of gaining the recognition of Lord Salisbury’s Conservatives that the United States 
could interfere in the affairs of the British Empire even if it could not dictate terms. The 
result, despite some occasional turbulence both domestically and internationally, was a 
better understanding between the two nations at a time of international change.
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Chapter 4 – Cuba 
 
 Of the three central foreign policy incidents of Grover Cleveland’s second term – 
the Hawaiian revolution, the Venezuelan Border Dispute, and the Cuban revolution – it 
was the latter that would have the most tangible impact on the evolution of U.S. foreign 
policy and the creation of an American empire. If the Venezuelan Border Dispute had 
demonstrated a new American assertiveness in foreign policy rhetoric and ideology, the 
Cuban revolution which began in 1895 would prove to be the trigger for actions that would 
fundamentally change the position of the United States in global affairs. As the central 
cause of the War of 1898 the Cuban revolution can safely be called a turning point in U.S. 
history. 
 This being the case, it is easy to overlook the fact that the Cuban revolution 
endured for more than three years before the United States finally intervened – a fact that 
has led one biographer to suggest that Cleveland’s role has been “treated as an unimportant 
prologue to the Cuban policy of the McKinley administration.”1 In fact two of those three 
years came under the leadership of Cleveland and Olney for whom Cuba formed the 
culmination of their foreign policy. Between the outbreak of revolution in February, 1895, 
and the inauguration of President McKinley on March 4, 1897, the administration’s 
response to the situation in Cuba saw them face a variety of challenges overseas. Clear 
parallels can be drawn between the answers to many of these challenges and the 
administration’s actions in previous incidents as Cleveland and Olney employed the 
template for action they – and Gresham – had established elsewhere. Beyond this, 
however, the administration faced further challenges from Congress that required new and 
radical responses and which ultimately saw the propagation of a new interpretation of 
executive power, paving the way for the new American foreign policy of the next century. 
 
 The Cuban revolution against Spanish rule began on February 24, 1895, with a 
rebellion in Santiago province. In April the arrival in Cuba of the political dissident José 
Martí and the military commanders Máximo Gómez and Antonio Maceo confirmed that 
the insurgency would be a serious one.
2
 Both Maceo and Gómez had commanded rebel 
forces in the previous major insurrection in Cuba, which had lasted from 1868 until 1878, 
while Martí was one of the leading advocates of Cuban independence and an important 
figure in the exiled Cuban community in the United States. The revolution of 1895 was, in 
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many respects, a continuation of the conflict of 1868-78. The problems of arbitrary 
colonial rule, racial divisions, and chronic debt and the subsequent heavy taxation it caused 
had all played a part in the development of that rebellion and the passage of seventeen 
years did little to dissipate them. The Ten Years War had ended with promises of reform 
which swiftly proved to be illusory, while subsequent attempts to implement autonomous 
rule for all Spanish overseas territories by the Spanish Foreign Minister Antonio Maura y 
Montaner in the winter of 1893-94 had received so little support in Spain that he had been 
forced to tender his resignation.
3
 The internal problems were exacerbated by the loss of 
Cuba’s favoured position as a sugar supplier to the United States under the Wilson-
Gorman tariff of 1894. As had happened in Hawaii under the McKinley tariff of 1890, the 
blow to sugar producers in Cuba led to increased unemployment and further damaged the 
island’s already weak economy.4 Meanwhile, activists such as Martí agitated for full 
Cuban independence, gaining significant financial backing in the United States. As a 
result, when open rebellion finally broke out in 1895, the rebels were supplied by 
shipments of arms, ammunition and other supplies transported from the United States by 
filibustering expeditions. 
 
 The Cleveland administration’s policy towards the revolution evolved gradually 
over the course of two years. The first response conformed to the precedent established in 
the Brazilian Naval Revolt and the Sino-Japanese War: placing the United States on a 
neutral course and dealing with any incidents that directly involved American interests as 
they occurred. There is little to suggest that either Cleveland, Gresham or Olney initially 
saw any great significance in the outbreak of revolution. Unrest was not unusual on the 
island and the Spanish government had no desire to advertise the seriousness of their 
predicament as the insurrection grew in strength over the summer of 1895. Beyond this, 
neither Cleveland nor his Secretaries of State had any preconceived designs on Cuba, any 
more than they had had on Brazil 18 months before, making their usual conservative stance 
a natural one. To the administration this was a Spanish internal matter and it was the duty 
of the United States to simply mind its legal obligations. Observing these obligations, 
however, was easier said than done. Cuba had been the focus of interest for many 
Americans throughout the 19
th
 Century and the U.S. government had repeatedly sought to 
buy the island from Spain in the 1840s and 1850s.
5
 While the Cleveland administration 
now stood opposed to any such acquisition, this position was not widely supported. The 
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summer of 1895 saw a stream of messages pass between the Spanish Minister in 
Washington and the State Department calling the United States government’s attention to a 
series of alleged breaches of neutrality by American citizens. While some – such as an 
allegation that the Cuban rebels were openly recruiting volunteers in New Orleans – were 
found by investigators to be without foundation it was clear that the rebels were receiving 
tangible support in the form of arms and ammunition from the United States.
6
 The extent 
of the problem was sufficient to encourage Cleveland to issue a proclamation of American 
neutrality on June 12 warning U.S. citizens against serving in, recruiting for, or attempting 
to supply the rebel forces.
7
  
While the Spanish minister in Washington attempted to ensure that the United 
States government did everything it could to fulfil its legal obligations, the State 
Department increasingly found itself asserting the legal rights of American citizens in 
Cuba as the insurgency – and the efforts to control it – threatened to infringe them. In this 
respect the administration was again essentially following the course that had been laid out 
in previous incidents such as the Brazilian Naval Revolt and the incidents at Bluefields in 
Nicaragua. In the case of Cuba, however, both the number and the severity of the cases 
which the State Department found itself raising with the Spanish government and the 
Cuban authorities gave warning that the situation on the island was far more serious than 
either of the incidents in Brazil and Nicaragua. 
 The first major incident that required the State Department’s intervention was the 
firing on the American mail steamer Alliança in international waters by a Spanish gunboat 
patrolling off the coast of Cuba. Although the Alliança was not hit and sailed on to its 
destination without further interference, when news of the incident reached Washington 
Gresham demanded an immediate apology and assurances that all Spanish commanders 
would be instructed to ensure that such events would not be repeated.
8
 The subsequent 
investigation revealed that the incident had been the result of an error by the Spanish 
commander in calculating the positions of the two vessels resulting in the mistaken 
impression that the Alliança had entered Cuban waters.
9
 Gresham received his apology 
while the officer in question was relieved of his command, but perhaps more important 
was the instruction issued to all Spanish commanders in Cuban waters not to interfere with 
                                                 
6
 Mr. Muruaga to Mr. Gresham, March 30, 1895, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1895, Part 2, p. 
1191; Mr. Uhl to Mr. Muruaga, April 6, 1895, [No. 17], Foreign Relations of the United States, 1895, Part 2, 
p. 1194 
7
 Grover Cleveland, ‘A Proclamation’, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1895, Part 2, p. 1195 
8
 Mr. Gresham to Mr. Taylor, March 14, 1895, [Telegram], Foreign Relations of the United States, 1895, 
Part 2, p. 1177 
9
 Mr. Taylor to Mr. Gresham, May 20, 1895, [No. 357], Foreign Relations of the United States, 1895, Part 2, 
pp. 1184-85 
163 
 
legitimate American shipping. The strong wording of the normally placid Gresham’s first 
telegram of protest which demanded that “Forcible interferences with [regular American 
mail and commercial shipping] can not be claimed as a belligerent act, whether they pass 
within 3 miles of the Cuban coast or not, and can under no circumstances be tolerated 
when no state of war exists,” demonstrated the seriousness with which he viewed any 
interference with American commerce as a result of the insurrection.
10
 Once again, the 
needs of American commerce were a priority for the Cleveland administration. The fact 
that the captain of the Spanish gunboat had seen fit to go so far as to open fire on the 
Alliança, though, also demonstrated that the Cuban authorities saw filibustering 
expeditions as a very real threat, thus posing a conundrum that would be hard to solve: 
how could Spanish forces control the Cuban coast without interfering with American 
commerce? 
 As well as the Alliança incident, the early months of the insurrection saw the first 
examples of what would be a recurring problem for the United States in their relations with 
Spain: the arrest of American citizens in Cuba on suspicion of aiding the rebels. Such 
arrests would prove to be a key concern for the State Department over the next three years 
with the situation being confused by a variety of issues.
11
 The first such problem was the 
dubious citizenship status of many of those arrested. Dual American-Spanish citizenship 
was not uncommon in Cuba with many people born on the island living in the United 
States long enough to acquire American citizenship before returning to their homeland. As 
a result the State Department was repeatedly forced to investigate the validity of such 
claims – often for men who had made no attempt to assert their citizenship before their 
arrest – in order to ascertain whether they were entitled to the protection of the United 
States. The situation repeated itself so often in the first two years of the conflict that 
Cleveland spoke out specifically in his Annual Message of 1896 against those who 
“though Cubans at heart and in all their feelings and interests, have taken out papers as 
naturalized citizens of the United States--a proceeding resorted to with a view to possible 
protection by this Government,” noting the indignation that this provoked from the Cuban 
authorities.
12
 Even when American citizenship was clearly established the legal situation in 
Cuba made the assertion of treaty rights a difficult matter. Under their treaty of 1795, the 
United States and Spain agreed to guarantee the legal rights of each others’ citizens unless 
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they were captured with arms in their hands. In Cuba in 1895, however, the Spanish 
government experienced repeated difficulties in controlling the local authorities who were 
far more concerned with putting down the rebellion in any way possible than with the 
niceties of international diplomacy. Arrests were often made without charge and prisoners 
held for extended periods without trial. On one occasion in September, 1895, Olney was 
forced to complain to Minister Dupuy de Lôme that the Governor-General of Cuba was 
refusing the right of the U.S. consul-general in Havana to intervene on behalf of American 
citizens being held without trial despite this being an established function of consular 
representatives under international law.
13
 
 Beyond the arrest and detention of American citizens, the State Department also 
worked to protect American property in Cuba. This became a key priority as it became 
clear that the rebels intended to operate a policy of deliberate destruction of the island’s 
agricultural and industrial infrastructure in order to increase pressure on the Spanish 
government. In the face of such attacks, however, there was little that the department could 
hope to achieve. From an early stage the message sent to property owners was that 
compensation could only be forthcoming if they could prove that the Spanish government 
had been in a position to protect their property, but had failed to do so.
14
 Undoubtedly, 
Cleveland and Olney were concerned by the prospect of widespread destruction of 
American property and investment in Cuba, but a letter from Olney to the President 
demonstrated the extent to which they felt their hands were bound. Referring to documents 
sent to Olney by a man claiming to represent the Cuban Republic the Secretary wrote: 
They are serious principally as they show how the insurrection is affecting 
American citizens and American property. At the same time, it being their 
misfortune to reside and have invested their capital in a country in which a 
rebellion has broken out, it is not easy to see how this government can protect them 
from the inevitable consequences.
15
  
 
Since this was the established position under international law in cases relating to the 
destruction of property of alien residents by insurgents beyond the control of the sovereign 
government it was a logical position for the State Department to adopt, but the general 
policy of the administration was also one of only gentle pressure on the Spanish 
government. In December, 1895, Olney forwarded to Dupuy de Lôme a detailed letter 
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from an American sugar company whose plantations in Cuba had been harassed by the 
rebels. In his accompanying note Olney simply declared: 
 I send it for your information, as well as for any suggestions and 
recommendations you may see fit to make either to the Spanish Government or to 
the local authorities in Cuba for the protection of American properties in Cuba from 
destruction by the Cuban insurgents.
16
 
 
Clearly Olney believed that applying direct pressure for action from Spain would be 
unlikely to produce any concrete results and that American interests would best be served 
by maintaining a cordial relationship with the Spanish government. 
 
A potential reason for this reluctance to exert pressure on Spain is that by the 
winter of 1895 it had become clear that the insurrection was a very serious matter. On 
September 25, 1895, Olney wrote a letter to Cleveland that demonstrated that the Secretary 
of State was beginning to have serious doubts about the administration’s early 
interpretation of the situation in Cuba. Opening with the suggestion that the matter was 
“one calling for the careful consideration of the Executive” – a statement which itself 
suggests that up to that point the issue had not been the subject of serious discussion – 
Olney first set out the Spanish version of events. In this version the insurgents were a 
ragtag army comprised of Cuba’s lowest orders “under the leadership of a few 
adventurers”.17 These men “would be incapable of founding or maintaining a decent 
government if their revolution against Spain were to be successful” and any such triumph 
would lead to “anarchy and a repetition in Cuba of the worst experiences of other West 
India Islands.” The latter point was primarily a reference to the racial violence that had 
characterised the Haitian revolution a century earlier and which, due to its capacity to 
terrorise white landowners in areas containing significant black populations, was regularly 
used as a means of reinforcing white support to the Spanish colonial government in Cuba. 
All this combined to form a vision of a conflict in which “it would be quite impossible to 
withhold sympathy from Spain or to doubt that she must ultimately prevail.” Now, though, 
Olney was coming to question this view.
18
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The Secretary had recently been put in contact with a major Cuban landowner, “a 
man of great wealth, an employer on his estates of some eight hundred people,” an 
American who had served as a consular-agent for the United States and who had little 
interest in any specific type of government so long as it provided peace and stability for 
commerce. Olney declared himself to be impressed “both with his intelligence and his 
honesty” and so was inclined to believe his informant’s very different interpretation of the 
situation in Cuba.
19
 Briefly stated, that interpretation was that, far from being “the scum of 
the earth” the rebels had the sympathy of 90% of the Cuban population including virtually 
all of the prominent families, simultaneously challenging the Spanish argument that the 
rebels were in the minority and would be incapable of forming a permanent government. In 
reality, Olney’s source claimed, the majority of Cuban landowners were:  
to a man disgusted with Spanish mis-rule, with a system which has burdened the 
Island with $300,000,000 of debt, whose impositions in the way of annual taxes 
just stop short of prohibiting all industrial enterprise, and which yet does not fulfill 
the primary functions of government by insuring safety to life and security to 
property.
20
 
 
All this combined to form a serious problem for the Cleveland administration. In the space 
of a few lines Olney’s letter revealed a far greater strength to the rebellion, making U.S. 
recognition of the rebel cause a matter for serious consideration, and highlighted serious 
problems with Spanish rule which undermined all of the qualities – investment, commerce, 
and the security of life and property – that the administration’s foreign policy was designed 
to protect and facilitate as a first priority. Further to this, Olney’s informant raised the 
genuine prospect of a Spanish defeat, arguing that the 1895 rebellion was more formidable 
than that of 1868-78 and, unlike its predecessor, would not be placated by promises of 
reform, not least because the promises made in 1878 were not kept. This contrasted with 
Spanish power which “has visibly and greatly decreased.” 
 Having brought such concerns – as well as stories of the brutal treatment being 
meted out to those suspected of aiding the rebels – to Cleveland’s attention, Olney neatly 
summarised the plethora of difficulties that the administration now faced: 
The Representatives of the two parties ... being wholly conflicting, and the true 
status being one of grave doubt -- Cuba lying at our very door -- the contest 
attracting the attention of all our people as well as enlisting their sympathies, if no 
other reason, then [sic] because the insurgents are apparently the weaker party -- 
politicians of all stripes, including Congressmen, either already setting their sails or 
preparing to set them so as to catch the popular breeze -- it being not merely 
probable but almost certain that next winter Washington will swarm with 
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emissaries of the insurgents demanding at least recognition of their belligerency -- 
what duty has the Executive branch of the Government?
21
 
 
The Secretary was content that, as far as Spain was concerned, the United States was doing 
all that could be expected in terms of respecting and preserving neutrality. He was less 
sure, however, that all was being done for the insurgents that they might be entitled to. 
They have a right, I think, that we inform ourselves upon the point, whether they 
are merely gangs of roving banditti, or are a substantial portion of the community 
revolting against intolerable political conditions and earnestly and in good faith 
seeking the establishment of a better form of government.
22
 
 
Such an investigation would be a typically measured approach to a complex problem from 
an administration that had made it a habit not to act swiftly if it could possibly be avoided, 
but Olney did at least raise the prospect of more dramatic action if his informant’s claims 
turned out to be true. While not categorically declaring himself in favour of either 
possibility he argued that the United States would be better placed to decide whether to 
recognise Cuban belligerency or even independence. A canny politician, Olney recognised 
that these were questions that were “sure to be raised and the decision of which sooner or 
later cannot be avoided.” 
 
 The suggestion of sending an agent to Cuba appealed to Olney for a variety of 
reasons. As chief of the State Department he recognised that his subordinates would be 
called upon to handle many claims relating to the destruction of property and disruption of 
commerce and thus would be well served by a definitive picture of the situation on the 
ground. Once again, for a legally-minded administration the availability of clear evidence 
to guide actions was a high priority. Ultimately, however, the plan for sending a special 
envoy was not pursued. Olney and Cleveland certainly discussed the matter seriously, and 
Olney even spoke with Secretary of War Daniel Lamont about suitable candidates after it 
was decided that a man with military experience would be best suited to the role. Lamont 
suggested General John M. Schofield, recently retired as commanding general of the U.S. 
Army, an appointment which Olney favoured as a means of removing the matter from the 
political arena, while expressing reservations that the Spanish government might see it as 
granting the rebels too much credibility.
23
 In his September 25 letter Olney had dismissed 
the possibility of the Spanish officials objecting to the arrival of an American investigator 
on the grounds that, by their own interpretation of the situation, any such mission “could 
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have but the one result of demonstrating that both right and might are on their side.”24 He 
presented the same argument in the letter of October 8 in which General Schofield’s name 
was proposed, but he may have underestimated Spain’s willingness to accept the suspicion 
that came with rejecting the proposal. Olney’s biographer, Gerald G. Eggert, claims that 
the Spanish government vetoed the plan and, although he unfortunately provides no 
evidence to support this statement, it would appear to be consistent with the recalcitrance 
of the Cuban authorities.
25
 Certainly Cleveland was not entirely enthusiastic for the project, 
although his objections appear to have been more related to the choice of Schofield – on 
the basis that the President believed “that he would not see all that he ought to see.” – than 
to the idea in general.
26
 In a letter of October 6 Cleveland had been sufficiently interested 
to name a candidate for the role – Major Davis who had worked with Lamont on delicate 
matters before – but had also informed Olney that he would make a final decision on the 
matter when he returned to Washington on the 15
th
 so it is entirely plausible that the 
President decided in the intervening period that the potential rift the project might cause 
with Spain was too great a risk to run.
 27
 Whatever the case, the plan for sending a special 
envoy to investigate was dropped for the time being. 
 Despite prompting a dramatic reappraisal within the administration both of the 
nature and strength of the rebellion and of its prospects for success, the exposure of the 
flawed view being presented by the Spanish authorities had no discernible impact on 
Cleveland or Olney’s actions in the short term, even to the extent of abandoning the plan to 
send an envoy to investigate in person. Why this was the case is difficult to answer, not 
least because the correspondence between the men is very thin: presumably the President’s 
return to Washington meant that such matters were discussed in person. The first – and 
most likely – reason for this lack of action is Cleveland and Olney’s instinctive tendency to 
stand pat when presented with a volatile situation beyond their control and understanding. 
This would conform to the cautious precedent set as far back as the withdrawal of the 
Hawaiian annexation treaty in 1893 and chimes well with Olney’s suggestion that they 
urgently seek to acquire better information on the conflict. That said, the eventual decision 
not to send a special envoy to investigate the situation in Cuba suggests an alternative 
reason for not acting: the need to protect American property and commerce. The fact that 
such matters were at the forefront of the administration’s thinking is demonstrated by 
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Olney’s direct references to “a large and important commerce” with Cuba, “large amounts 
of American capital in Cuba”, and the likelihood that the U.S. government would be called 
upon to protect its citizens and property and to secure indemnities for damage done.
28
 The 
Secretary of State was primarily concerned with providing himself with sufficient 
information to make legal claims of the Spanish government, but it did not require a great 
leap of reasoning to recognise the potential damage to such cases that would be done by 
recognising the rebels as belligerents. Under these circumstances the burden of protecting 
American lives and property in Cuba would fall upon the rebels, the same people that were 
waging a campaign of destruction against American plantations. Granting recognition 
might have brought such attacks to a halt, but there was little guarantee of that, especially 
if the rebel government could not be sure to control the actions of its various armies. It 
would seem strange if Olney and Cleveland had not considered such questions as soon as 
the revolution broke out, but the letter of September 25, with its suggestion that recognition 
of either belligerency or independence might be feasible, could be construed as suggesting 
otherwise. Beyond the loss of protection for American property any move that was deemed 
by Spain to be supporting the rebel cause risked creating a diplomatic rift and even raised 
the prospect of war between the two nations. With the experiences of the Brazilian Naval 
Revolt and the Sino-Japanese War behind them the administration cannot have failed to 
realise this fact – indeed it was openly acknowledged by Cleveland later in the term – and 
once again the instinct to stand pat may well have taken control. Beyond this, it is possible 
that Cleveland and Olney believed that they did not need to act. In both Brazil and China 
the instinct to maintain a cautious neutrality had ultimately proved to be correct as both 
conflicts came to a natural conclusion of their own accord – although the role of the U.S.S. 
Detroit in bringing the Brazilian Naval Revolt to an end formed a salutary lesson in the 
power of minor actions from the United States to effect major changes in conflicts – and, if 
Olney’s source was to be believed, a similar natural resolution might occur in Cuba very 
soon. Indeed, the situation in Cuba in the winter of 1895 was such that if the administration 
received further accurate reports from the island they would have been confirmed in this 
belief since by January 1896 the rebels were in possession of most of the hinterland and 
had advanced to the outskirts of Havana.
29
 It was only the arrival from Spain of General 
Valeriano Weyler in that same month that brought the rebel advance to a halt and began 
the stalemate that characterised the next two years of the conflict.  
Cleveland’s annual message of 1895 illustrates the position taken by the 
administration after the first 9 months of the rebellion as well as highlighting one of the 
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key issues they were facing. Having informed the nation that an insurrection “in some 
respects more active than the last preceding revolt” – that of 1868-78 – was raging in 
Cuba, the President set out his vision of the United States position: 
Besides deranging the commercial exchanges of the island, of which our country 
takes the predominant share, this flagrant condition of hostilities, by arousing 
sentimental sympathy and inciting adventurous support among our people, has 
entailed earnest effort on the part of this Government to enforce obedience to our 
neutrality laws and to prevent the territory of the United States from being abused 
as a vantage ground from which to aid those in arms against Spanish sovereignty.
30
 
 
In short, while recognising that a very serious insurrection was taking place that was 
harming the economy of the United States, Cleveland was still devoted to maintaining 
international obligations, a position he directly reiterated twice in the subsequent 
paragraph. His determination to maintain his non-interventionist stance was demonstrated 
by another passage worth quoting at length: 
Though neither the warmth of our people's sympathy with the Cuban insurgents, 
nor our loss and material damage consequent upon the futile endeavors thus far 
made to restore peace and order, nor any shock our humane sensibilities may have 
received from the cruelties which appear to especially characterize this sanguinary 
and fiercely conducted war, have in the least shaken the determination of the 
Government to honestly fulfill every international obligation, yet it is to be 
earnestly hoped on every ground that the devastation of armed conflict may 
speedily be stayed and order and quiet restored to the distracted island, bringing in 
their train the activity and thrift of peaceful pursuits. 
 
Beyond his desire to have the Spanish government solve its own problems, this passage 
illustrates Cleveland’s awareness of the major problem that was facing his administration: 
that of public opinion. Where in the early days of his second term Cleveland and Gresham 
had expressed hopes of leading public opinion and building support for their position, it is 
clear from the annual message of 1895 and Olney’s letter of September 25, 1895, that such 
hopes were not extended to the situation in Cuba. While the annual message did present a 
call to the American people not to breach their country’s neutrality – going so far as to 
remind them of their duty as patriotic citizens to honour the obligations of their national 
government – this was in itself almost an admission that public opinion was 
overwhelmingly in favour of the rebels. Further proof of this attitude can be gained from 
the September 25 letter when Olney declared that the rebels were gaining the sympathy of 
the American people “if for no other reason, then [sic] because the insurgents are 
apparently the weaker party”.31 If the Secretary of State was resigned to the fact that public 
opinion was irreversible despite admitting that much of it was based on the flimsiest of 
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reasoning then clearly the administration was seeking to manage the problem rather than to 
solve it. This latter point is crucial to the understanding of the administration’s Cuba policy 
– or lack of one – at the end of 1895. Unlike in Hawaii – the previous incident to elicit 
strong public feeling over a lengthy period of time – Cleveland and his advisors did not 
have a set policy that they wished to sell to the electorate, they simply hoped to limit the 
extent to which the actions of American citizens forced their hand. Cleveland and Olney 
were well aware of public opinion and the potential difficulties it could bring them if 
influential members of Congress attempted to harness it, but in the wake of the crushing 
Republican victory in the 1894 Congressional election – or perhaps after the death of 
Gresham – there appears to have been less concern that the administration should have a 
public mandate for their actions. The hope of leading informed opinion in the United States 
had gone, but there was no corresponding move to bow to public whim; Cleveland would 
continue to enact a foreign policy that he believed to be morally and legally right. As the 
Cuban revolution continued through 1896 this belief in the independence of Executive 
power would come to be a major issue and one that would have far-reaching consequences 
for the evolution of American foreign policy. 
 
 The long period of inactivity came to an end in early April, 1896, when Cleveland 
and Olney launched two new policies in a matter of days which had the potential to 
profoundly alter the United States’ stance on Cuba. On April 4 Olney wrote a letter to 
Minister de Lôme that ended the administration’s policy of non-involvement in the Cuban 
crisis. After a lengthy exposition on the calamitous state of affairs on the island and the 
consequent damage being done to American commerce and investment the Secretary 
declared the need for a solution before the island was ruined or a Spanish defeat resulted in 
the outbreak of a race war.
32
 What Olney proposed was a cooperative effort between the 
two nations which would see the United States extend its good offices to promote any 
reforms that the Spanish government proposed which, while maintaining Spanish 
sovereignty, “shall yet secure to the people of the island all such rights and powers of local 
self-government as they can reasonably ask.”33 This proposal, while vague in itself, 
revealed a great deal about the administration’s thinking. It declared a preference, under 
the circumstances, for the continuation of Spanish rule over Cuba rather than the creation 
of an independent Cuban republic. By taking such a stance the administration was 
demonstrating its willingness to ignore the calls of popular opinion in preference of a 
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policy which they believed to be better for the United States. It may also, however, have 
revealed a naivety in Cleveland and Olney’s reasoning and a failure to understand the 
nature of the rebel cause. 
The decision to suggest reforms aimed at granting Cuba autonomy was a logical 
one for Cleveland and Olney, conforming with their stand pat instincts. An autonomous 
Cuba still existing under Spanish sovereignty appeared, in many respects, to be an ideal 
solution from the position of the United States. Olney’s note had spoken of his concern at 
the continuing destruction of the island’s industry and the indiscriminate nature of these 
attacks which saw American investors suffer equally with their Spanish counterparts. It 
had also raised the prospect of the island being engulfed in a civil war between the white 
and black communities. Both these issues could only be secured against by existence of a 
sound governmental authority and, since by Olney’s own admission the rebels seemed 
incapable of creating one for themselves, the continuation of Spanish rule was the most 
viable means of providing it. Olney was aware, however, that the continuation of Spanish 
rule in its current form was unlikely to be acceptable to the rebels and so real political 
reform amounting to autonomy was the only potential means of bringing peace while 
keeping Spanish sovereignty. In this case, though, it seems that Olney had misjudged the 
rebels. In his letter to de Lôme the Secretary had referred to the fact that the 1868-78 
insurrection had only been pacified by promises of political reforms which were 
subsequently not fulfilled, but his suggestions to the Spanish government were predicated 
on such a policy being successful for a second time which, given the greater strength of the 
1895 insurrection and the sense of betrayal harboured by the rebels after the previous 
promises, was highly unlikely. This raises doubts about the seriousness of Olney’s whole 
proposal, not least because his own note repeatedly emphasised the strength of the rebel 
forces and the inability of Spain to bring it to an end through military force. Given the 
vagueness of Olney’s plan – lacking in any specific detail and placing the entire burden of 
creating a policy acceptable to the rebels on the Spanish government – it is tempting to 
question whether it was indeed a serious proposal or rather a thinly veiled hint that the 
United States desired that the situation be resolved quickly. On balance, though, Olney’s 
proposal should be considered a serious one. Throughout their time in office Cleveland and 
Olney had preached a reluctance to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations and 
while their record had perhaps not always perfectly conformed to this position even in 
Hawaii – the most flagrant case of interference – they had only interfered to correct 
damage already done by the United States. In many respects the entire foreign policy 
history of the second Cleveland administration is one of minor interference with the 
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internal affairs of other nations and a willingness to interfere with Spanish policy in Cuba 
would be demonstrated again only two weeks after Olney’s letter to de Lôme. On April 18 
he wrote a private letter to the Spanish minister questioning the wisdom of the arrest by the 
Spanish authorities of Bishop Diaz, even going so far as to state: 
I venture to suggest the inexpediency of holding him. To hold him as a prisoner for 
any length of time will be certain to excite the religious sentiment of the country 
unless the reasons for so doing are very plain and are publicly manifested.
34
 
 
Two days later he was even more explicit declaring: 
If you realize where your interests and mine lie, you will have Diaz and his brother 
landed in the United States within the next twenty-four hours. It makes little 
difference what they have done or what they have not done. A more troublesome 
and dangerous hornets’ nest could not have been stirred up than has been by the 
arrest of Diaz.
35
 
 
These were not merely disinterested expressions of concern, they were powerful 
suggestions of the direction which the American government desired Spanish policy to 
take and thus an indication of a new determination within the administration to make its 
feelings known on Cuban matters. The suggestion of a fully formed policy aimed at 
solving the entire conflict to a European power such as Spain was, however, still a step too 
far. As Olney himself declared in the April 4 note: “the United States has no designs upon 
Cuba and no designs against the sovereignty of Spain.”36 Undoubtedly Cleveland and 
Olney were serious in their desire to see peace restored to Cuba and the plan Olney 
suggested promised to fulfil all of their wishes: a restoration of peace, a stable government 
providing a safe market for trade and investment, the expansion of democratic rights within 
the American hemisphere, and a resolution that avoided the prospect of racial violence. 
That Olney was not certain of success is demonstrated by his advice to Spain to act swiftly 
before the rebels could attribute any such negotiation to Spanish weakness or defeat, but 
the autonomy policy matched so well with the administration’s stand pat instincts it seems 
he and Cleveland considered it worth proposing.
37
 
At the same time that Olney was preparing his note to Minister Dupuy de Lôme, he 
and Cleveland were also planning another move that demonstrated the increased interest 
the administration had in the Cuban conflict and its resolution. On the evening of April 7, 
Cleveland – with Olney probably in attendance – met with Fitzhugh Lee of Virginia, son of 
                                                 
34
 Richard Olney to Dupuy de Lôme, April 18, 1896, Reel 51, Richard Olney Papers, Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 
35
 Richard Olney to Dupuy de Lôme, April 20, 1896, Reel 51, Richard Olney Papers, Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 
36
 Olney to Dupuy de Lôme, April 4, 1896, FRUS, 1897, p. 544 
37
 Ibid 
174 
 
the legendary Civil War General Robert E. Lee. The purpose of the meeting was to offer 
Lee the position of Consul-General in Havana and the correspondence between Cleveland 
and Olney leaves no doubt that the appointment was more than simply filling a vacant 
diplomatic post. On April 7 Cleveland expressed his hope that a private meeting might 
mean that “the matter may be settled without newspaper nonsense and he might return 
home without comment.”38 Two days later he wrote again saying “I suppose the Havana 
matter must wait, now that we have entered upon it by way of Virginia.”39 While it appears 
that the exact nature of the “Havana matter” – or what alternative measures may have been 
considered relating to it – must remain tantalisingly unknowable, it is clear that Cleveland 
had a definite purpose in mind for Lee beyond normal consular duties. In light of the more 
assertive posture adopted with the April 4 letter to Minister Dupuy de Lôme, it is logical to 
assume that the appointment was a revival of the proposal to send a representative to 
directly investigate the true situation in Cuba, but that could have been achieved simply by 
sending a special envoy. It is entirely plausible that Cleveland and Olney hoped to avoid 
the potential rift with the Spanish government that might have been created by sending an 
envoy with the sole remit of investigating whether Spain’s own reports of the situation 
were reliable. The appointment of a new Consul-General would not cause such diplomatic 
issues, especially if his secondary purpose were kept secret. The fact that Lee was given 
the position of Consul-General may suggest another intention from the President, however. 
As the senior American diplomat in Cuba Lee would become a key figure in the 
implementation of American policy. By placing a man specially recruited for the role in 
that position it appears Cleveland and Olney were seeking to ensure greater control over 
events in Havana. This would be a logical reaction to growing concern at the treatment of 
American citizens and property in Cuba, but would also be a sensible move if the 
administration anticipated implementing a more assertive policy in relation to Cuba. 
Indeed, the move may have been made in anticipation of a favourable response to Olney’s 
suggestion of the United States providing its support to Spanish proposals of political 
reform. 
In the event neither the proposal to Spain nor the appointment of Lee would have 
the consequences Cleveland and Olney desired, but before discussing why the two moves 
failed it is necessary to examine why they came about at all. A variety of causes, both 
foreign and domestic, can be identified that may have played a role in convincing the 
administration to change its stance on Cuba. The simplest of these relate to the situation in 
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Cuba and two of them derive from the letter to Minister Dupuy de Lôme on April 4. In it 
Olney reported that “competent authority” had predicted to him that Cuba’s usual annual 
product of $80m to $100m was likely to fall in 1896 to at most $20m with that figure set to 
decline still further as crops were not replanted and plantations and industries destroyed.
40
 
With capital fleeing the island and no indication of further investment replacing it, Olney 
was clearly concerned by the prospect of one of the United States’ vital trading partners 
suffering complete economic ruin. This prospect would be raised again in Cleveland’s 
annual message of 1896 when he suggested that the damage to the Cuban sugar industry 
was in danger of becoming so great as to make it uneconomical to rebuild it in the future.
41
 
Clearly the preservation of American trade and investment was the central motivation for 
Cleveland and Olney and it is possible that the continuing destruction of Cuba’s agriculture 
and industry was what prompted them to act, but this alone does not explain the timing of 
the action. One possible explanation is revealed by an earlier section of Olney’s April 4 
letter. Having explained the purpose of the letter – the President’s desire that the rebellion 
be settled – the Secretary of State opened his summary of the administration’s position by 
reminding de Lôme of their conversations the previous year: 
 It is now some nine or ten months since the nature and prospects of the 
insurrection were first discussed between us. In explanation of its rapid and, up to 
that time, quite unopposed growth and progress, you called attention to the rainy 
season which from May or June until November renders regular military operations 
impracticable. Spain was pouring such numbers of troops into Cuba that your 
theory and opinion that, when they could be used in an active campaign, the 
insurrection would be almost instantly suppressed, seemed reasonable and 
probable. .... 
It is impossible to deny that the expectations thus entertained by you in the summer 
and fall of 1895, and shared not merely by all Spaniards but by most disinterested 
observers as well, have been completely disappointed.
42
 
 
In Olney’s own words, therefore, the United States had accepted Spain’s assurances that 
the rebellion would be swiftly crushed once the rainy season ended and was now, with the 
dry season nearly over and a new rainy season in sight, disappointed to observe that 
nothing of the kind had happened. By itself, this failure would not justify interfering with 
Spanish policy, but the continuing destruction of property, both Cuban and American, and 
the subsequent damage to trade with the United States was sufficient cause to intervene, at 
least in the limited manner that Olney proposed. 
 Olney’s letter to Minister Dupuy de Lôme still does not fully explain why the 
administration chose to act in early April, 1896, rather than waiting for the start of the next 
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rainy season or acting a month earlier and thus giving Spain more time to consider the 
implications of the change while still being in a position to make decisive moves militarily. 
It can be argued that the timing was of no further significance than that outlined by Olney, 
but it appears likely that other factors also played a part. On a technical level, Lars 
Schoultz has argued that the change of stance coincided with the British agreement to 
negotiate over the Venezuelan Border Dispute which freed the administration to adopt a 
more active stance towards the Cuban revolt.
43
 Such a theory is difficult to either prove or 
disprove: the Venezuelan situation had only rarely taken up sizable portions of Cleveland 
and Olney’s time due to the almost total lack of urgency with which it was treated by their 
British counterparts and, if anything, the opening of negotiations on the subject gave Olney 
considerably more work to do from April, 1896. From a position of international politics, 
however, it is not impossible that Cleveland wished to be entirely certain that the 
Venezuelan matter would be settled in a manner agreeable to the United States before 
acting on Cuba in order to ensure that the British government was not granted a new 
opportunity to exert leverage over the United States. Beyond the logistics of the war and 
other calls on the State Department’s time one other development stands out as a potential 
reason for the administration’s decision to develop a more active policy on Cuba. 
Beginning in December, 1895, members of both houses of Congress began proposing 
resolutions that sought, in a variety of ways, to influence the policy of the United States 
toward the conflict. Through the winter of 1895-96 a concerted effort evolved aimed at 
securing recognition of the Cuban insurgents as belligerents; a movement which reached a 
shambolic climax in the early days of March, 1896. On March 4 the New York Times 
reported that the mood in Congress had dramatically shifted after a flurry of activity so 
precipitous it had left Senators uncertain as to which chamber’s resolutions were under 
consideration. In the cold light of day, the paper reported, “Not one man in ten of those 
who voted in favor of recognition of the belligerency of the Cubans could tell why he 
voted to afford those rights, except that he sympathized with the people who were 
endeavouring to get rid of Spanish rule in Cuba.”44 The article closed by suggesting that 
public sentiment in favour of the resolutions was declining and that Cleveland, who had 
been rumoured to support the resolutions, now wanted them shelved with the result that 
any resolution passed would simply result in making the United States look foolish since 
the President would not act on it. On these last points there is reason to believe that the 
New York Times was mistaken. While it is not possible at this distance to distinguish 
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whether there truly was a change in American public opinion in early 1896, if there was it 
did not last long. More importantly there is no evidence that Cleveland ever welcomed the 
prospect of Congressional resolutions which were intended to dictate his course of action. 
Equally, if Congressional leaders really believed that passing resolutions would be 
rendered pointless by the President’s refusal to act then they had changed their minds by 
the time the next session of Congress opened in December when the question of 
Congressional control of foreign policy would become one of the key debates of 
Cleveland’s second term. Whatever the case, the debating of the resolutions continued 
throughout the spring during which time it seems that Cleveland’s feelings became clearer 
to both Congress and the media.
45
 On May 21, the New York Times published another 
article which predicted that Cleveland’s supporters in Congress would be able to postpone 
action on any resolutions until the session was adjourned. Cleveland, the article declared, 
“does not care to be bullied or worried into the recognition of Cuban belligerency, or to 
appear to be influenced by Congress” and was instead awaiting reports from Lee and the 
coming of the rainy season which would allow the rebels to demonstrate their capacity for 
self-government before acting.
46
 This latter point, the New York Times reported, was key 
since “The President and Secretary Olney have never lacked sympathy with the insurgents; 
but they have not proposed to violate international law and the rules of neutrality before it 
appeared that the Cubans were capable of maintaining an independent government.” This 
was a fine definition of Cleveland and Olney’s position – and indeed of much of their 
foreign policy – but presumably the author was unaware of the proposal made by Olney to 
Minister Dupuy de Lôme in the letter of April 4. In the light of the debates in Congress - 
and especially given the volatility of mood among members being reported by the New 
York Times - the April 4 letter takes on further significance. It appears likely that Cleveland 
was not as unmoved by Congressional pressure as was reported and that the timing of the 
change of policy was no coincidence. It is highly likely he and Olney were motivated to act 
by the fear that if they did not Congress might force their hand. This is borne out further by 
Olney’s language in the April 4 letter. His opening words described the continued failure 
to express the President’s concern at the situation in Cuba as “a dereliction of duty to the 
Government of the United States” and, more importantly, he went on to note that the 
conflict had “led many good and honest persons to insist that intervention to terminate the 
conflict is the immediate and imperative duty of the United States.”47 This implied that the 
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President was feeling pressured to act, even if only by his own sense of duty to his 
government. 
 It is reasonable to assume that the agitation in Congress in the spring of 1896 
played a significant part in motivating Cleveland and Olney to alter their stance on Cuba, 
but it is also fair to say that the policy change was not simply the result of domestic 
politics. In both Olney’s April 4 letter and in Cleveland’s Annual Message of 1896 a great 
deal was made of the permanent damage being caused to Cuba’s economy by the war 
while both messages also painted a similarly bleak picture of the long term prospects of 
victory for either side. The April 4 letter in particular raised the possibility that the 
insurrection might become bogged down in another 10 year quagmire as had happened in 
the 1868-78 rebellion.
48
 Since the April 4 letter was not intended for public view and the 
Annual Message came several months after Spain had rejected the offer of American good 
offices – and weeks after a decisive Republican victory in the Presidential election of 1896 
– there was nothing to be gained politically from either statement. Cleveland and Olney 
were genuinely concerned by the prospect of Cuba being ruined by the war and the 
potential effects this might have on the American economy. Pressure from the discussions 
in Congress may have been a trigger for the change in administration policy, but it was 
events in Cuba - and concern for the future - that motivated it. 
 
 If the events of April, 1896, had given Cleveland hope that progress might be made 
in Cuba then the summer was to prove one of disappointment. In a matter of weeks in June 
and July the administration had their proposal for reforms rejected by Spain and began to 
experience trouble with Fitzhugh Lee in Havana. Compounding these problems, however, 
was a domestic political disaster for Cleveland which would have profound consequences 
for his policy in Cuba.  
 Minister Dupuy de Lôme’s reply to Olney’s offer of American good offices with 
the rebels in support of Spanish proposals of reform was dated June 4, exactly two months 
after Olney’s letter.49 Given the delay in replying it is reasonable to assume that the 
Secretary of State must have been disappointed to discover that his suggestion was being 
rebuffed with a mixture of diplomatic courtesy and pointed advice as to the United States’ 
conduct. De Lôme himself put the delay down to the seriousness of the matter under 
discussion before launching into a vindication of Spanish rule in Cuba, declaring it to be 
“one of the most liberal political systems in the world”.50 In brief the Spanish reply was a 
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reiteration of their long-standing policy that there would be no negotiation until the rebels 
laid down their arms, but the Spanish government also took the opportunity to lecture 
Olney on American actions and how best the United States could assist in bringing about 
peace. The reply declared that the American proposal could not succeed since the rebels 
did not believe that the United States was genuinely neutral and instead believed that the 
U.S. wanted to take possession of the island for itself. It went on to suggest that if the 
United States government really wished to help in bringing the insurrection to an end then 
it should further step up its efforts to counter filibustering expeditions - offering to provide 
any intelligence that might possibly be of help in this endeavour - before closing with a 
declaration that came close to accusing the U.S. government of negligence in their support 
of Spain’s legal rule:  
When the Government of the United States shall at once be convinced of our being 
in the right, and when that honest conviction shall in some manner be made public, 
but little more will be required in order that all those in Cuba who are not merely 
striving to accomplish the total ruin of the beautiful country in which they were 
born, being then hopeless of outside help and powerless by themselves, will lay 
down their arms.
51
 
 
Minister de Lôme’s reply thus combined to disappoint Olney’s hopes both for an 
immediate change in Spanish policy in Cuba and for any prospect of cooperation between 
the United States and Spain to bring about change in the future. Of more interest than a 
fairly predictable insistence on maintaining established policy by a Spanish regime that had 
long since resorted to stubbornness in the face of a problem that could not be solved to its 
liking is the fact that the June 4 reply also made use of the Cleveland administration’s own 
predilection for legality in its argument against offering the rebels reforms. In his letter of 
April 4 Olney had called the question of whether the rebels could be legally considered 
belligerents “immaterial” on the grounds that the only reason why they could not be was 
that they had not established a central government.
52
 Olney’s point had been that, even if 
the rebels were not legally belligerents, they were militarily powerful enough to warrant an 
attempt at a negotiated peace. De Lôme, however, insisted that the rebel’s inability to form 
a central government was anything but immaterial since it demonstrated that they were not 
in a position to negotiate political reforms and would not be capable of enacting any that 
they were offered.
53
 Hammering his point home, he also noted that “their systematic 
campaign of destruction against all the industries on the island ... keep them without the 
pale of the universally recognized rules of international law.” Not only was Minister de 
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Lôme rejecting Cleveland and Olney’s proposal, he was also employing the legal 
framework that had been such a vital part of their foreign policymaking to fundamentally 
question their actions. 
 The hope of working with Spain to bring about a conclusion to the conflict in Cuba 
had been dashed and the appointment of Fitzhugh Lee proved to be equally disappointing. 
The new Consul-General had taken to his work enthusiastically, but it quickly became 
apparent to Cleveland and Olney that their man in Havana was not working to their 
agenda. In June Lee’s dispatches became increasingly enthusiastic in their advocacy of 
U.S. intervention in Cuba with the ultimate goal of annexation. His reports to the War 
Department proved similarly lacking in useful detail, but enthusiastic in their suggestions 
of how the United States might seek to benefit from the conflict.
54
 This prompted Olney to 
call the wayward consul back to his duties. In a lengthy instruction written on June 29 
Olney called attention to the fact that Lee had not left the confines of Havana. Reminding 
him that the State Department required more from him than simple representation with the 
Spanish authorities, Olney wrote “it is quite material to ascertain what sort of civil 
government and administration, if any, prevail in that large part of the island which is 
under the control of the insurgents.”55 What followed left no doubt that the Secretary was 
unhappy with Lee’s efforts to that date. In rapid succession Olney listed twelve questions 
relating to the rebel government. These questions ranged widely from simply establishing 
whether any de facto government existed - and, if so, where it met - to seeking to ascertain 
whether the government was enforcing and administering the law, collecting taxes, and 
delivering the mail. For Olney to not simply request more information, but to painstakingly 
list all of the questions his subordinate was not answering was an unmistakable rebuke to 
Lee and an order to focus on the task in hand and leave policymaking to Washington. It 
may even be that Olney was seeking to force Lee to leave the confines of Havana in order 
to remove the temptation and opportunity to meddle in matters of policy. Whatever the 
Secretary of State’s exact objectives they were not fulfilled; Lee’s unwanted suggestions of 
intervention – perhaps in the form of the purchase of the island from Spain by the United 
States – continued to arrive. By the second week of July the consul was reporting that 
feelings were running high in Havana and recommended that the U.S. government offer to 
buy the island and, if refused, declare Cuban independence.
56
 In preparation for this, Lee 
recommended stationing a warship at Key West, Florida, from where it could be rapidly 
deployed at the consul-general’s request. As Eggert notes, this proposal raised troubling 
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memories of Minister Stevens’ actions in Hawaii in 1893, but even without that precedent 
it was never likely to prove popular with Cleveland or his advisors. On July 14 Olney 
reluctantly wrote to Secretary of the Navy Hilary A. Herbert asking for his views on Lee’s 
proposal.
57
 On the same date Olney mentioned the matter in a letter to Cleveland who had 
left Washington for his summer house at Buzzard’s Bay, Massachusetts.58 Both letters 
informed their readers – in nearly identical phrases – that “at first blush” Olney was not in 
favour the plan and clearly he did not require a great deal of convincing that his first blush 
was correct since his reply to Lee was dispatched without waiting for Cleveland to 
comment. In a reply that carefully avoided the subject of Lee seeking to gain direct control 
over a warship, Olney was still pointed enough in his reasoning to leave little doubt as to 
his low opinion of the scheme. Informing the consul that the U.S.S. Maine – “which is far 
more powerful than any vessel the Spanish fleet have” – was already stationed at Key West 
and that the Navy could assemble a sufficient fleet to command the waters around Cuba in 
a matter of days, he closed with an observation that demonstrated the administration’s 
position while also bordering on sarcasm by suggesting that the Spanish navy should have 
little trouble providing security since the rebels had no navy.
59
 
 Although Olney did not wait to hear Cleveland’s views before replying to Lee they 
are still of interest for what they tell us of the President’s thinking in the summer of 1896. 
On July 13 a letter to Olney ranging across a wide variety of subjects, both foreign and 
domestic, had included the statement “I am thinking a great deal about Cuba but am as far 
as ever from seeing the place where we can get in.”60 His reply to Olney’s reporting of 
Lee’s proposal demonstrated that this search for options was genuine and that the President 
was indeed taking a variety of suggestions seriously: 
I am a little surprised at Consul General Lee’s dispatch. He seems to have fallen 
into the style of rolling intervention like a sweet morsel under his tongue. I do not 
think the purchase plan would suit at all though it is perhaps worth thinking of. 
Many of the fairest talkers in favor of intervening (Sherman for instance) are 
opposed to incorporating the country into the United States system and I am afraid 
it would be entering upon dangerous ground. It would seem absurd for us to buy the 
Island and present it to the people now inhabiting it, and put its government and 
management in their hands.
61
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Clearly Cleveland was unimpressed by the consul-general’s conduct, but he was not 
dismissing his ideas – all of which had been proposed by others in Washington or the press 
before – out of hand. This brief extract alone demonstrates the plethora of competing 
voices which Cleveland believed he had to satisfy; small wonder then that – with the 
President lacking a positive agenda of his own on Cuba – American policy reached 
stalemate. This dilemma was neatly illustrated by Cleveland’s direct response to Lee’s 
proposal: 
I do not like the suggestion of a Man of War &c though of course prudent 
measures might well be taken to provide in good faith for the safety of our people 
and interests in case Spain failed in that behalf; but I do not want now anything of 
that kind made a convenient excuse for trouble with Spain.
62
 
 
Cleveland, with impressive foresight, was concerned about the potential consequences of 
introducing American warships into the volatile situation in Cuba, even if it seems that his 
concern was more related to the potential insult to Spain than to any specific fear that the 
warship might itself become a flashpoint for conflict.
63
 That same volatility, however – 
coupled with the difficulty of obtaining reliable information from men like Lee who clearly 
had agendas of their own – made him wary of the risk to the safety of Americans in Cuba 
and unsure of how best to proceed. 
 
 Lee’s attempts to influence policy in the summer of 1896 had little long term effect, 
but they are indicative of a larger problem facing the Cleveland administration. 
Throughout his second term Cleveland and his advisors had attempted to develop a new 
template for American foreign policy, one based on non-interference, international law, 
and moral probity. In Cuba it became clear that their attempts to convince the broader 
public to follow them had failed. Fitzhugh Lee is a prime example of a key difficulty they 
faced in enacting the new policy: the need for reliable subordinates who could be trusted to 
follow orders from Washington without seeking to expound their own agendas either for 
personal gain or for the perceived benefit of the nation or their party. Lee – like many 
members of Congress and leaders of the press – had his own opinions on how best the 
situation in Cuba might be managed for the United States’ benefit. This in itself made him 
an unfortunate choice for the role Cleveland and Olney desired him to perform, but a 
greater problem was his eventual revelation to Olney that his proposals had been made 
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with a view to domestic political considerations.
64
 Failure to convince the country to 
follow them on matters of foreign policy was only a minor facet of a far greater problem 
facing the administration. By the summer of 1896 the continuing struggles of the American 
economy and the ongoing controversy over the methods adopted by Cleveland to counter it 
were hotly debated topics. More importantly for the President, his actions in forcing 
through the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act and in insisting on the introduction 
of a new tariff bill – then allowing it to become law without his signature after the bill was 
savaged by amendments – had lost him support in Congress and opened damaging fissures 
in the Democratic Party. These fissures had only deepened as Cleveland’s attempts to 
stabilise the economy and protect the position of gold as the basis for the currency 
continued in 1896. Since the economic disasters of 1893 commentators had been deeply 
concerned by the declining gold reserves in the U.S. Treasury with a particular fear that if 
the reserves fell below $100,000,000 it would cause lasting damage to investor confidence. 
In a bid to rebuild that confidence Cleveland authorised the sale of government bonds to 
investors. In all, four such sales took place, but the failure of the first two to stem the 
outflow of gold from the Treasury prompted a change of tactic. With public subscribers 
largely exhausted by the first two sales and a pressing need not just to restore the 
Treasury’s holdings, but to curtail future withdrawals, Cleveland opted to negotiate 
directly with the nation’s financial community in the hope of bringing in gold from 
overseas and gaining the bankers’ support in stabilising the Treasury. A third issue of 
$65,000,000 of bonds restored the gold reserve to above the $100,000,000 mark and ended 
gold exports to Europe, but when the financial syndicate who had bought the bonds almost 
instantly sold them on for a profit there were howls of protest from the Republican press as 
well as newspapers allied to the Populist movement of the South and West.
65
 When a 
fourth and final bond issue was made in February, 1896, Cleveland and Secretary of the 
Treasury Carlisle were determined not to repeat the public relations disaster of a year 
earlier and the bonds were sold by public subscription, but the damage to the Democratic 
Party was already done. The bond issues saved the gold reserve, but in a party increasingly 
split between those dedicated to a currency based on silver and those still loyal to gold 
Cleveland had opened himself to accusations that he was a creature of New York’s 
financiers and further alienated supporters of silver. The Democratic National Convention 
met in Chicago on July 7. By the time it had closed on July 11 any lingering hopes that 
Cleveland might be called upon to serve a third term of office had been dashed. Far worse, 
the man who was chosen to be the Democratic candidate for the 1896 Presidential election 
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was the charismatic young exponent of silver currency, William Jennings Bryan. Any 
doubt that his nomination was anything but a repudiation of Cleveland’s record was 
comprehensively dispelled by an election platform that “[damned] the administration and 
its works, virtually read Cleveland out of the party, condemned the administration’s 
monetary policy, ... [and] denounced ‘government by injunction,’”.66 Given the obvious 
fractures that had developed within the Democratic Party during Cleveland’s term in office 
it is a little odd that he himself seems to have been surprised by the development.
67
 He 
wrote to Olney that he was “so dazed on the political situation that I am in no condition for 
speech or thought on the subject.”68 Olney himself clearly suspected betrayal from within 
the administration stating that “The culmination of events at Chicago shows us what 
Secretary [of Agriculture] Morton has been doing all this time in that city. Doubtless he 
was one of the enthusiastic individuals who helped carry Bryan about on their shoulders.”69 
In this sense of betrayal, if not the specific allegation of it, he may well have been joined 
by Cleveland. Certainly the President was clearly both hurt and angered by the rejection, 
adopting a fatalist satisfaction in the troubles ahead for those who had wronged him: 
It is certainly an ill wind that blows no good to anyone. Has it occurred to 
you that in view of the outcome at Chicago no one can be fool enough to charge 
against this administration the disasters that await the Democratic party?
70
 
 
 The 1896 Democratic National Convention has long been seen as a pivotal moment 
in American political history for the changes it produced in the structure and balance of the 
Democratic Party. What has been less well acknowledged is that the repudiation of 
Cleveland’s record as President also resulted in the repudiation of his nascent plan for 
American foreign policy. In the summer of 1896 – and, indeed, throughout his second 
presidency to varying degrees – Cleveland found himself in a position where he was 
simultaneously losing out by attempting to implement a foreign policy that did not seek to 
garner him domestic political support and also battling with members of his own party – 
exemplified by Fitzhugh Lee, but also including members of Congress such as John T. 
Morgan – who had their own ideas on how American foreign policy should be conducted, 
sometimes for the benefit of the Democratic Party, sometimes for the benefit of their 
regions or themselves. It would be dramatically overstating the case, however, to suggest 
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that a more flexible approach to foreign policy might have saved Cleveland’s position on 
other matters. The fractures within the Democratic Party – always a coalition subject to 
internal contradictions due to its powerbases in the Northeast, South and Southwest – were 
far too serious, and the destabilising influence of the arguments over monetary policy and 
the tariff too strong, to be overcome by the relatively cosmetic benefits that might have 
been gained through foreign policy. Only by openly seeking to annex Cuba, and thus 
prompting war with Spain, might Cleveland have united his party and the nation behind 
him and neither prospect was guaranteed to win significant support from all sections of the 
party without alienating others (in particular the Eastern financiers that were virtually the 
only remaining constituency whose support the President could rely on). In any case, such 
policies were anathema to Cleveland personally. Ultimately, the Democratic National 
Convention resulted in the rejection of Cleveland’s template, but only as a secondary 
casualty to the rejection of his financial policies. 
 
 There have been few U.S. presidents, if any, who have found themselves in as weak 
a position politically as Grover Cleveland did in the final nine months of his second term. 
His period as a lame duck president began nearly four months before the presidential 
election of November, 1896, after the Democratic National Convention confirmed that, 
whatever the outcome of that election, the victor would not be seen as Cleveland’s political 
successor. It was only natural that this development affected the administration’s actions 
for the remainder of the term. Cleveland was presented with a variety of options. If he had 
had any designs on Cuban independence or annexation then he might have taken this lack 
of a successor as an opportunity to act decisively to secure it, in the knowledge that should 
it fail the next man in the White House would be left to pick up the pieces. Conversely he 
might have washed his hands of the entire affair knowing that there was nothing for him or 
his few remaining supporters to gain from any success and glad to be rid of a vexing 
problem. In the event he took neither option, but instead chose a middle course even if it 
veered more towards inaction than action. 
 There is no evidence to suggest that Cleveland ever seriously contemplated 
intervention against Spanish rule in Cuba. For the most part this can be attributed to his 
fundamental opposition to American interference in the affairs of others, but the continued 
cost of policing the United States’ shores against filibusters and the ongoing destruction of 
the island’s industry and agriculture meant that alternative solutions must have been open 
to consideration. One such solution – as presented by Fitzhugh Lee among others – was to 
purchase the island, but this option had been dismissed by Cleveland in July, 1896 – days 
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after the Democratic Convention – on the grounds that it would be “dangerous” for the 
U.S. to seek to integrate Cuba into its political system and “absurd” to buy the island and 
then present it to its inhabitants.
71
 Presumably the absurdity to which Cleveland referred 
was the notion of buying the island only to instantly give it away, but no less a reason for 
his reluctance to countenance such a move was the continuing failure of the Cuban rebels 
to establish a viable government. The lack of a stable governmental authority that Olney 
had acknowledged in his April 4 letter to de Lôme – and which the Spanish minister had 
subsequently seized upon in his reply – was not rectified in 1896. Instead the military 
commanders became even more dominant, ignoring the calls of civilian leaders and 
financial backers to end the campaign of destruction.
72
 In his Annual Message to Congress 
of 1896, Cleveland – already aware that new attempts were being made in Congress to 
force him to recognise Cuba’s independence – declared that the commander in chief of the 
rebel forces had demanded that the civilian government cease to make any attempt to 
exercise authority leaving it “a government merely on paper.”73  Outside the limited 
enclaves of Spanish rule, Cleveland declared, “the entire country is either given over to 
anarchy or is subject to the military occupation of one or the other party.” For Cleveland 
and Olney this was conclusive, international law did not justify the recognition of a 
military insurrection that lacked a civil authority capable of upholding the rule of law and 
any attempt at recognition would be recklessly irresponsible toward the Cuban population 
(and American investors) just as it had been in Brazil three years earlier. It may well be 
that, had Lee been able to categorically demonstrate that the rebels deserved American 
recognition, even Cleveland would have overcome his stand pat conservatism and granted 
it, but with fresh reports suggesting that, if anything, the insurgency in Cuba was becoming 
less worthy of such recognition that path was closed. Later in the annual message the 
President noted the various calls for recognition first of Cuba belligerency, then of full 
Cuban independence, but directly rejected them on the grounds that “imperfect and 
restricted as the Spanish government of the island may be, no other exists there”. In this 
instance the suggestion of buying the island was deemed “possibly worthy of 
consideration”, but accompanied by the caveat that there was no evidence that Spain was 
willing to sell. Whether this constituted a greater openness to the idea than had been 
displayed in July or simply a less frank appraisal of the difficulties is open to debate. 
Finally, Cleveland raised the possibility of an arbitrary intervention by the United States’ 
military forces to end the rebellion. He made no comment on the likelihood of an 
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American victory if the intervention, as seemed likely, resulted in war with Spain, but 
instead made a declaration that might have characterised the foreign policy of his entire 
second term: 
The United States has, nevertheless, a character to maintain as a nation, which 
plainly dictates that right and not might should be the rule of its conduct. Further, 
though the United States is not a nation to which peace is a necessity, it is in truth 
the most pacific of powers and desires nothing so much as to live in amity with all 
the world. Its own ample and diversified domains satisfy all possible longings for 
territory, preclude all dreams of conquest, and prevent any casting of covetous eyes 
upon neighbouring regions, however attractive. 
 
In their immediate context these words can be seen as Cleveland seeking to vindicate his 
position on Cuba, but in a larger sense they can also be viewed as a final attempt to present 
a vision for how the United States should utilise its new grown power. From a man who 
had often openly venerated the past in his formulation of foreign policy there are 
unmistakable echoes of Washington’s Farewell Address as, a century later, Cleveland 
sought to counsel the next generation of politicians on the direction the nation should take. 
 
The combination of the perceived unworthiness of the Cuban rebels to receive 
independence and the clear deficiencies in all of the obvious courses of action he might 
have taken suggests that Cleveland was not so much unwilling to act as paralysed by his 
own belief, best summed up by the statement from the letter of July 13 already quoted, that 
he could not “[see] the place where we can get in.”74 This is almost certainly the dominant 
factor in his reasoning on Cuba, but it is very possible that two other factors supported him 
in his decision not to act. The first is the simple fact that, as a President without even a 
potential political heir, he saw little incentive to begin a course of action which almost 
certainly would not reach fruition before he left office and therefore would potentially 
serve to provide the next occupant of the White House with a victory for which the 
Cleveland administration was unlikely to be credited. By contrast it might also be more 
charitably argued that, with time for decisive action rapidly running out before the end of 
his term in office, Cleveland was seeking to avoid setting the United States on any course 
that might have created difficulties for the next President. This might be to grant him too 
much credit, but the man known for his courageous honesty and probity may also have had 
personal reasons for not wishing to present the man who came after him with a situation 
from which they would wish to extract themselves. In both of his presidencies Cleveland 
had found some of his first acts to be reversing foreign policy positions set by his 
predecessor. Upon taking office in 1885 he withdrew the Frelinghuysen-Zavala Treaty 
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from Senate consideration as it formed an entangling alliance with Nicaragua and declined 
to send the Berlin Convention (which sought to maintain the Congo Basin as a neutral 
territory for international trade) to the Senate on the grounds that it bound the United States 
to uphold the neutrality of a “remote valley” thus constituting “an alliance whose 
responsibilities we are not in a position to assume”.75 Far more seriously, of course, 
Cleveland’s second term began with the decision to reverse the Harrison administration’s 
attempts to annex Hawaii in 1893. Both moves had forced Cleveland to begin his 
presidencies with a negative decision that was bound to alienate sections of Congress and 
the public and, in the case of Hawaii, left him with an unsolvable problem that lasted the 
better part of a year. It is quite possible that Cleveland considered that it would be in the 
best interests of the nation for him to ensure that such a volatile issue as Cuba did not 
become a similar impediment to the next President. Ultimately, though, the fact that 
President McKinley took over a year after his inauguration to act decisively on Cuba – 
during which time the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine in Havana harbour introduced a 
powerful impetus to act – would suggest that the difficulty of choosing how best to act was 
the major reason for delay. 
 From this we might conclude that Cleveland must have been tempted not to act at 
all on Cuba after the summer of 1896, but the final months of his presidency still saw some 
efforts to bring about a resolution. In July Cleveland accepted a request by the Spanish 
government that he make a new, stronger proclamation against filibusters although Olney’s 
concern at what he perceived as Spain’s suggesting policies to the U.S. President caused 
the request to be toned down before the final version was sent and therefore resulted in a 
proclamation which, while stronger than its predecessor of 1895, did not satisfy the 
Spanish government’s wishes.76 More significantly, the winter of 1896-97 saw a new effort 
to convince Spain to grant reforms in Cuban rule. This effort saw its clearest demonstration 
in the Annual Message to Congress of 1896 which Cleveland and Olney chose as the 
opportunity to apply fresh pressure to the Spanish government. It appears that the section 
of the message relating to Cuba was originally drafted by the Secretary of State before 
being polished by Cleveland. Several drafts exist in the Olney Papers that closely match 
the final message, but carry some significant differences which grant a fascinating insight 
into the Secretary’s thinking and Cleveland’s moderating influence. In the message’s final 
form direct pressure on Spain was limited to criticism of the Spanish government’s 
insistence that any negotiations be contingent on the rebels first laying down their arms and 
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the revelation that the United States had offered to guarantee any offer of reforms leading 
to autonomy and awaited Spain’s reply.77 Also significant was the fact that the message 
laid the administration’s chosen policy of reforms aimed at granting Cuba autonomy under 
Spanish sovereignty before the public and the press, simultaneously further increasing the 
pressure on Spain and forestalling the growing calls in Congress for the United States to 
directly intervene. Besides these revelations the message contained a strange mix of 
flattery and warnings to the Spanish government. Having declared that the need to 
maintain the United States’ high character as a nation prevented it from forcibly 
intervening to end the conflict the message proceeded to inform readers that, given the 
provocation of the rebellions of 1868-78 and 1895, “No other great power, it may safely be 
said, under circumstances of similar perplexity, would have manifested the same restraint 
and the same patient endurance.” It is interesting to observe here the strong correlation 
between this statement and Cleveland’s insistence that the United States showed restraint 
in its dealings with Hawaii in 1893. Once again Cleveland’s policy was not simply based 
upon the assumption that resisting the temptation to intervene for American gain was the 
best policy, but that the simple act of resisting that temptation was in itself an admirable 
act. Having praised the noble self-restraint of the United States the annual message 
continued with a rather strange salute to Spain in the form of a declaration of the 
continuing respect and regard of the American people to Spain due to their role in the 
discovery of the Western Hemisphere and “the great qualities of the Spanish people” 
including their patriotism and their chivalry. One can only assume that such flattery – 
which, considering the actions of Congress and the American press, not to mention the fact 
that President had stated previously that the American people naturally supported any 
people who struggled for “better and freer government”, was clearly not well supported by 
fact – was hoped to make Spain more pliable to Cleveland’s request. This interpretation is 
supported by the President’s salute to “the cheerful resolution with which vast bodies of 
men are sent across thousands of miles of ocean and an enormous debt accumulated that 
the costly possession of the gem of the Antilles may still hold its place in the Spanish 
crown” – a pointed reminder that the war in Cuba was damaging Spain almost as much as 
it was damaging the island. 
 Presumably it was hoped that such flattery and reminders of the United States good 
faith would induce the Spanish government to see reason, but Cleveland and Olney also 
offered a more concrete incentive to seek to bring matters to a resolution. The message 
declared that, while the United States had shown restraint and was offering its good offices 
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to help secure a resolution, there could be no guarantee that this would continue 
indefinitely. The bleak picture of destruction presented earlier in the message carried the 
obvious connotation that the United States was concerned for its trade and investments; 
that being the case Spain had to show evidence that it could solve the conflict by its own 
means or the United States would feel obliged to intervene. From the early drafts it appears 
that Olney wanted to make a bold statement of American intent with one suggestion being 
that progress needed to be evidenced by the New Year. Since this would have given Spain 
only three weeks to bring about a notable change it was never a realistic proposal and, 
either due to this fact or simply due to an unwillingness to pressure the Spanish 
government unnecessarily, the ultimatum was replaced by the warning that American 
patience had its limits.
78
 
 Also considered, but ultimately rejected was a reference to the Monroe Doctrine. It 
is unclear who made the decision not to raise the subject of the Monroe Doctrine or why, 
but it would be consistent with Cleveland’s long-standing reluctance to invoke a topic 
which he felt he did not completely understand. It is also indicative of a dilemma which 
confronted the administration after their aggressive handling of the Venezuelan Border 
Dispute: having invoked the Monroe Doctrine once in relation to a European power’s 
actions in the American hemisphere, were they now obliged to do so again? Some 
members of the public clearly believed that the forceful stand taken on Venezuela should 
be adopted again in relation to Cuba - an editor of a German-language newspaper wrote to 
Cleveland during Congress’ first flurry of resolution drafting in the spring of 1896 
declaring that “Your prompt and decisive course in the Venezuela matter which electrified 
this whole nation from sea to sea is undoubtedly the cause of this sentiment.”79 For many 
of those similarly electrified - as well as politicians and newspaper editors who agreed with 
them - the Monroe Doctrine appeared to be a convenient tool for justifying American 
engagement in Cuba while the conflict itself simultaneously formed an opportunity to 
confirm the United States’ new assertive policy against interference in the affairs of the 
Americas. For Cleveland, however, neither of these perceived benefits was desirable. For 
the legally-minded President the Monroe Doctrine conferred upon the United States no 
right to interfere since the Spanish colony of Cuba predated the doctrine and Spain’s 
actions there were clearly not designed to interfere with independent American states. 
Olney’s corollary and the declaration that “the United States is practically sovereign on 
this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition” did 
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potentially raise the possibility that the U.S. would intervene in any matter it chose, but 
clearly Cleveland was not keen to do so in a situation from which he saw little potential 
benefit to the United States.  
Invoking the Monroe Doctrine, therefore, was a step too far in December, 1896, but 
the annual message still carried a warning to the Spanish government. While the President 
had decided against presenting Spain with an ultimatum his annual message still made a 
firm declaration that this situation could not be counted on to continue indefinitely: 
It should be added that it can not be reasonably assumed that the hitherto 
expectant attitude of the United States will be indefinitely maintained. While we 
are anxious to accord all due respect to the sovereignty of Spain, we can not view 
the pending conflict in all its features and properly apprehend our inevitably close 
relations to it and its possible results without considering that by the course of 
events we may be drawn into such an unusual and unprecedented condition as will 
fix a limit to our patient waiting for Spain to end the contest, either alone and in her 
own way or with our friendly cooperation.  
 
 The warning was clear, but it was not as direct as it first appeared. With less than 
three months remaining in Cleveland’s term of office the Spanish government were 
undoubtedly aware that the likelihood of the lame duck president making a dramatic late 
shift in his policy was negligible. The warning can be taken at face value as a fear that 
future events might drag the United States into events unwillingly - a scenario which 
Cleveland obviously considered possible as demonstrated by his prescient reluctance to 
station a warship in Havana harbour at the request of Fitzhugh Lee - but it might also be 
argued that it formed a message to Spain. With the presidential election of the previous 
month having confirmed the return of the Republicans to the White House - on the basis of 
a platform that promised to be considerably less patient regarding affairs in Cuba - 
Cleveland and Olney were reminding their Spanish counterparts that they might never have 
a better opportunity to exploit the good offices of a sympathetic U.S. government in order 
to bring about a peaceful settlement. The message had repeatedly declared the wisdom of a 
policy that would bestow autonomy and the blessings of democracy on the Cuban people 
under “the most favorable conditions” - Spanish rule. Now it offered a reminder that a time 
was fast approaching when the American government might demand a more radical 
solution. This interpretation is supported by the paragraph immediately following the 
warning that events might draw the United States into the conflict which simultaneously 
warned Spain that if the situation degenerated to such a point that it “means nothing more 
than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the very subject-matter 
of the conflict” then “the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations” 
and also gave a thinly veiled message to the President’s successor and members of 
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Congress by suggesting that any action taken by the United States “should not be 
determined upon without giving careful heed to every consideration involving our honor 
and interest or the international duty we owe to Spain.” Once again Cleveland was 
attempting to balance the competing needs of national honour, international law, and 
human and economic loss. 
 On that note, one final aspect of the Annual Message of 1896 that deserves mention 
is the general lack of discussion of the humanitarian costs of the Cuban conflict. 
Cleveland’s message contained almost no reference to the human suffering resulting from 
the destruction of property, with only brief mention of the reconcentrado policy which 
would famously become the focus of much press attention in the United States in the build 
up to the War of 1898. What mention there was of the new policy focused exclusively on 
the extra damage the removal of the rural population from the countryside would cause to 
the island’s agricultural productivity and was followed by a paragraph relating the 
estimated level of financial investment by American capital in Cuba and the volume of 
trade between the two. Even when declaring the reason for the United States’ interest in the 
conflict the key concern was for the destruction of the island and its resources and financial 
concerns were at the root of the matter:  
The spectacle of the utter ruin of an adjoining country, by nature one of the most 
fertile and charming on the globe, would engage the serious attention of the 
Government and people of the United States in any circumstances. In point of fact, 
they have a concern with it which is by no means of a wholly sentimental or 
philanthropic character. It lies so near to us as to be hardly separated from our 
territory. Our actual pecuniary interest in it is second only to that of the people and 
Government of Spain.  
 
While Cleveland made numerous references to the wanton plunder and destruction of the 
island by forces loyal to both sides it is clear that for him the United States’ involvement in 
the conflict was still firmly a financial matter. 
In truth this interpretation is consistent with Cleveland’s established tendency to 
place issues of law and the protection of personal property over more human questions, but 
an argument can be made for a more sympathetic interpretation. Writing nearly 15 years 
after the event, Richard Watson Gilder suggested that the President was deeply concerned 
by the humanitarian costs of the conflict. He described a discussion he had had with 
Cleveland, during a trip that took place between July 31 and August 4, 1896:  
The President went on to tell me all the difficulties of the position. He was willing 
to go a great way in insisting upon humanity - in fact, he feared there were some 
outrages on both sides, if the truth were known. But in a general way he felt it 
incumbent upon him to be extremely careful, as the public mind seemed to be in an 
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inflammable state and a spark might kindle a conflagration. He said there seemed to 
be an epidemic of insanity in the country just at this time.
80
 
 
While doing little to further his reputation for courageously doing what was right over 
what was politically expedient, the theory that Cleveland was afraid to truly speak his mind 
on the humanitarian cost of the war for fear of creating a public demand for intervention 
that he simply could not ignore is a plausible one. 
This interpretation is supported by another foreign policy incident which saw 
Cleveland come under pressure from Congress and the press to intervene on humanitarian 
grounds. Between the autumn of 1894 and August, 1896, the Armenian Christian 
community in the Ottoman Empire was subjected to a series of attacks from both regular 
troops and Kurdish militia acting with the support of the Ottoman government.
81
 With 
American missionary societies active in the region the incident was of great interest in the 
United States and was immediately raised Congress. As news of the attacks trickled back 
to the United States, Republican Senator George Frisbie Hoar responded by introducing a 
resolution on the first day of the Senate’s new session calling on the President to provide 
any information he had on the situation in Turkey and asking him whether he intended to 
protest or coordinate his actions with other Christian nations. Cleveland – struggling with 
confused reports from the diplomats in the region – replied that he only knew what he read 
in the newspapers.
82
 Neither Cleveland nor Secretary of State Gresham were keen to 
involve the United States in what they perceived to be a European matter and when an 
invitation was received to have an American consul join a Turkish commission 
investigating the violence it was first rejected and then reluctantly accepted at the request 
of Great Britain, perhaps as a result of the evident concern of some in Congress. When the 
Sultan refused a proposal to have a consul accompany the commission without 
participating officially a secretly relieved Gresham issued only a token complaint.
83
 In a 
personal letter to Ambassador Thomas F. Bayard in London Gresham declared that, with 
Britain, France and Russia willing to conduct the investigation, the United States was 
“better out of the matter than in it.”84 
The reasoning behind Cleveland and Gresham’s reluctance to involve the United 
States in a European problem was explained in his Annual Messages of 1895 and 1896. In 
the former the President declared that his aim was the protection of American missionaries 
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and their property while also seeking to reassure his audience that the offer to participate in 
the investigation was “in no sense meant as a gratuitous entanglement of the United States 
in the so-called Eastern question”.85 A year later the focus was again placed on the possible 
danger to American citizens in the region, but the administration’s hesitation in intervening 
directly was justified on the grounds that it might interrupt the plans of “the great nations” 
of Europe who held the “exclusive right” to intervene in Turkey.86 While the 
administration did consider sending warships to Constantinople – resulting in a strange 
inversion of gunship diplomacy whereby Olney mulled over the legality of the United 
States’ dispatching naval vessels to the region – it seems clear that Cleveland’s thinking 
was still dominated by the Monroe Doctrine’s division of the world into separate European 
and American spheres of influence.
87
 Throughout the crisis there was a marked willingness 
to rely on British vessels to defend American citizens in an emergency. 
Cleveland’s caution was not widely shared in the United States. In an article in 
Forum magazine of March, 1895, entitled ‘Our Blundering Foreign Policy’ Henry Cabot 
Lodge declared the administration’s half-hearted offer of participation to be “enough to be 
laughed at and too little to be effective.”88 When the announcement of political reforms by 
the Sultan as a result of the findings of the investigatory commission led to renewed 
attacks against Armenians in September, the New York Times ran the headline ‘Armenian 
Holocaust’.89 Much of the American press was united in calling for urgent action on behalf 
of the Armenians, joined by the Armenian immigrant community centred in New England 
and phil-Armenic societies across the nation.
90
 Inspired by such rhetoric and a steady flow 
of stories of the atrocities being committed against Armenian civilians, the American 
public rallied to the cause and charitable societies for relief of the victims sprang up in 
practically every major city with the fledgling American Red Cross proving instrumental in 
the distribution of the aid received.
91
 In a nation well-used to racial stereotypes the 
situation quickly came to be viewed as a clash between brutal heathen Turks and oppressed 
Christian Armenians. In addition to the Armenian voices calling for action the 
administration was also receiving pressure from missionary groups seeking protection both 
for their activists overseas and for the Armenian Christians. These groups provided a 
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double headache for the Cleveland administration as they were simultaneously the source 
of the most detailed accounts of the situation unfolding within the Ottoman Empire and 
also the American citizens most in need of protection - not least because they often 
employed Armenian Christians in mission schools, thus increasing the distrust of Muslim 
communities in the region. Much of Cleveland’s information on conditions in the Empire 
came from his communications with John Stewart Kennedy, a wealthy New York 
philanthropist who was in direct contact with several missionary leaders in Anatolia. While 
Kennedy himself was often remarkably restrained in his calls for American intervention, 
he forwarded several letters from missionaries on the scene and strongly supported their 
requests for American warships to be sent to the region. Understandably, given this weight 
of public interest, the crisis impacted on domestic politics within the United States. With 
their state containing one of the largest concentrations of Armenian immigrants the 
involvement of Senators Hoar and Lodge from Massachusetts was not coincidental, but the 
general level of interest in the situation was demonstrated by bipartisan calls for action in 
Congress. A sign of the attention gained by the matter was the inclusion by William 
McKinley of saving the Armenians as one of three foreign policy priorities in his election 
platform of 1896 - alongside annexing Hawaii and securing Cuban independence from 
Spain.
92
 In his Annual Message of 1896 Cleveland abandoned the traditional alphabetical 
format to discuss the Turkish situation before any other, including the situation in Cuba. 
Although Cleveland declined to bring direct American pressure on the Turkish 
government, events in 1896 did conspire to bring the worst of the massacres to an end. 
When Armenian radicals, seeking to force European intervention, occupied the Imperial 
Ottoman Bank in Constantinople on August 26, organised mobs – apparently with the 
backing of the Turkish police – attacked the capital’s Armenian community, killing 
between 5,000 and 6,000 people in 24 hours.
93
 Once again the European governments 
pressured the Sultan to restore order and the worst violence subsided for the next two 
decades. Politically, however, damage had already been done for Cleveland. Faced by 
stories of atrocities carried out against Christians by an Islamic nation he had resisted calls 
to act, falling back on older prerogatives like the Monroe Doctrine and deferring to the 
European powers. As would be the case in Cuba, Cleveland’s policy was correct in a 
strictly legal sense, but it was considered insufficient by the majority in the more emotive 
press and was exploited in Congress. Ultimately, it was not the end of the violence which 
brought respite to the Cleveland administration over Armenia. By the summer of 1896 
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interest in the crisis had subsided, but it had only done so because the unfolding situation 
much closer to home in Cuba had taken its place. 
 
 The annual message of 1896 demonstrated that President Cleveland did not believe 
that his lame duck status meant that he could simple ignore the issue of Cuba and that he 
still hoped that Spain might be convinced to accept his help in granting political reforms in 
order to bring the rebellion to an end. As the administration entered its final weeks in 1897 
further initiatives were still being made. Olney dispatched Oscar B. Stillman, former 
manager of the East Boston Sugar Refining Company, to the island to gauge the opinion of 
the rebel leaders, receiving the promising news that the majority – with the notable 
exception of Maximo Gomez, the rebel’s military commander and de facto leader by 1897 
– were in favour of autonomy guaranteed by the United States. Olney brokered meetings 
between Stillman and Minister de Lôme at the end of January and may well have used 
negotiations for a new commercial treaty between Spain and the United States as a further 
opportunity to apply pressure to the Spanish government. In February the reforms were 
finally announced, but despite satisfying the Cleveland administration they proved 
insufficient to win the backing of the insurgents in Cuba.
94
  
 Cleveland and Olney were not alone in hoping that the Cuban revolution might be 
settled before the end of their time in office. In February, 1897, Fitzhugh Lee once again 
began agitating for American intervention. The initial cause was the death in Spanish 
custody of a naturalised American citizen named Ricardo Ruiz who, Lee reported, had 
been kept in solitary confinement for 315 hours before dying from a head injury which was 
either self-inflicted due to madness brought on by his incarceration or the result of a 
beating delivered by his captors. Declaring Ruiz to be innocent of the charges made against 
him or of any involvement in the insurrection, Lee suggested that the State Department 
should immediately demand that the Spanish authorities release all American citizens 
imprisoned in Cuba.
95
 Olney was undoubtedly concerned by the case – instructing Lee to 
demand an official investigation from the Governor-General while informing him the State 
Department would be applying pressure in Madrid – but when the Consul-General reported 
that he had discovered another American, Charles Scott, who had been held 
incommunicado for 264 hours with the words “Cannot stand another Ruiz murder and have 
demanded his release” followed by a query as to the number of American warships 
stationed at Key West, Florida, that might be dispatched to sustain the demand if it was 
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refused, the Secretary of State’s patience evaporated.96 Olney first upbraided Lee for his 
failure to protect Ruiz before his death and then queried whether Ruiz’s American 
citizenship was valid before reminding the Consul-General that any protection from the 
United States was forfeited by the dead man’s return to permanent residence in Cuba, the 
exact facts of which he requested Lee to provide.
97
 At last Olney called Lee to task directly 
with the questions “Will you explain further what you mean by suggestion that demand by 
now made for release of all Americans imprisoned in Cuba? Is it the idea that such 
demand, which must be refused, can be made hostile intervention or demonstration?” Once 
again the difference between the interpretation of Olney and Cleveland and that of Lee in 
how American power should be deployed in foreign affairs was clearly displayed as the 
Secretary of State declared “The United States makes demands only when prepared to 
enforce them and therefore only on assured grounds, and in the complete uncertainty as to 
the facts, the suggestion as to war-ships is most surprising.” While one might question 
whether the Cleveland administration always was prepared to enforce the demands it 
made, the demand for assured grounds and certain facts neatly sums up the foundations of 
their foreign policy. Chastened, Lee responded by defending his actions in relation to Ruiz 
and denied that he wanted to provoke a war, declaring that he had “Seen too much of it.”98 
Two days later the Consul-General went some way to admitting the reasons for his actions 
when he wrote “Nothing can prevent Cuban matter very soon settling itself. I am deeply 
interested that Administration should participate.”99 Like Olney and Cleveland, Lee hoped 
that the Cuban revolution might be concluded before the Democrats left the White House; 
unlike his political masters he was happy for matters to be settled by conflict between the 
United States and Spain and was not overly concerned over how that conflict might come 
about. Somewhat strangely given that they no longer needed to worry about losing friends 
in domestic politics Cleveland and Olney chose not to recall Lee from Havana, despite at 
least one and possibly two (if a cryptic reference to Olney holding the “remedy” in his 
hands if he did not approve Lee’s actions is construed as a challenge to the Secretary to 
sack him) suggestions by the Consul-General that he might be withdrawn if he did not 
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have their support.
100
 Nevins describes how the President met with the international lawyer 
Frederic R. Coudert and asked him to act as a special peace envoy to Spain in order to 
counteract the machinations of Americans, led by Lee, in Cuba who were seeking to bring 
about war.
101
 Despite this belief, Cleveland contented himself with merely warning 
President McKinley at his inauguration that Lee was untrustworthy. Why he chose to do so 
is unclear, perhaps he did not wish to present his successor with a vacant post at a time of 
critical uncertainty or perhaps he did not want to appear to be interfering with a personnel 
decision that rightly belonged to the incoming administration, but his pain that his advice 
was subsequently ignored is evident in a letter written to Olney shortly after the declaration 
of war against Spain in 1898 in which he described the new President as a victim of 
“amiable weakness” who had surrendered to the Senate and “given his confidence” to 
Lee.
102
 It was a bitter irony that a man who Cleveland himself had, through an error of 
judgement, appointed and who had practically come to personify the sort of buccaneering 
approach to foreign affairs that he had spent four years counselling against as President 
was still ensconced in a critical position when Cleveland’s vision of how the United States 
should conduct itself in relation to Cuba was categorically rejected by his successor in the 
spring of 1898. 
 
 While the administration’s attempts to broker a last minute settlement in Cuba 
eventually amounted to nothing, events taking place in domestic politics during the winter 
of 1896-97 held far greater long-term significance for the evolution of U.S. foreign policy. 
In the wake of Cleveland’s 1896 annual message members of both houses of Congress, 
disappointed that the message did not go further toward ending Spanish rule in Cuba, once 
again moved to apply pressure to the Executive. Senate leaders introduced a new resolution 
in mid-December; unlike the resolutions of the previous session the Cameron Resolution, 
as it became known, called directly for the recognition of Cuban independence by the 
United States. Also unlike the situation twelve months previously, the Resolution received 
the united backing of the administration’s opponents in both houses raising a real concern 
that it might be not only passed, but also sustained over a presidential veto. Faced by this 
determined challenge to the Executive’s authority, which risked unsettling foreign 
governments and provoking renewed anxieties on Wall Street, Olney made his response 
directly to the press. In a statement to newspapers he made clear that if the resolution was 
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passed it would “be regarded only as an expression of opinion by the eminent gentlemen 
who vote for it...” before going on to declare  
The power to recognize the so-called Republic of Cuba as an independent State 
rests exclusively with the Executive. A resolution on the subject by the Senate or 
by the House, by both bodies or by one, whether concurrent or joint, is inoperative 
as legislation, and is important only as advice of great weight, voluntarily tendered 
to the Executive, regarding the manner in which he shall exercise his Constitutional 
functions.
103
 
 
For all the respectful language, Olney was well aware of the gravity of this question. 
Despite disingenuously calling for the simultaneous offering of American good offices to 
achieve a peaceful settlement in Cuba as well as the recognition of Cuban independence by 
the United States, the supporters of the Cameron Resolution knew that any such 
recognition was highly likely to result in war between Spain and the USA.
104
 Such a series 
of events would have profound consequences for the future of American foreign policy: if 
the Cameron Resolution passed and the President was forced to act upon it then control 
over the nation’s foreign policy would be permanently altered, with the Executive bowing 
to the will of Congress. The seriousness with which the Secretary of State was treating this 
threat is evidenced by his decision to ask the Assistant Attorney General, E.B. Whitney, to 
prepare a brief on the subject of the control of foreign policy and the separation of powers. 
On December 26 Olney wrote an 8 page letter to Whitney setting out a detailed legal 
defence of Executive control based on the language of the Constitution itself, the debates 
surrounding its framing and adoption, state constitutions of the same period, and a century 
of judicial support and historical precedent.
105
 The fact that Olney had this defence 
prepared – obviously devoting serious attention to it himself – and that his immediate 
response to the proposal of the resolution was directed at the press clearly demonstrate that 
he believed that a serious question was at stake and that public opinion – which had not 
been widely acknowledged in the administration’s decision making relating to Cuba before 
– would potentially be decisive. In the event, despite Olney preparing an elaborate legal 
defence in readiness for a Congressional assault on Executive power, the administration’s 
opponents in the Senate chose not to dispute the point and the resolution did not come to a 
vote. With Cleveland’s term rapidly drawing to a close, and the prospect of a more 
agreeable occupant of the White House in William McKinley, calmer heads – perhaps 
cognisant of a surge of approval for Olney’s stance in the press – once again prevailed to 
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avoid a constitutional crisis.
106
 Thus Olney asserted executive power in defence of a 
minimalist foreign policy from attacks by the legislature and, in doing so, somewhat 
ironically helped to secure for the president the power to lead policy which would be so 
vital for the development and enacting of the activist foreign policies of Cleveland’s 20th 
Century successors. 
 This victory saved the administration from a final challenge to its authority, but it 
did not end debate on the subject entirely. One speech in the Senate is worth noting simply 
for the illustration it provides of the contrast between the methods and rhetoric of the 
administration and of their opponents. The Cameron Resolution had cited a great deal of 
historical precedent in Europe and the Americas to justify American interference in a war 
of independence – ignoring the fact that Cleveland had stated in his Annual Message that 
the lack of a viable rebel government meant that legally it could not be regarded as 
anything more than an insurrection. It had also attempted to use the Monroe Doctrine as 
justification for the involvement of the United States in the affairs of an American 
republic, no matter how embryonic it may be. On January 26, 1897, the New York Times 
reported a speech in support of the Cameron Resolution delivered on the Senate floor by 
Senator David Turpie, a Democrat from Indiana.
107
 In this speech Turpie made a series of 
claims that far outdid the already inventive reasoning of the Resolution itself, among them 
that, since the 1821 treaty that had ceded Florida to the United States had contained a 
clause prohibiting Spain from selling Cuba to another European power, Spain’s title to 
Cuba was not total and so the Spanish government could not now deny Cuba’s people their 
claim of independence; that Congress’ power over commerce and control of the process 
whereby new states were admitted to the Union gave it the authority to recognise new 
nations; and that Spain herself had tacitly acknowledged the rebels as belligerents by 
fighting them – a claim which, while sound in a literal sense, was hardly well-founded in 
international law. With the Cameron Resolution already being gently pushed to one side by 
Senate leaders, Turpie’s speech is of no significance in itself, but it is indicative of the kind 
of creative reasoning which Cleveland and Olney’s insistence on a foreign policy founded 
upon legality utterly rejected. The fact that these ideas were being spoken by a Democrat 
was a double blow; by the winter of 1896-97 foreign affairs had become practically the 
only area of policy in which the administration could still be considered to be in sole 
control, but the inauguration of a new President on March 4, 1897, was likely to herald a 
new policy direction and Cleveland’s own party would not be defending his ideas in 
opposition. 
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 Among the various factors affecting the Cleveland administration’s handling of the 
Cuban revolution of 1895-98 one of the most significant was the disagreements it 
provoked with Congress over who controlled the direction of U.S. foreign policy. While a 
full constitutional crisis was avoided, the President’s authority was challenged on several 
occasions and the stubborn refusal to bow to the will of Congress undoubtedly played a 
part in the repudiation of Cleveland by his own party in the Democratic National 
Convention of 1896. This being so, it is interesting to observe that, in one significant 
respect, Cleveland, Olney and Gresham were not completely out of step with their 
Congressional opponents. Despite initial desires not to interfere with Spanish internal 
affairs, the course of events over two years showed an increasing willingness to do so. The 
administration was criticised not for the actions that it made, but for those it did not make, 
and the strong rhetoric of the annual message of 1896 was widely applauded even if many 
in Congress did not believe it went far enough. If anything, the message of the Cuban 
revolution was that the United States considered itself entitled to meddle in Cuban affairs 
and – as both the 1895 and 1896 annual messages demonstrated multiple times – Cleveland 
and Olney were not immune from such a belief. 
 It is clear that the administration’s policy was too passive to hold the support of 
many members of Congress, despite sharing some preconceptions with the more active 
stance they proposed. In this respect Cuba marks both the culmination of Grover 
Cleveland’s foreign policy and also its point of collapse. Between February, 1895, and 
March, 1897, the Cleveland administration maintained a calm and steady posture in the 
face of an extremely volatile situation. In so doing, it has been suggested, they may have 
helped to preserve peace by “[damping] the jingoism raging about them.”108 Beyond this, 
however, the legalist framework that Cleveland, Gresham and Olney had attempted to 
apply throughout their time in office must be considered a failure in regard to Cuba. In the 
immediate case of the revolution itself the legalist policy once again provided a convenient 
template for the initial American response to the insurrection. As in Brazil in 1893, the 
studious application of international law allowed the administration to categorically reject 
any claims to belligerent status held by the rebels and undoubtedly Cleveland derived some 
satisfaction from the gradual revelation that, far from establishing a functioning 
governmental apparatus, the rebels’ civilian government was increasingly undermined by 
the military throughout 1896. However, while the administration’s decisions may have 
been proven to be justified in hindsight, the framework within which those decisions were 
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taken offered no assistance in bringing about a resolution to the problem. This was the key 
flaw in the legalist template: if the situation demanded American neutrality then the 
administration’s options in bringing matters to a resolution were extremely limited. In both 
the Brazilian Naval Revolt and the Sino-Japanese War it had been possible to maintain a 
policy of neutrality since both conflicts resolved themselves relatively quickly and without 
impacting heavily on public opinion in the United States – even if popular support for 
Japan did cause the administration some discomfort in the latter case. In Cuba Cleveland 
and Olney were confronted with a conflict that was both seemingly never-ending – since 
neither the rebels nor the Spanish government had the military might to defeat the other – 
and also of enormous popular interest due to the island’s proximity to the United States 
and the strong human and economic ties between the two. President McKinley would 
ultimately confront this issue by taking the nation to war, but even he did not rush into war 
and in fact followed a policy not dissimilar to Cleveland’s for over a year. Indeed, his War 
Message of April 11, 1898, is notable for its expression of the exact dilemma that had 
faced Cleveland between acting within the constraints of international law and intervening 
in order to end the destruction and loss of life. It is notable though that McKinley’s War 
Message placed a considerably greater emphasis on the humanitarian costs of the rebellion, 
while also directly arguing that “victory for either side seems impracticable.”109 This 
difference would prove crucial. Where Cleveland had repeatedly refused to intervene on 
the grounds that it constituted a breach of Spain’s sovereign rights, McKinley used the 
humanitarian argument to justify intervention as beneficial both to Spain and Cuba in 
ending the violence.
110
 McKinley thus was willing to override the constraints of 
international law on behalf of a higher duty to humanity. This was by no means the only 
reason McKinley declared to justify war – not to mention those reasons which remained 
undeclared – but it is an important difference between his stated policy and that of 
Cleveland while its popularity indicates that popular sentiment had clearly settled behind 
factors that transcended the bounds of the law. 
Welch has argued that “Cleveland’s Cuban policy was deeply flawed by an anti-
Cuban bias.”111 This is open to debate: undoubtedly Cleveland and Olney distrusted the 
rebels and were deeply troubled by their policy of destroying the island’s agricultural and 
industrial infrastructure. Indeed, in 1898, Cleveland described them as “the most inhuman 
and barbarous cut-throats in the world”.112 However, it might be fairer to suggest that both 
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men were less biased against the rebels than distrustful of any situation which might result 
in widespread disorder. Olney, in particular, certainly contemplated the prospect of a civil 
war fought along racial lines in the wake of a Spanish withdrawal. Beyond this, though, the 
administration’s methods may give an unfair impression of bias against the rebel 
leadership. The decisions to concentrate efforts at achieving a settlement on negotiations 
with the Spanish government and the refusal to acknowledge rebel belligerency should not 
be taken as signs of anti-Cuban bias, but purely as the result of the legalist foreign policy 
which necessitated working with the sovereign power and did not allow interaction with 
the rebels after their failure to establish a viable government. It could also be reasonably 
suggested that the failure to establish a viable government may have itself resulted in the 
ever-conservative President, who was never likely to look kindly upon those who attacked 
the existing social order without attempting to create one of their own, hardening his stance 
against the rebels. Welch also states that “[n]either Cleveland nor Secretary Olney 
understood the sources and strength of Cuban nationalism,” and in this case he is 
undeniably correct.
113
 Having refused to intervene either directly with American force or 
indirectly through the recognition of Cuban belligerency, Cleveland fell back on a plan for 
political reforms aimed at granting autonomy which was always unlikely to gain the 
approval of the rebels and became less likely to do so as the conflict continued. Thus the 
administration found itself trapped by its own methods: unwilling to intervene and unable 
to play the honest broker between two irreconcilable opponents. 
 By comparison, the administration’s domestic opponents were much freer in their 
approach to policymaking. For the most part they were far less concerned than the 
President by the niceties of international law and even by the prospect of war. The latter 
possibility was clearly a major concern for Cleveland and Olney – as shown by their 
efforts to rein in Fitzhugh Lee and quash his suggestions for stationing warships in Cuban 
waters – but the fear was considerably more complex than simple anxiety at the possibility 
of American defeat. As Cleveland stated in a letter to Olney at the outbreak of the War of 
1898  
My only relief from the sick feeling which these thoughts induce consists ... in the 
hope, almost amounting expectation, that we shall find Spain so weak and 
inefficient that the war will be short and that the result may not be much worse than 
a depreciation of national standing before the world abroad, and at home - - 
demoralization of our peoples [sic] character, much demagogy and humbug, great 
additions to our public burdens and the exposure of scandalous operations.
114
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From a modern viewpoint this reluctance to go to war, even when victory seemed likely 
from the outset, is admirable, but popular opinion of the 1890s did not necessarily agree. 
While the administration’s policy gradually evolved to the extent where the annual 
message of December 1896 contained a warning that American neutrality could not be 
guaranteed to continue indefinitely, the wishes of Congress – as expressed in the 
resolutions debated in the House and the Senate – were always for an entirely different 
level of action. Perhaps the most striking example of this difference is that while the 
wisdom of Cleveland’s refusal to acknowledge Cuban belligerency on the grounds that 
they had not proven their capacity for self-governance was born out by the assumption of 
governmental functions by the rebel military the Cameron Resolution sought to proclaim 
Cuban independence in the winter of 1896-97 without regard to the legal niceties of such a 
move (or, for that matter, the fate of the Cuban people who would be left with a military 
dictatorship of dubious governmental capacity). Thus Cuba marks not simply a failure of 
the legalist approach to foreign policy, but also its repudiation. As Senators rejected such a 
constricted approach to policymaking, the Democratic party rejected Cleveland and 
disowned his works. Foreign policy issues only played a relatively minor role in this 
decision, but the legalist approach to foreign policy was one of the resultant casualties 
since no one would remain to carry on its adaptation and evolution even in opposition. 
 The question is often asked whether Cleveland would have gone to war in 1898 had 
he still been President. Leaving aside the combination of factors that rendered any such 
possibility hugely unlikely, the question is unhelpful for other reasons. A major factor in 
the outbreak of war was the destruction of the U.S.S. Maine in Havana harbour on 
February 15, 1898, which a subsequent investigation blamed on a Spanish mine. This 
calamity was precisely what Cleveland had resolutely avoided by refusing to send a 
warship to Cuba in the previous two years. Without that trigger it seems highly unlikely 
that Cleveland would have changed his resolute stance against what he considered to be 
illegal intervention while there is little to suggest that the rebels would alter their policies 
sufficiently to justify a recognition of their belligerency. Indeed, even if we were to include 
the destruction of the Maine in such a scenario it may not have been sufficient to bring 
about war since as late as March 27, 1898, Cleveland wrote “[n]otwithstanding warlike 
indications, I cannot rid myself of the belief that war will be averted. There would be 
infinitely more credit and political capital in avoiding war when so imminent than to carry 
it on even well.”115 The President’s hope that the insurgents might be convinced to accept 
political reforms as a basis for a peace settlement was naive in 1897, but there was little 
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else that he could do within his own template for action. It is doubtful, therefore, that 
Cleveland would have taken the United States to war, but how the conflict would have 
been resolved under such circumstances is unknowable. By contrast, it is often forgotten 
that Cleveland’s policy towards Cuba presented a useful foundation for President 
McKinley for his first year in office. It was not lost on Cleveland who ruefully noted the 
irony in a letter to Olney: “How differently the present administration is treated though 
pursuing the same policy as the last.”116 Similarly, on February 16, 1898, he wrote that “if 
the President’s back bone holds out our Cuban policy will I believe be fully justified”.117 
Ultimately Cleveland’s verdict on McKinley – a victim of “amiable weakness” – would 
place him as a critic of his successor’s character in a debate which has continued among 
historians for over a century. Regardless of the truth of this assessment, McKinley was able 
to use his predecessor’s policy as a base from which to take up his own course. Any pride 
that Cleveland may have taken from this, however, was undoubtedly marred by the 
subsequent course of events which saw the declaration of war against Spain, the 
dispatching of American troops to Cuba, and the eventual annexation of the Philippines, 
Guam and Puerto Rico. The knowledge that many members of his own party were loudly 
applauding some, if not all, of these developments left a bitter taste.
                                                 
116
 Grover Cleveland to Richard Olney, November 11, 1897, Reel 59, Richard Olney Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 
117
 Grover Cleveland to Richard Olney, February 16, 1898, Reel 59, Richard Olney Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 
206 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Foreign policy was not a priority for Grover Cleveland when he returned to the 
Executive Mansion on March 4, 1893. His first term in office had demonstrated that he 
was a domestic-minded president and the ever-increasing financial calamity afflicting the 
United States in 1893 ensured that there would be no shortage of domestic problems that 
would require his attention. While Cleveland might have preferred to have devoted the 
entirety of his second term in office to dealing with these domestic problems, a series of 
incidents in global affairs provided constant distraction. The fact that Cleveland felt 
obliged to involve the United States in these incidents is indicative of the nation’s growing 
stature as a world power and the breadth of its interests and contacts overseas, but it also 
refutes any suggestion that Cleveland himself was purely an isolationist. Although his 
opposition to American imperialism would remain unwavering until his death, he was not 
himself purely in favour of isolation and much of the administration’s foreign policy would 
be decidedly internationalist in its attempts to formulate new frameworks through which 
international disputes might be resolved through methods short of war. Despite these 
views, however, the formulation of foreign policy was still a decidedly ad hoc affair and, 
while the same might be said for much of the administration’s domestic policy as well, it is 
clear that domestic issues held priority. It is somewhat ironic then, that Cleveland’s 
domestic troubles would ultimately leave him so bereft of support that foreign relations 
became the only area in which executive authority remained largely undiminished, if not 
unchallenged. Perhaps as a result of this repudiation, or out of concern at the growing 
jingoism in American politics and the press evidenced during the Cuban revolution, it was 
only in his final months as President that Cleveland sought to put forward a definitive 
statement of his vision for the future of U.S. foreign policy. That said, his conduct of 
foreign policy during the preceding three years evidenced clear themes of legalism, 
morality, and even exceptionalism – in terms of the belief that the United States should 
hold itself to a higher standard than the great powers of Europe – which were the central 
planks of this framework for the formulation of policy. In each of the series of foreign 
policy incidents that took place between March 1893 and February 1897 he attempted to 
put these ideas into practice and, in so doing, to set out a template for policymakers in the 
future. 
 This template came about due to factors – the growth of American industry and 
commerce, the rise of jingoist sentiment in the American public and the press – which have 
been identified and debated for decades, but Cleveland’s policy itself has been largely 
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overlooked. In a time of profound change it is easy to dismiss Cleveland as the last of the 
old guard of 19
th
 Century presidents who enacted policy based on limited interaction with 
the rest of the world because the nation did not have the power or influence to enact any 
other. For Cleveland the creation of a policy based around legality and moral justice was a 
matter of choice, as much rejecting the possibility of a more active policy as embracing a 
limited one. Cleveland and his Secretaries of State recognised the changing place of the 
United States in global affairs and aimed to produce a new form of foreign policy which 
acknowledged and made use of that newfound power without fundamentally abandoning 
what they perceived as the nation’s mission. Perhaps due to the failure of the legalist 
template to outlast Cleveland’s presidency, its distinctiveness has not been previously 
acknowledged by historians who have tended to either justify Cleveland’s actions as part 
of a larger policy movement the entire late 19
th
 Century period or dismiss them entirely. 
 
 The second Cleveland administration’s first involvement in foreign affairs began 
even before the inauguration with the revolution against the native monarchy in Hawaii. 
The stance taken by the president and Secretary of State Gresham set the tone for all the 
incidents that followed: a principled insistence that the United States should not interfere in 
the internal affairs of sovereign nations and that it should not seek to profit from such 
unauthorised actions even if they had proven successful. It also, however, demonstrated the 
limits to which the administration was willing to go in order to uphold its principled stance 
and, ultimately, showed that pragmatism – in the form of recognition of the Hawaiian 
Republic – would be the final resort if confronted by an unyielding opponent. Similarly, 
the administration’s tentative efforts to extricate the United States from its commitments in 
Samoa demonstrated a personal wish from Cleveland and Gresham that they might reduce 
American entanglements abroad, but ultimately proved fruitless. In perhaps the only 
serious attempt to enact a policy they had desired before the inauguration, lack of political 
and popular support – and a somewhat half-hearted approach from the administration – 
meant the attempt to extricate the United States from its commitments in Samoa made little 
headway.  
The Brazilian Naval Revolt set out a framework for how the administration would 
approach foreign conflicts which affected American interests without directly involving the 
United States’ itself. Specifically it declared that the United States would seek to remain 
neutral regardless of its interests (although in the case of Brazil the status quo appeared to 
favour those interests) and only operate within the limits of international law. This policy 
was confirmed during the Sino-Japanese War in which the administration resisted the 
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urgings of popular opinion to back Japan and the appeals of other powers to work with 
them to create a settlement that would be mutually beneficial. In both Brazil and the Sino-
Japanese War the administration also balanced the calls of American business to protect 
trade and the temptation to exploit the situation for commercial gain with their desire to act 
in a manner which they considered to be both legally and morally right. That said, by 
seeking in both conflicts to maintain the status quo ante as far as was possible Cleveland 
and Gresham were to a large extent still acting on behalf of American business even if their 
scruples regarding direct intervention overseas meant that they rejected any opportunity to 
actively seek to obtain new markets or more favourable trade deals. Similarly, while the 
administration’s actions in offering American good offices in order to help bring about a 
peace treaty between China and Japan are evidence of the moral basis to their policy 
previously seen in Hawaii, it might also be suggested that these efforts ensured that the 
situation in China remained stable enough to facilitate American trade while also 
generating good will with both powers which might subsequently generate commercial 
benefits which did not contradict the president’s scruples over intervention in the affairs of 
another nation. While Cleveland resisted any suggestion of acquiring an area of American 
influence in China the United States’ actions were consistent with his belief in free trade 
and the power of U.S. industry to compete effectively in the international marketplace. 
Closer to home, the Brazilian Naval Revolt had already shown hints of concern at 
the prospect of European interference in the affairs of American nations and this played a 
role firstly in Nicaragua and then, more forcefully, in the administration’s actions over the 
Venezuelan Border Dispute. Events in Nicaragua demonstrated both Cleveland’s desire to 
limit direct U.S. involvement in the affairs of other nations and also his readiness to accept 
limited European intervention if it was justified by international law – possibly due to the 
recognition that any failure to uphold the law might lead to more damaging interference on 
a larger scale. They also demonstrated that there was no desire within the Cleveland 
administration to push for the construction of a trans-isthmian canal. By comparison with 
Nicaragua the Venezuelan Border Dispute saw the abandoning of cautious diplomacy, but 
this may have given a false impression of the Cleveland administration’s intentions. 
Regardless of how the dispute came to a head the real aim of American involvement was to 
protect Venezuela from European encroachment and, by so doing, defend the Monroe 
Doctrine. While the dispute can be seen as evidence of an increased assertiveness in 
foreign affairs, the administration’s intentions were to uphold the law and shield American 
nations from European interference, not to expand American control in the region.  
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Finally, the Cuban revolution of 1895 exposed the limits of the administration’s 
legal and moral framework for foreign policymaking to manage events or bring about a 
settlement to an intractable problem without direct interference. In an area of great interest 
to American business and to the American public the administration proved itself to be 
incapable of exerting the necessary influence to protect American interests or end the 
suffering of the Cuban population. Similarly, the Cleveland administration’s muted 
response to the attacks on Christians in the Ottoman Empire exposed the inconsistency of a 
policy which simultaneously sought to uphold the values of morality and legality while 
minimising American involvement in the affairs of other nations and the Old World in 
particular. 
 
 While the failure to produce a satisfactory outcome to the crises in the Ottoman 
Empire did not prove costly to the United States in material terms, it did prove costly to the 
Cleveland administration in terms of public opinion. While gauging public opinion in an 
age before polling is extremely difficult it is still possible to gain an understanding of the 
interest of the public in each of these incidents through various means. In particular, while 
the question of whether the press has the power to form public opinion or merely to reflect 
it is one that has been the subject of long debate, it seems clear that the events in which the 
American press showed the greatest interest were, in one form or another, also of interest 
to the general public. Just as importantly as gauging public opinion directly, it is also 
possible to discern changes in the administration’s attitude toward the cultivation and 
manipulation of that opinion, from early optimism to final resignation. Cleveland and 
Gresham entered office with the belief that “public opinion [was] made and controlled by 
the thoughtful men of the country”, but over time this belief was challenged by the rise of 
jingoism and the power of the press until the point was reached where the administration’s 
actions in Cuba were conducted in the hope that, at best, a silent majority would prove to 
be in favour and that, at worst, history would judge their course to be the right one.
1
 The 
strength of public interest varied depending on the area of the foreign policy incident in 
question and the drama surrounding it. There was little press interest in the Brazilian Naval 
Revolt since it involved relatively few American interests and, more importantly, occurred 
in a region which was of little interest to the majority of Americans. Brazil and the United 
States may have shared a hemisphere, but it lacked the immediacy of events in Mexico or 
the Caribbean. By comparison, while the Sino-Japanese War was a conflict that took place 
in a distant land, between alien peoples, the longstanding American fascination with East 
                                                 
1
 Walter Q. Gresham to Carl Schurz, October 6, 1893, Reel 2, Walter Quintin Gresham Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 
210 
 
Asian culture, and the decades-old dream of China’s markets, combined with the 
excitement of an international war to provoke greater interest from both press and public. 
Although the administration’s approach to the Sino-Japanese War was little different to 
their approach to the Brazilian Naval Revolt – both being mainly characterised by an 
insistence on maintaining neutrality even if China and Japan received the benefit of 
American good offices in achieving a peace settlement where the Brazilian rebels received 
nothing – the vast difference in public interest made it necessary to take steps to stop 
American businesses selling arms to the warring parties and even to discourage American 
citizens volunteering to fight for Japan. 
 Cleveland demonstrated his ability to inspire popular support during the 
Venezuelan Border Dispute when his special message to Congress of December 17, 1895, 
produced a wave of support for his strong stance against Great Britain. If this was an 
attempt to play to the gallery, however, it was not one which he would repeat during the 
remainder of his term; while it is impossible to judge his intentions, it seems likely that this 
unleashing of jingoistic opinion was an unintended – or at least underestimated – 
consequence of a momentary rashness born out of frustration. If Cleveland did truly aim to 
use a public mood of which he himself deeply disapproved in order to achieve what he 
believed to be a just objective, then it would appear that he was sufficiently unnerved by 
the forces unleashed to ever attempt it again and his later actions were almost studious in 
their refusal to bow to popular pressure. 
 In his handling of the Armenian massacres between 1894 and 1896 Cleveland once 
again rejected the calls of the press and Congress – as well as missionary societies – to 
intervene in what he perceived to be a European matter. These events showed that the 
American press were becoming increasingly interested in humanitarian issues, but also 
demonstrated that, fundamentally, Cleveland still had sufficient support to justify his 
reluctance to involve the United States in affairs of the Old World. Any satisfaction he may 
have gained from this, however, must have been of little comfort when the Armenian crisis 
was subsumed by the unfolding situation in Cuba in 1895 and 1896. In their handling of 
Cuba it is clear that Cleveland and Olney were fully prepared to act in the manner which 
they believed to be correct in spite of public opinion. While to some extent admirable 
leadership, this refusal to intervene in events which combined both drama and immediacy 
left the administration isolated and besieged by the press and Congress while not providing 
any concrete course of action that might have brought the conflict to an end. The 
administration may have been guilty of a failure to fully educate the public of their 
intentions and objectives, but it is highly unlikely that better information would have 
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produced a swell of support. This is not to say that Cleveland was completely bereft of 
popular or media support in 1896 – in a nation strongly divided along both partisan and 
regional lines his policies would always find some element of support, a fact illustrated by 
the letters of support which appear in the Cleveland Papers after every major decision – 
but, with the Republican party and press implacably opposed to almost any move he made, 
the failure to carry significant support from his own party outside the North East eventually 
robbed him of political capital. Somewhat ironically, the administration’s own actions in 
raising the Monroe Doctrine in the public consciousness may have helped to undermine its 
position in Cuba by creating a popular sentiment strongly opposed to any move seen as 
facilitating the extension of European colonialism. Ultimately, though, Cleveland was able 
to maintain a rigid adherence to his chosen position because, in the wake of his repudiation 
by his own party, he had nothing to lose. That said, there is little evidence that public 
opinion would have prompted him to change a position which he believed to be mandated 
by international law, while it should be remembered that, in the end, it was domestic 
factors that played the deciding role in destroying Cleveland’s standing in the Democratic 
Party, not his international policies. 
 
 The increasing public interest in how the United States conducted itself in world 
affairs was bound up in a range of factors which stemmed from – and helped to fuel – the 
nation’s rise to the position of a world power. As a growing industrial economy devoured 
more raw materials and demanded new markets for its products, the United States found 
itself with commercial interests and citizens in an ever-increasing number of far-flung 
locations, all demanding some measure of protection by the government. The expansion of 
the navy in order to facilitate the protection of these commercial interests led to the 
problem of fuelling and supplying warships around the world and raised the possibility – 
largely, but not entirely, rejected by Cleveland – of acquiring bases in strategic locations 
which would then themselves require protection. The United States’ economic power also 
served to create foreign policy problems, with the revolutions in both Hawaii and Cuba 
being directly related to changes to U.S. tariffs; a clear sign that the nation was now 
incapable of remaining a passive observer of world affairs. Meanwhile the century-old 
tradition of American missionary evangelism continued, placing more American men and 
women in situations of serious potential danger. All of these factors combined to give the 
United States a direct stake in far more incidents – a few of which American interests 
played a direct role in creating – in a much more diverse variety of places with public 
demand for action – fuelled by the increasingly powerful press – ensuring that problems 
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could not simply be ignored. All things considered, Cleveland and his cabinet acquitted 
themselves well to the series of problems with which they were presented. Despite 
following a largely reactionary policy the administration succeeded in its primary goals of 
protecting American lives overseas, avoiding unnecessary entanglements, preventing 
increased European interference in the Americas, and not being sucked into any conflict. 
Secondary goals such as the moral duty to help resolve the Sino-Japanese War could also 
been seen as a success although there were also humanitarian failures in Turkey and Cuba. 
These latter two cases were the result of the administration’s successful efforts not to 
interfere in the internal affairs of other nations, but correspondence of Cleveland and Olney 
suggests that neither man was entirely satisfied with upholding principle in the face of 
human suffering.  
Cuba also marks the major failure of another of the administration’s key priorities: 
the protection of American property overseas. While the rigid adherence to conservative 
principles served the administration well for the most part, it proved to be fundamentally 
flawed when it came to protecting American property in Cuba due to the inability of the 
Spanish government to fulfil its own obligations. Indeed, it could be argued that the 
Cleveland administration’s greatest foreign policy successes came from its rare moments 
of activism: the actions of the U.S.S. Detroit in Rio de Janeiro harbour – which were not 
directly orchestrated by Washington – and the firm intervention in the Venezuelan Border 
Dispute. This raises a question as to whether the fundamental successes of the 
administration’s policy were indeed a result of that policy or simply an inevitable 
consequence of the United States’ circumstances as a new world power. While Cleveland’s 
minimalist handling of the incidents in Brazil and Nicaragua produced the desired result to 
such an extent that his actions might reasonably be called adroit, the failure to bring about 
his preferred solution in Hawaii, and inability to create any form of settlement in Cuba 
suggest that more assertive action was necessary. In Brazil and Nicaragua European 
powers were willing to acknowledge the United States’ passive regional authority – at least 
to the extent of not attempting to interfere in New World affairs directly – while in the 
Venezuelan Border Dispute Great Britain showed itself to be willing to acknowledge, at 
least tacitly, that same regional authority in order to allow it to focus on more pressing 
matters in Europe and Asia. Throughout the administration’s time in office the question of 
European interference was a constant factor, being seen in Hawaii, Brazil, China, 
Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba. In Hawaii, Venezuela, and Cuba direct warnings of 
varying degrees of hostility were made to European powers that the United States would 
not look kindly upon any attempt to interfere in events which were perceived to be within 
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American jurisdiction. Significantly, while little idea was given of the potential 
consequences of ignoring these warnings (with the partial exception of the Venezuelan 
Border Dispute), none of the European powers considered it wise to risk a challenge. 
In this way Cleveland, placed in a strong position by burgeoning U.S. power and 
the increasingly complex situation in Europe can be argued to have been playing with the 
deck stacked in his favour. That said, increased assertiveness in itself could not be said to 
have been a magic bullet; the administration was also frustrated in its more activist efforts 
to alter the United States’ involvement with other world powers, firstly in the failure to 
extricate the nation from its agreements in Samoa, and secondly in the failure to promote 
an internationalist system of legal resolution of disputes through the General Arbitration 
Treaty. In these cases a more active stance was not backed with public or political support. 
Overall, therefore, while the administration might be accused of not fully exploiting a 
geopolitical and strategic situation which strongly favoured the United States to achieve 
their aims, the fact that those aims did not always carry the support of either the American 
electorate or, perhaps more significant, that of Congress meant that such achievement was 
always going to be limited. In addition, it should be noted that this increased national 
power carried an unexpected price in the form of a growing willingness of other nations to 
seek to court – and even to exploit – the United States’ support in their disputes with 
European powers. This issue, while not a new one in the 1890s, was particularly evident in 
the incidents in Nicaragua and Venezuela and one of the administration’s minor successes 
came in establishing a clear policy which protected American nations against arbitrary 
European interference while insisting that those same nations lived up to their 
responsibilities. Cleveland, Gresham and Olney had notable success in reaffirming the 
United States’ authority over the Americas – even if that authority was exercised by them 
in a profoundly passive manner – and otherwise maintained a principled foreign policy 
which had limited goals and, for the most part, achieved them. As with so many other 
Cleveland policies, however, it could be argued that this strong stance formed the basis for 
the more assertive Caribbean policies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. 
 
 While it would be wrong to say that Cleveland had no interest in foreign affairs, it 
is clear that his first priority throughout his second term in office was battling the nation’s 
economic troubles. While these efforts occasionally had bearing on foreign relations – 
tariff reform in particular – there is no evidence to suggest that foreign policy was ever 
enlisted to attempt to combat the economic depression. Cleveland acted repeatedly to 
protect American commerce and its assets overseas, but efforts to expand trade were 
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largely rhetorical. This being the case, it is somewhat ironic that, by the summer of 1896, 
Cleveland’s failures in handling these domestic issues – and the severe loss of political 
capital involved in passing the Wilson-Gorman Tariff and the government bond issues – 
had left him so bereft of political support that foreign policy was virtually the only area in 
which he had freedom of action. Indeed, one significant success of Cleveland’s foreign 
policy was in maintaining that presidential control of foreign policy. Olney’s actions in 
bluntly rejecting any notion of Congress’ right to dictate aspects of foreign policy to the 
President may have been something of a pyrrhic victory at the time – given that one reason 
why Congress retreated was that Cleveland was entering his final months in office and had 
lost so much political credibility that there was little to be gained by attacking him – but it 
can be seen as a significant event in the creation of the imperial presidency. While Olney’s 
defence of presidential authority did nothing to enlarge the powers of the office, it did 
confirm the primacy of the executive in foreign affairs, thus paving the way for the more 
expansive interpretations of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. 
 Given this disinterest in foreign policy matters it is perhaps surprising that 
Cleveland could be said to have set out a template for the United States’ approach to 
foreign affairs in a changing world. In this vein, it is important to recognise the distinction 
between template and grand strategy. Cleveland undoubtedly held strong views about how, 
when, and where the United States should conduct itself in world affairs, but the template 
his administration created had little to do with specifics. The Cleveland template set out a 
foundation of legal rights and obligations, like the observation of neutrality in foreign 
disputes, and a recognition (and defence) of certain key pseudo-legal principles such as the 
Monroe Doctrine while also going some way towards promoting peaceful methods of 
conflict resolution, most notably arbitration. It should be particularly noted that the 
template was not a coherent project throughout Cleveland’s second term, but instead came 
together on an ad hoc basis as each new crisis was addressed. Indeed it might be argued 
that the template was only promoted to the public as the best course for American policy in 
future after the repudiation of the administration at the Democratic National Convention in 
1896. Undoubtedly some elements were intended to lay the foundations for future policy. 
The General Arbitration Treaty was negotiated with a clear hope that it might be an 
example to other nations and in February, 1896, Olney persuaded Congress to appropriate 
the necessary funds to produce a new digest of international law for the nation.
2
 It was only 
in regards to the Cuban problem, however, that Cleveland specifically suggested the 
direction that American foreign policy should take after his departure from office. 
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 Of course, Cleveland’s template did not form the foundation to American foreign 
policy that he may have hoped. Having retired to Princeton, New Jersey, after leaving 
office, the former president became something of a political outsider, expressing 
disappointment – often to Olney, who remained a close friend – with both his Republican 
successor and his former colleagues in the Democratic Party. It was a situation that 
frustrated him, at one point writing that “... I have an idea that there are not many people 
who care to hear from me at this time. That’s why I stay at home and mope.”3 While in the 
immediate aftermath of leaving office Cleveland was able to inform Olney that he was “on 
the whole much gratified by the apparent conviction among the people, that the new 
administration after all could find but little to amend” in American policy toward Cuba, his 
battle between hope and scepticism is illustrated by an extract from a letter to Olney in the 
summer of 1897 which stated: 
Did you ever see such a preposterous thing as the Hawaiian business? The papers I 
read are mostly strongly opposed to it and there ought to be soberness and decency 
enough in the Senate to save us from launching upon the dangerous policy which is 
foreshadowed by the pending treaty; but I am prepared for almost anything.
4
 
 
Cleveland’s bitterness at the manner of his departure from office is similarly displayed by 
another letter to Olney two months later in which he denounced “the silly exhibition our 
government is making in its conduct of foreign affairs,” before declaring: 
I am willing however to confess to enough of the “old Adam”, to feel a little bit of 
satisfaction in a situation that crowds this bitter dose down the throats of the dirty 
liars who attempted so hard to decry and depreciate your dignified, decent and 
proper management of our foreign relations. 
The present administration must soon find that the Executive Department 
cannot drift through public duty on a wave of applause and adulation and that the 
day comes when popular tickling and humbug will not do.
5
 
 
By February, 1898, Cleveland was happy to note that, in his opinion, “popular sentiment 
seems to be vindicating our ideas on certain unfinished public business” such as Hawaii 
and even Cuba, but he also noted, rather mournfully, that “[a]s parties are now organised 
however neither side is inclined to even whisper approbation of our work.”6 Any good 
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cheer was dashed by the declaration of war against Spain. While he did not accuse 
President McKinley of anything worse than “amiable weakness”, he declared it to be “the 
old story of good intentions and motives sacrificed to false considerations of complaisance 
and party harmony.”7 He also specifically took issue with the “strut” of both Fitzhugh Lee 
and Theodore Roosevelt and feared the consequences of siding with the “inhuman and 
barbarous cut-throats” among the Cuban insurgents. Typically, he took refuge in the hope 
that: 
we shall find Spain so weak and inefficient that the war will be short and that the 
result may not be much worse than a depreciation of national standing before the 
world abroad, and at home - - demoralization of our peoples [sic] character, much 
demagogy and humbug, great additions to our public burdens and the exposure of 
scandalous operations. 
 
In the event, he would be disappointed in this hope, being prompted by the acquisition of 
the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico to join the Anti-Immigration League, referring to 
the annexation of Hawaii as an “outrage”, and bitterly bemoaning the actions of the 
American army against Filipino rebels before noting “anybody who says this is not a 
Christian nation or that our President is not the very pink of perfection of a Christian, is a 
liar and an un-American knave.”8 
 Cleveland’s disappointment with the Democratic Party would be, if anything, 
greater than that with McKinley’s foreign policy – not least because he believed 
McKinley’s conduct of foreign affairs, among other things, meant that he could be beaten. 
He despaired of the still divided Party being able to put up a strong challenge and his 
lingering anger at his treatment in 1896 is evident from his declaration almost three years 
later that “I am afraid [the Party] will never be in winning condition until we have had a 
regular knockdown fight among ourselves, and succeeded in putting the organization in 
democratic hands and reviving democratic principles in our platform.”9 Personally, though, 
he had little confidence of such an outcome, stating: 
I don’t believe our people, notwithstanding the disgust the Administration is 
breeding, are ready to accept Bryan and the Chicago platform and if they are, what 
comfort is there in that for decent, sound, democrats? 
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He saw no reason to predict anything other than another Bryan candidacy in 1900, and he 
would be right. By the summer of 1900 his response to a suggestion that he should run for 
President again was bitter: “Let them that got into this scrape, get out of it.”10 
  
  The 1890s was the last time when it could be said that the foreign policy of the 
United States was directed by only a handful of men. Subsequently, the spreading of 
American commerce and the acquisition of overseas territories necessitated an increase in 
both the size and the professionalism of the State Department and the diplomatic corps as a 
whole. Having grown to become a great power, the United States needed a bureaucracy 
capable of handling its newfound responsibilities. While this professional bureaucracy did 
produce the welcome effect for government of having more reliable and better qualified 
representatives overseas in greater numbers – an increasing number of whom would be 
contactable by telegraph – thus making flights of individualist foreign policymaking much 
less common than had been the case in the 19
th
 Century, it also increased the complexity in 
foreign policy formulation making any final policy less clearly the work of any one person 
or group of people. American enthusiasm for international involvement would fluctuate 
over the next half century – when the Second World War and its aftermath would 
comprehensively change the manner in which foreign policy was created – the machinery 
of government would always be larger and more complex than that of the 1890s. In many 
respects, however, the possibility for a political elite to control American foreign policy 
was already coming to an end in the1890s as business interests and the press exerted an 
ever-increasing influence on policy. As events in Brazil in 1893-94 and Nicaragua in 1894-
95 indicated, American business interests served to provide an extra dimension to U.S. 
involvement in foreign crisis. Similarly, the response of American business to the Sino-
Japanese War demonstrated that old dreams of Far Eastern markets were still very much 
alive, while the enthusiasm for a trans-isthmian canal confirmed the existence of a 
widespread belief that the Pacific offered a new marketplace to be exploited. Perhaps more 
importantly, events of Cleveland’s second term demonstrated the changing disposition of 
the public and the press. Whether the press is considered to reflect public opinion or to 
shape it – or some combination of the two – it is clear from the reaction to the 
administration’s policies in relation to Armenia and Cuba that the popular mood was 
increasingly in favour of an active American involvement in world affairs. In an early 
manifestation of what would a century later be termed the ‘CNN effect’ the revolution in 
communications technology allowed the press to provide the public with daily coverage of 
                                                 
10
 Grover Cleveland to Richard Olney, June 25, 1900, Reel 59, Richard Olney Papers, Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 
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events taking place thousands of miles away thus generating greater interest both in the 
specific events in question and in the wider world generally. With a domestic political 
arena divided by lines of both party and region – and including highly opinionated figures 
such as Senators John Tyler Morgan of Alabama and Henry Cabot Lodge of 
Massachusetts, both of whom pursued agendas beyond the limits of party loyalty – 
Congress too expressed a strong interest in foreign affairs. All this combined to place 
considerably greater pressure on the President and the Secretary of State to alter their 
foreign policy. Cleveland may have bemoaned the decision to go to war with Spain as a 
failure for the nation, but it seems doubtful that even he would have been able to withstand 
the pressure to act that emanated from Congress, the press, and the public after the 
destruction of the Maine in Havana harbour. 
 This growing power of non-governmental influences on foreign policy would 
undermine Cleveland’s new template for American foreign policy, but it would not be the 
ultimate cause of its downfall. By comparison with the disastrous loss of support for the 
administration’s domestic policies even the refusal to act in Cuba was only charged as a 
secondary failing. That said, the failure to harness the power of the press and public 
opinion in support of the legalist template was a major reason why it did not long survive 
under the McKinley administration. While it might be argued that Cleveland’s basic 
approach to affairs in Cuba proved to be a useful foundation to McKinley’s own policy, 
there was little that could be done to avoid war as events spiralled out of control. Just as 
damaging, the failure to generate public support for the General Arbitration Treaty – the 
most concrete element of Cleveland’s legacy – before leaving office meant that there was 
little opposition to the Senate’s rejection of the treaty. 
 In the final analysis, the effort by Cleveland, Gresham, and Olney to provide a new 
direction for United States’ foreign policy was a noble one, but doomed to failure from the 
beginning. While the template came into being through a series of ad hoc decisions, it 
developed in an essentially coherent manner throughout the term, and by 1896 had clearly 
become a matter of some importance to a President alarmed at the rising jingoist sentiment 
in Congress and the press. It would be this changing public opinion that ensured that the 
legalist approach to foreign policy did not survive the Cleveland administration’s 
devastating eviction from office in March, 1897, with the United States adopting a very 
different course of colonial acquisition and military intervention shortly afterwards. For a 
brief period a handful of policymakers had been able to formulate and enact a new 
approach to foreign policy, but ultimately the same forces that had combined to make that 
new approach necessary combined to reject it.
219 
 
Primary Sources 
 
Documentary Sources 
 Carl Schurz Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 
 Grover Cleveland Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington 
D.C. 
 Richard Olney Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 
 Walter Quintin Gresham Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington D.C. 
 Foreign Relations of the United States Collection 1892-1898 
 
Published Collections 
 Nevins, Allan, Letters of Grover Cleveland, 1850-1908, (Cambridge, Ma.: The 
Riverside Press, 1933) 
 
Memoirs 
 Cleveland, Grover, Presidential Problems, (New York: The Century Co., 1904, 
reprint Boston, Ma.: Elibron Classics, 2005) 
 Gilder, Richard Watson, Grover Cleveland: A Record of Friendship, (New York: 
The Century Co., 1910) 
 Parker, George F., Recollections of Grover Cleveland, (New York: The Century 
Co., 1909) 
 
Articles 
 Alvarez, Segundo, ‘The Situation in Cuba’, The North American Review, Vol. 161, 
Issue 466, (September, 1895), pp. 362-365 
 Bryce, James, ‘British Feeling on the Venezuelan Question’, The North American 
Review, Vol. 162, Issue 471, (February, 1896), pp. 145-153 
 Carnegie, Andrew, ‘The Venezuelan Question’, The North American Review, Vol. 
162, Issue 471, (February, 1896), pp. 129-144 
 Davis, Cushman K., ‘Two Years of Democratic Diplomacy’, The North American 
Review, Vol. 160, Issue 460, (March, 1895) 
 Doane, William Croswell, ‘Follies and Horrors of War’, The North American 
Review, Vol. 162, Issue, 471, (February, 1896), pp. 190-194 
220 
 
 Gray, George, ‘Two Years of American Diplomacy’, The North American Review, 
Vol. 160, Issue 461, (April, 1895), pp. 409-424 
 Hazeltine, Mayo W., ‘What Should Be Done About Cuba?’, The North American 
Review, Vol. 163, Issue 481, (December, 1896), pp. 731-742 
 Heard, Augustine, Stevens, D.W., and Martin, Howard, ‘China and Japan in 
Korea’, The North American Review, Vol. 159, Issue 454, (September, 1894), pp. 
300-321 
 Hearn, Lafcadio, ‘After the War’, The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 76, Issue 457, 
(November, 1895), pp. 599-605 
 Lodge, Henry Cabot, ‘England, Venezuela, and the Monroe Doctrine’, The North 
American Review, Vol. 160, Issue 463, (June, 1895), pp. 651-658 
 Schurz, Carl, ‘Manifest Destiny’, Harper’s New Monthly Magazine, Vol. 87, Issue 
521, (October, 1893), pp. 737-746 
 Southwick, George M., ‘Our Defenceless Coasts’, The North American Review, 
Vol. 162, Issue 472, (March, 1896), pp. 317-327 
 Wells, David A., ‘Great Britain and the United States: Their True Relations’, The 
North American Review, Vol. 162, Issue 473, (April, 1896), pp. 385-405 
 
Novels 
 Verne, Jules, Around the World in 80 Days, Trans. Michael Glencross, (London: 
Penguin Books, 2004, reprint 2011) 
 Wells, H.G., The War in the Air, (London: Penguin Books, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
221 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
 Algeo, Matthew, The President is a Sick Man, (Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 
2011) 
 Bailey, Thomas A., A Diplomatic History of the American People, Tenth Edition, 
(Eaglewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980) 
 Beale, Howard K., Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power, 
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956, reprint 1989) 
 Beard, Charles A. & Mary R., The Rise of American Civilization, Vol. II, pp. 170-
171 (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1927, reprint New York: The 
MacMillan Company,  1954) 
 Beisner, Robert L., From the Old Diplomacy to the New, 1865-1900, (New York: 
Thomas Y. Cromwell Company, 1975) 
 Benedict, Michael Les, ‘Law and the Constitution in the Gilded Age’, The Gilded 
Age: Perspectives on the Origins of Modern America, 2
nd
 Edition, (Lanham, MD.: 
Rowman and Littfield Publishers Ltd., 2007) pp. 333-351 
 Calhoun, Charles W., Benjamin Harrison, (New York: Times Books, 2005) 
----- Gilded Age Cato: The Life of Walter Q. Gresham, (Lexington, KY.: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 1988) 
----- From Bloody Shirt to Full Dinner Pail: The Transformation of Politics and 
Government in the Gilded Age, (New York: Hill and Wang, 2010) 
----- ‘American Policy Toward the Brazilian Naval Revolt of 1893-94: A 
Reexamination’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 4, No. 1, (1980) pp. 39-56 
----- ‘Introduction’, The Gilded Age: Perspectives on the Origins of Modern 
America, 2
nd
 Edition, (Lanham, MD.: Rowman and Littfield Publishers Ltd., 2007) 
pp. 1-9 
----- ‘Late Nineteenth Century Politics Revisited’, The History Teacher, Vol. 27, 
No. 3, (1994) pp. 325-337 
----- ‘The Political Culture: Public Life and the Conduct of Politics’, The Gilded 
Age: Perspectives on the Origins of Modern America, 2
nd
 Edition, (Lanham, MD.: 
Rowman and Littfield Publishers Ltd., 2007) pp. 239-264 
 Callcott, Wilfrid Hardy, The Caribbean Policy of the United States, 1890-1920, 
(New York: Octagon Books, 1966) 
 Campbell, Charles S., The Transformation of American Foreign Policy: 1865-
1900, (New York: Harper & Row, 1976) 
222 
 
 Carlson, W. Bernard, ‘Technology and America as a Consumer Society, 1870-
1900’, The Gilded Age: Perspectives on the Origins of Modern America, 2nd 
Edition, (Lanham, MD.: Rowman and Littfield Publishers Ltd., 2007) pp. 29-52 
 Collin, Richard H., Theodore Roosevelt, Culture, Diplomacy, and Expansion: A 
New View of American Imperialism, (Baton Rouge, LA.: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1985) 
 Crapol, Edward P., ‘Coming to Terms with Empire: The Historiography of Late 
Nineteenth-Century American Foreign Relations’, in Paths to Power: The 
Historiography of American Foreign Relations to 1941,  ed. Michael J. Hogan, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) pp. 79-116 
----- James G. Blaine: Architect of Empire, (Wilmington, DE.: Scholarly 
Resources, 2000) 
 Daniels, Roger, ‘The Immigrant Experience in the Gilded Age’, The Gilded Age: 
Perspectives on the Origins of Modern America, 2
nd
 Edition, (Lanham, MD.: 
Rowman and Littfield Publishers Ltd., 2007) pp. 75-99 
 DeSantis, Hugh, ‘The Imperialist Impulse and American Innocence, 1865-1900’, in 
American Foreign Relations, A Historiographical Review, ed. Gerald K. Haines 
and J. Samuel Walker, (London: Frances Pinter, 1981) pp. 65-90 
 Devine, Michael J., John W. Foster: Politics and Diplomacy in the Imperial Era, 
1873-1917, (Athens, OH.: Ohio University Press, 1981) 
 Divine, Robert A., and Others, The American Story, Third Edition, (New York: 
Pearson Longman, 2007) 
 Doenecke, Justus D., The Presidencies of James A. Garfield and Chester A. Arthur, 
(Lawrence, KA.: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1981) 
 Dorwart, Jeffery M., The Pigtail War: American Involvement in the Sino-Japanese 
War of 1894-1895, (Amherst, MA.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1975)  
 Eggert, Gerald G., Richard Olney: Evolution of a Statesman, (University Park, PA.: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1974) 
----- ‘Our Man in Havana: Fitzhugh Lee’, The Hispanic American Review, Vol. 47, 
No. 4, (1967) pp. 463-485 
 Field, Jr., James A., ‘American Imperialism: The Worst Chapter in Almost Any 
Book’, The American Historical Review, Vol. 83, No. 3, (1978) pp. 644-668 
----- Field, Jr., ‘American Imperialism: The Worst Chapter in Almost Any Book: 
Reply to Comments’, The American Historical Review, Vol. 83, No. 3, (1978) pp. 
679-683 
223 
 
 Ferguson, Niall, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire, (London: 
Penguin Books, 2005) 
 Foner, Philip S., History of the Labor Movement of the United States, Vol. II: From 
the Founding of the American Federation of Labor to the Emergence of American 
Imperialism, 2
nd
 Edition, (New York: International Publishers, 1975) 
 Fry, Joseph A., ‘Essay Review: William McKinley and the Coming of the Spanish-
American War: A Study of the Besmirching of an Historical Image’, Diplomatic 
History, Vol. 3, No. 1, (1979) pp. 77-97 
----- ‘John Tyler Morgan’s Southern Expansionism’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 9, 
No. 4, (1985) pp. 329-346 
----- ‘Phases of Empire: Late Nineteenth-Century U.S. Foreign Relations’, The 
Gilded Age: Perspectives on the Origins of Modern America, 2
nd
 Edition, (Lanham, 
MD.: Rowman and Littfield Publishers Ltd., 2007) pp. 307-332 
 Gott, Richard, Cuba: A New History, (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 2004) 
 Gould, Lewis L., ‘Party Conflict: Republicans versus Democrats, 1877-1901’, The 
Gilded Age: Perspectives on the Origins of Modern America, 2
nd
 Edition, (Lanham, 
MD.: Rowman and Littfield Publishers Ltd., 2007) pp. 265-282 
----- The Presidency of William McKinley, (Lawrence, KA.: The Regents Press of 
Kansas, 1980) 
----- ‘The Reick Telegram and the Spanish-American War: A Reappraisal’, 
Diplomatic History, Vol. 3, No. 2, (1979) pp. 193-199 
 Graff, Henry F., Grover Cleveland, (New York: Times Book, 2002) 
 Grenville J.A.S., and Young, George B., Politics, Strategy and American 
Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917, (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1966) 
 Hammett, Hugh B., ‘The Cleveland Administration and Anglo-American Naval 
Friction in Hawaii, 1893-94’, Military Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 1, (1976) pp. 27-32 
 Harrington, Fred H., ‘The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States, 1898-
1900’, The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 22, No. 2, (1935) pp. 211-
230 
 Harris, Christopher, ‘Edwin F. Atkins and the Evolution of United States Cuba 
Policy, 1894-1902’, The New England Quarterly, Vol. 78, No. 2, (2005) pp. 202-
231 
224 
 
 Healy, David, U.S. Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890s, (Madison, 
WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1970) 
 Herring, George C., From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 
1776, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) 
 Hobsbawm, Eric, The Age of Empire, 1875-1914, (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1987) 
 Hofstadter, Richard, ‘Cuba, the Philippines, and Manifest Destiny,’ The Paranoid 
Style in American Politics and Other Essays, (London: Johnathan Cape, 1966) pp. 
145-185 
 Hunt, Michael H., Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1987) 
 James, Henry, Richard Olney and His Public Service, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1923) 
 Jeffers, H. Paul, An Honest President: The Life and Presidencies of Grover 
Cleveland, (New York: HarperCollins, 2000) 
 Kagan, Robert, Dangerous Nation: America and the World, 1600-1898, (London: 
Atlantic Books, 2006) 
 Keller, Morton, Affairs of State: Public Life in Late Nineteenth Century America, 
(Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1977) 
 Kelley, Robert, ‘Presbyterianism, Jacksonianism and Grover Cleveland’, American 
Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 4, (1966) pp. 615-636 
 Kennedy, Paul, ‘Continuity and Discontinuity in British Imperialism, 1815-1914’, 
British Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century, (London: MacMillan Publishers 
Ltd., 1984) pp. 20-38 
----- The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military 
Conflict from 1500 to 2000, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990) 
----- The Samoan Tangle: A Study in Anglo-German-American Relations, 1878-
1900, (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1974) 
 Kiernan, V. G., America, the New Imperialism: From White Settlement to World 
Hegemony, (London: Zed Press, 1978) 
 Klinghard, Daniel, The Nationalization of American Political Parties, 1880-1896, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
 LaFeber, Walter, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 
1860-1898, (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1963) 
225 
 
----- The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Vol. II: The American 
Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993) 
----- ‘The Background of Cleveland’s Venezuela Policy: A Reinterpretation’, The 
American Historical Review, Vol. 66, No. 4, (1961) pp. 947-967 
----- ‘The Constitution and U.S. Foreign Policy: An Interpretation’, The Journal of 
American History, Vol. 74, No. 3, The Consitution and American Life: A Special 
Issue, (1987) pp. 695-717 
 LaFeber, Walter, and Beisner, Robert, ‘American Imperialism: The Worst Chapter 
in Almost Any Book: Comments’, The American Historical Review, Vol. 83, No. 3, 
(1978) pp. 669-678 
 Leopold, Richard W., The Growth of American Foreign Policy, A History, (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962) 
 Lewy, Guenter, The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed 
Genocide, (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2005) 
 Lindsey, Almont, The Pullman Strike: The Story of a Unique Experiment and of a 
Great Labour Upheaval, (Chicago: Phoenix Books, 1964) 
 Litwicki, Ellen M., ‘The Influence of Commerce, Technology, and Race on Popular 
Culture in the Gilded Age’, The Gilded Age: Perspectives on the Origins of Modern 
America, 2
nd
 Edition, (Lanham, MD.: Rowman and Littfield Publishers Ltd., 2007) 
pp. 187-209 
 Marks III, Frederick W., ‘Morality as a Drive Wheel in the Diplomacy of Theodore 
Roosevelt’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 2, No. 1, (1978) pp. 43-62 
 Mathews, Joseph J., ‘Informal Diplomacy in the Venezuelan Crisis of 1896’, The 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 52, No. 2, (1963), pp. 195-212 
 May, Ernest R., Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great 
Power, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961) 
 McWilliams, Tennant S., ‘Procrastination Diplomacy: Hannis Taylor and the 
Cuban Business Disputes, 1893-97’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 2, No. 1, (1978) pp. 
63-80 
 Mead, Walter Russell, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it 
Changed the World, (New York: Routledge, 2002) 
 Morgan, H. Wayne, From Hayes to McKinley: National Party Politics, 1877-1896, 
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1969) 
226 
 
 Morgan, William Michael, ‘The Anti-Japanese Origins of the Hawaiian Annexation 
Treaty of 1897’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 6, No. 1, (1982) pp. 23-44 
 Nevins, Allan, Grover Cleveland: A Study in Courage, (1932, reprint New York: 
Dodd, Mead & Company, 1966) 
 Ninkovich, Frank, Global Dawn: The Cultural Foundation of American 
Internationalism, 1865-1890, (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2009) 
----- The United States and Imperialism, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2001) 
 Nugent, Walter, Habits of Empire: A History of American Expansion, (New York: 
Vintage Books, 2009) 
 Oren, Michael B., Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to 
the Present, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2007) 
 Painter, Nell Irvin, Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877-1919, (New 
York: WW. Norton & Company, 1987, reprint New York: WW. Norton & 
Company, 2008) 
 Parker, Matthew, Panama Fever: The Battle to Build the Canal, (London: 
Hutchinson, 2007) 
 Perkins, Dexter, The Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907, (Johns Hopkins Press, 1937, 
reprint Gloucester, MA.: Peter Smith, 1966) 
 Pletcher,  David M., ‘Review’, Journal of American History, Vol. 62, No. 2, (1975) 
pp. 417-418 
------ ‘Rhetoric and Results: A Pragmatic View of American Economic Expansion, 
1865-98’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 5, No. 2, (1981) pp. 93-105 
 Porter, Glenn, ‘Industrialisation and the Rise of Big Business’, The Gilded Age: 
Perspectives on the Origins of Modern America, 2
nd
 Edition, (Lanham, MD.: 
Rowman and Littfield Publishers Ltd., 2007) pp. 11-27 
 Pratt, Julius W., A History of United States Foreign Policy, 2nd Edition, 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965) 
 Rappaport, Armin, A History of American Diplomacy, (New York: MacMillan 
Publishing, 1975) 
 Ritchie, Donald A., ‘Congress Confronts the Armenian Genocide’, America and the 
Armenian Genocide of 1915, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 
276-290 
 Schoultz, Lars, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin 
America, (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1998) 
227 
 
 Sexton, Jay, The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century 
America, (New York: Hill and Wang, 2011) 
 Silva, Noenoe K., Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American 
Colonization, (Durham NC and London: Duke University Press, 2004) 
 Stephanson, Anders, Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of 
Right, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995) 
 Sturgis, James, ‘Britain and the New Imperialism’, British Imperialism in the 
Nineteenth Century, (London: MacMillan Publishers Ltd., 1984) pp. 88-105 
 Tompkins, E. Berkeley, Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 
1890-1920, (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970) 
 Welch, Richard E., The Presidencies of Grover Cleveland, (Lawrence, KA: 
University Press of Kansas, 1988) 
 Wiebe, Robert H., The Search for Order, 1877-1920, (London: MacMillan and 
Company, 1967) 
 Williams, William Appleman, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, (New York: 
Dell Publishing, 1962) 
----- The Roots of the Modern American Empire, (New York: Vintage Books, 1970) 
 Zimmerman, Warren, First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made Their 
Country a World Power, (New York: Farrer, Straus and Giroux, 2002) 
 
